Objections To The Supralapsarian.
But we object more particularly to the Supralapsarian scheme.
(a) That it is erroneous in representing God as having before His mind, as the objects of predestination, men conceived in posse only; and in making creation a means of their salvation or damnation. Whereas, an object must be conceived as existing, in order to have its destiny given to it. And creation can with no propriety be called a means for effectuating a decree of predestination as to creatures. It is rather a prerequisite of such decree.
(b.) It contradicts Scripture, which teaches us that God chose His elect "out of the world," John 15:19, and out of the "same lump" with the vessels of dishonor (Rom. 9:21). They were then regarded as being, along with the non–elect, in the common state of sin and misery.
(c.) Our election is in Christ our Redeemer (Eph. 1:4; 3:11), which clearly shows that we are conceived as being fallen, and in need of a Redeemer, in this act. And, moreover, our election is an election to the exercise of saving graces to be wrought in us by Christ (1 Pet. 1:2; 2 Thess. 2:13). (d.) Election is declared to be an act of mercy (Rom. 9:15 16, 11:5, 6), and preterition is an act of justice (Rom. 9:22). Now as mercy and goodness imply an apprehension of guilt and misery in their object, so justice implies ill-desert. This shows that man is predestined as fallen; and is not permitted to fall because predestined. I will conclude this part, by repeating the language of Turrettin, Loc. 4, Qu. 18, 5.
1. "By this hypothesis, the first act of God’s will towards some of His creatures is conceived to be an act of hatred, in so far as He willed to demonstrate His righteousness in their damnation, and indeed before they were considered as in sin, and consequently before they were deserving of hatred; nay, while they were conceived as still innocent, and so rather the objects of love. This does not seem compatible with God’s ineffable goodness.
2. "It is likewise harsh that, according to this scheme, God is supposed to have imparted to them far the greatest effects of love, out of a principle of hatred, in that He determines to create them in a state of integrity to this end, that He may illustrate His righteousness in their damnation. This seems to express Him neither as supremely good nor as supremely wise and just.
3. "It is erroneously supposed that God exercised an act of mercy and justice towards His creatures in His foreordination of their salvation and destruction, in that they are conceived as neither wretched, nor even existing as yet. But since those virtues (mercy and justice) are relative, they pre-suppose their object, do not make it.
4. "It is also asserted without warrant, that creation and the fall are means of election and reprobation, since they are antecedent to them: else sin would be on account of damnation, whereas damnation is on account of sin; and God would be said to have created men that He might destroy them."
I had a link but it doesn't work anymore. I had to cut and paste this from an old post from an old friend. I wish I still had access to Dabney's works online because he also objected to the infralapsarian view. He went into a lot of related stuff. He basically concluded that these are questions that we should not ask. I really liked Dabney's thinking here. He puts Scripture first. And he also said...
"The distinction is, like that of the Supralapsarian and Infralapsarian, an attempted over–refinement, which should never have been made, which explained nothing, and whose corollaries increased the difficulties of the subject."--Robert L. Dabney, Systematic Theology, Index Created by Christian Classics Foundation., electronic ed. based on the Banner of Truth 1985 ed. (Simpsonville SC: Christian Classics Foundation, 1996), 424.
If I'm reading between the lines correctly, I think what Dabney was saying, in layman's terms, was that the Supra - Infra debate (to put it bluntly), is a case of theologians liking the smell of their own gas.
What say you.
But we object more particularly to the Supralapsarian scheme.
(a) That it is erroneous in representing God as having before His mind, as the objects of predestination, men conceived in posse only; and in making creation a means of their salvation or damnation. Whereas, an object must be conceived as existing, in order to have its destiny given to it. And creation can with no propriety be called a means for effectuating a decree of predestination as to creatures. It is rather a prerequisite of such decree.
(b.) It contradicts Scripture, which teaches us that God chose His elect "out of the world," John 15:19, and out of the "same lump" with the vessels of dishonor (Rom. 9:21). They were then regarded as being, along with the non–elect, in the common state of sin and misery.
(c.) Our election is in Christ our Redeemer (Eph. 1:4; 3:11), which clearly shows that we are conceived as being fallen, and in need of a Redeemer, in this act. And, moreover, our election is an election to the exercise of saving graces to be wrought in us by Christ (1 Pet. 1:2; 2 Thess. 2:13). (d.) Election is declared to be an act of mercy (Rom. 9:15 16, 11:5, 6), and preterition is an act of justice (Rom. 9:22). Now as mercy and goodness imply an apprehension of guilt and misery in their object, so justice implies ill-desert. This shows that man is predestined as fallen; and is not permitted to fall because predestined. I will conclude this part, by repeating the language of Turrettin, Loc. 4, Qu. 18, 5.
1. "By this hypothesis, the first act of God’s will towards some of His creatures is conceived to be an act of hatred, in so far as He willed to demonstrate His righteousness in their damnation, and indeed before they were considered as in sin, and consequently before they were deserving of hatred; nay, while they were conceived as still innocent, and so rather the objects of love. This does not seem compatible with God’s ineffable goodness.
2. "It is likewise harsh that, according to this scheme, God is supposed to have imparted to them far the greatest effects of love, out of a principle of hatred, in that He determines to create them in a state of integrity to this end, that He may illustrate His righteousness in their damnation. This seems to express Him neither as supremely good nor as supremely wise and just.
3. "It is erroneously supposed that God exercised an act of mercy and justice towards His creatures in His foreordination of their salvation and destruction, in that they are conceived as neither wretched, nor even existing as yet. But since those virtues (mercy and justice) are relative, they pre-suppose their object, do not make it.
4. "It is also asserted without warrant, that creation and the fall are means of election and reprobation, since they are antecedent to them: else sin would be on account of damnation, whereas damnation is on account of sin; and God would be said to have created men that He might destroy them."
I had a link but it doesn't work anymore. I had to cut and paste this from an old post from an old friend. I wish I still had access to Dabney's works online because he also objected to the infralapsarian view. He went into a lot of related stuff. He basically concluded that these are questions that we should not ask. I really liked Dabney's thinking here. He puts Scripture first. And he also said...
"The distinction is, like that of the Supralapsarian and Infralapsarian, an attempted over–refinement, which should never have been made, which explained nothing, and whose corollaries increased the difficulties of the subject."--Robert L. Dabney, Systematic Theology, Index Created by Christian Classics Foundation., electronic ed. based on the Banner of Truth 1985 ed. (Simpsonville SC: Christian Classics Foundation, 1996), 424.
If I'm reading between the lines correctly, I think what Dabney was saying, in layman's terms, was that the Supra - Infra debate (to put it bluntly), is a case of theologians liking the smell of their own gas.
What say you.