Freedom/Foreknowledge and Molinism

Having discussed Ockhamism (I am not assuming that it has either been upheld or rejected), let's turn to another Arminian solution to God's exhaustive definite foreknowledge of the future and its compatibility with man's libertarian free will.

Molinism (or the Middle Knowledge defense) is named after a Spanish monk Luis de Molina, who came up with this intriguing solution.

The term middle knowledge stands in distinction to God's natural knowledge and free knowledge:

Natural knowledge: God's exhaustive knowledge of all possibilities (what could happen)

Free knowledge: God's exhaustive knowledge of all actualities: past, present, and future (what has, is, and will happen)

Middle Knowledge: God's exhaustive knowledge of the counterfactuals of free agents (what would happen if a libertarianly free agent is put in a certain situation).

This defense invokes possible world talk. Nothing too scary, it just poses that there are an infinite amount of possible worlds. A possible world is a logically consistent state of affairs. For instance, there is a possible world, W~BJ, where the only thing different between that world and the actual world is that I do not exist in W~BJ. Obviously, that would indeed be a sad world for everyone, but it is still possible. Molinism invokes possible world talk to show that God knows all possible worlds, and if they include libertarianly free agents, then God knows what they would do in each possible world.

There is debate among philosophers whether or not God exists in every possible world, but this defense does not depend on a conclusion on that matter. This defense does depend on God, "before" (you can use this defense whether God is eternal (timeless) or everlasting (sempiternal) He chose to create the actual world, choosing to create this world as opposed to many other possible worlds.

Among these possible worlds are many worlds that involve libertarianly free agents. God knows what these agents would do in any possible world. Since He has this middle knowledge, then He decides to create this world already knowing what the libertarianly free agents in this world would do in any situation. This is how they are still libertarianly free, but He already knows everything they will do. Libertarian free will is upheld as well as God's exhaustive foreknowledge of the future!

Critique: As I alluded to on the Ockham thread, my biggest issue with this defense is that is tries to sneak God's knowledge of what free agents WOULD do and make that equal to God's knowledge of what free agents WILL do. There is a tiny difference between the two, and that difference renders libertarian freedom in jeopardy with this defense. The difference is that if God's knowledge of what they WOULD do still means that they can do otherwise--then this does not count as knowledge, but as something else--beliefs (yes Wes, I am familiar with the general way that people use this word). This means that God may have some false beliefs and is not omniscient.

The Molinist could respond and say, no, God, through middle knowledge knows what WILL happen. Well, if that is the answer then we have gotten no where with this defense. How does He know what will happen, until they actually make decisions? He just does...or the ockhamist defense...etc.

The Molinist could also respond and say, no, God, through middle knowledge, knows what COULD happen. Well, then my first point of critique applies and God's omniscience and foreknowledge are rather shaky since He could be wrong.

I hope this was fair to both sides and that this will invoke some good discussions instead of stock rhetoric and semantic issues.

For those interested in more on Molinism see William Lane Craig's website (google it for the address) or consult some fine print sources like his little book "The Only Wise God."

In Christ,
Brandon Jones

 

Trinity will do that to you whetstone.

 

This seems to fall under "semantic quibbling." Please consider what is written before objecting because I no where said that anything was infinite, but the amount of something was. There are an infinite amount of possible worlds because there is no end to how many combinations of states of affairs there can logically possibly be. There are also an infinite number of positive intergers, but no one claims that they have divine status...I think the same would hold true for possible worlds.

Regarding what God creates being finite...yes, a possible world is not the actual world (but the actual world was a possible world before it was actual) and every possible world is finite--what is infinite is how many possible worlds there are. Perhaps God knows the limits, but only He would know, and I see no need to put a mathematical "cap" on how many there could be...that's what the word "infinite" is for.

I think you are confusing what is infinite in my post, not the possible world itself, but how many of them there are.

 

GB: after looking at your post I don't think you have the amount confused with the possible world itself--sorry. Regarding whether or not God "creates" logical possibilities is another issue for another time. But "infinite" just means indefinite, and there is no need to avoid the word when dealing with indefinite issues from our standpoint.

regards,
BJ

 

what's embarrassing are posts like these...did you read my critique?

 

hmmm...i'll use the same defense of Calvinism:

It's tough to be God: He is not the author of evil but still decrees all things. Those who want to know how that works want to be God.

He still holds man responsible with compatibilistic freedom since they act on their desires and are not constrained. Those who want to know how that works want to be God.

Those are my boundaries...the issue is settled I guess.

 

Boy BR that sure was an objective treatment of the issue. BOTH sides agree with your premises? Last time I checked, no Calvinist would agree with only one definition of free will, namely the Arminian definition. Calvinists believe that God decreed the events of the world and they are set from before He created anything...so you are simply wrong to say that both sides agree with your premises.

So your solution does not work...and the Calvinist would say that the Arminian has an internal contradiction of her OWN since the Arminian account of human free will cannot fit with God's foreknowledge of libertarianly free decisions.

The point remains that your solution may convince Arminians, and if I use the same solution it may convince Calvinists...but it sure does not solve anything between the two.

You always say that you are objective, but your veil is thin to say the least. You assume your own terms and definitions for both sides...dress up a straw man that you label Calvinism...knock the straw man down...and then proudly proclaim victory because "Calvinism" has been defeated.

Your method does not "work" it just sidesteps any attempts to examine if a position has logical consistency by hiding behind "you are not God and you should not question how God works because you are just showing that you want to be God."

If that is your explanation for how libertarian freedom and foreknowledge fit together, then fine, but don't object when I do the same explanation for Calvinism (at least I didn't pretend that both sides agree with Calvinism's premises).

 

#2: God has free will, choice REAL option.

We've been here before on another thread except you claimed that my inquiry was obscurist. So if you now have decided that it is relevent, then let's discuss whether or not God has libertarian free will.

I will post a new thread.