Anselm, Abelard, and Friends - Influences of Theories of Atonement

I think we have to keep in mind that theological development always addresses the contemporary. What I mean by this is that theology tries to answer the questions being asked.

People have argued, for example, that John Calvin did not hold to the doctrine of limited atonement. Technically, this is probably true. BUT the reason is not that Calvin rejected limited atonement either. The reason is that the issue of the scope of the Atonement was a post-Calvin issue.

It is a fact that no one prior to the Reformation held what is known today as the Theory of Penal Substitution. BUT that does not necessarily mean that those who held the elements advocates point to in ECF writings (both penal and substitutionary aspects have always been inherent in the Atonement) wouldn’t have affirmed the Theory had they been contemporary to our time.

You often turn to Trinitarian doctrines as an example of theory vs. doctrine. It is a good example here. The doctrine was developed over time. Does this mean that the Apostles would have rejected the Doctrine of the Trinity? No. But at the same time they did not affirm the Doctrine in the way that it became articulated (three coeternal hypostases; the relationship of perichoresis, eternal generation, etc.).

So looking back at what the Church believed prior to the Reformation really doesn’t prove or disprove the Theory of Penal Substitution. Was the basis of redemption, in their minds, God punishing sin by pouring His wrath upon Christ who took our punishment in our stead? Only if we ignore context and replace “them” with “us”. But they also did not think in the same terms as us. They were not subject to the same ideas, the same philosophies, and the same ideologies as the post-Enlightenment world. They had a different worldview. The contemporary questions their theologies addressed were not exactly the same contemporary questions we would address. We can say (without doubt) that they did not hold Penal Substitution Theory, but we cannot say that they would not have (or that this proves the Theory incorrect).

Which brings us back to Scripture and the necessity to first examine and prove our presuppositions (not only yours, but mine as well). In terms of Penal Substitution Theory it is up to you (to those who would defend the theory), not me (or those who oppose the theory), to make a case for retributive justice as divine justice. Likewise, when I defend my position it is up to me to justify those things that I would presuppose.

The reason I believe this to be true is that IF redemption is based on divine justice AND divine justice is retributive justice, then I see no logical disagreement with the Theory of Penal Substitution. If the presuppositions the Theory hold are correct, then there exists no grounds for disagreeing with the Theory because it is the only theory that addresses the Atonement in that context. So if I held to the Theory, my first priority would be to prove its presuppositions. If they are proven true then the argument is won.

 

I am sorry if it appeared I had ignored your question (it was directed to Martin, but Martin holds to Penal Substitution Theory). I was thinking about how best to explain.

As I am sure you are aware, there are different ideas about justice. Retributive justice is just one philosophy among many.

Let’s look at Abelard. Suppose you punch me in the nose. Under “a punch for a punch” rule I am justified in punching you in your nose and if I did the onlookers would say you got what was coming to you. But I would also be justified in forgiving you and foregoing hitting you back. This is akin to a Justinian concept which is not concerned with the moral quality of actions but rather with the protection of interests (there is no retributive requirement). Your crime (punching me in the noise) is between you and me (not against the “law”).

Now let’s look at retributive justice. For the same circumstance you punching me in the nose demands (under “a punch for a punch”) that you also be punched in the nose. I can forgive you, but that doesn’t matter. You broke a law. In order for the judge (or the presider over the law) to forgive the crime a punch must land.

This need for a punishment is what is referred to as “sin debt” (in the illustration). The judicial scale must be balanced in order for you to once again be considered just under the “punch for a punch” law.


Thomas Aquinas came up with the idea that one person may be punished for another as long as both are willing and a relationship exist. Your best friend can step in and be punished in your place. BUT this cannot be a punishment for the punch you threw (because in truth, your friend is innocent and it would be unjust to punish him for your crime). Your friend, however, can be punished with the fine of $100 which can satisfy the debt you owe to the law for punching me in the noise.

Now let’s look at a reformed view of Aquinas’ theory. Instead of your friend bearing punishment (satisfactory punishment) by paying $100, suppose the law demanded that that person be actually punched to balance the scale. A simple punishment is required (someone must be punched in the nose because that is the law – a punch for a punch). Not only that, but since the crime is against the law (not really against me personally but against justice itself) the purveyor of the law is the executioner of the law. The judge must punch someone in the nose in order to forgive you for punching me because your punch was ultimately a crime against the judge who represents the law.


The idea of a “sin debt” that must be paid before one can be forgiven does not exist except under the system of retributive justice.

Throughout most of the middle ages the idea of crime was a crime against a person, community, or group. There were no crimes against the law. Even in the Old Testament this is true. There are crimes against God (transgressors of God’s covenant, which was personal to His people), crimes against other people, and crimes against the community. But the law as an entity (how it is viewed under Penal Substitution Theory) is questionable. God says “don’t steal”. When you transgress that command (that law) you are not sinning against a set of rules but you are disobeying God Himself.

 

That's what you get out of my reply???!!

I don't. I am saying even Ninevah realized God was compassionate and able to forgive so they could escape the wrath to come (Jonah realized that too). They believed in a God who was Sovereign and who was able to rightfully forgive the sins of men.

They had a different worldview.

 

I never said that God has divine wrath that needs to be vented.

I explained (tried to explain) how a different view would negate the existence of "sin debt" and how another would depend upon such a thing.

Did you even read my reply?

 

This is called "retributive justice", and killing someone to satisfy the demand of the law is called "retributive punishment".

I am saying not everyone believes that divine justice (or justice at all) falls into this context.

 

If God has to vent His wrath towards men before He can forgive men then you have a point. If divine justice is retributive then Penal SubstitutionTheory is the top contender.

I do not believe the type of justice Penal Substitution Theory presupposes is correct.

So my answer is that God is able to forgive men because He is God. God does not have to account for sin. God does not let the guilty go free (there is forgiveness and a second act of creation 8n Christ).

Your questions have already been answered, Bro. Read what I have already written regarding "sin debt".

 

That is because we can't examine Scripture until we face the presuppositions (which was my point of the post you quoted). What good would it do for you to say "Jesus was made sin for us therefore the Theory of Penal Substitution is correct" and me to say "Jesus was made sin for us therefore the Theory is not correct"?

People need to stop pretending that inundating posts with Scripture lends clarity or evidence, especially in discussions like this where ALL agree on the passages yet disagree on their meaning.

In the past I asked you to prove that divine justice is an issue of retributive justice. You never could do that. Instead you posted passages that we both affirmed and asserted the "plain meaning" was the Penal Substitution Theory's definition. For me (other people are different, but for me) this is the first thing that has to be shown because it is the basis of Penal Substitution Theory.

We have to first look at our presuppositions and defend the extra-biblical context that we would bring into Scripture before we can go forward. Penal Substitution Theory brings a lot into Scripture but very rarely attempts to defend what it assumes.

Why do you believe divine justice falls within the context of retributive justice rather than another model (why not, for example, restorative justice, or Justinian)?

You assume that God cannot freely have mercy because of the type of justice that you presuppose on Scripture. Historically you are in a minority. So why should we accept your idea of justice as the biblical model of God's justice? Just because your idea is more popular in western thought now, and just because it is a more contemporary model.....what makes it right to interpret ancient texts?