Featured Apple / FBI Legal Battle

Where am I misinformed?

My understanding of how crypography works? How the time of activation of the iPhone is probably used as a counter-key to a personal key of the user to create an extremely strong cipher, and how the iPhone wipes contents after 10 tries to prevent a brute force attempt?

Or is it my understanding of the issues surrounding chain of evidence?

Or is it the information I learned from touring an FBI computer forensics lab where a friend of my did this for a living and how he explained the process?

You essentially just said, "You're wrong" and stormed off.

 

Sorry about that, I didn't have time to comment earlier.

Apple could take the phone and load an operating system on it that changes the 10 tries to decode setting to unlimited tries. They could then supply the FBI with a laptop and/or any other necessary hardware for the FBI to do their brute force passcode generation algorithm. All of this could be done under strict supervision by Apple engineers. Once the FBI had thoroughly examined the contents of the phone, perhaps downloaded whatever data they needed to a USB stick, Apple could examine that USB stick to make sure nothing proprietary is on it, erase the altered operating system and reset the phone to its prior state.

The FBI would bring only the phone and leave with only the phone and the extracted data. They would never see any of Apple's code.

This shouldn't be that complicated. I'm starting to agree with the FBI that Apple is turning a moment of national security into a marketing campaign.

 

It seems we have two sides saying very different things. Who knows but I tend to distrust the government soo.....................

 

Not really. The FBI needs Apple to unlock the phone. Apple can do it but they don't want to do it. The question is WHY? Apple says if they unlock the phone there is a chance that there could be a backdoor created in their operating system. But if the FBI allows Apple to control the entire process including supplying the hardware and examining anything the FBI leaves with, there is no danger of the FBI leaking a backdoor.

All of this ignores the fact that hackers could crack Apple's security at any time or that Apple employees could steal code. I would distrust Apple's own employees or hackers more than the FBI under my scenario.

 

http://townhall.com/tipsheet/mattve...l&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer

 

Again I automatically distrust the government. I do not care what the government says. Given their dishonesty with NSA and collecting personal info my trust has severely deteriorated on issues like this.

 

The password was reset by the phone's owner, the county of San Bernardino, not the FBI. It's not the FBI's fault it was reset. In any event, we don't know if the data the county was after would have been auto backed up in the cloud. Contacts in the terrorists contact list would be backed up (assuming the terrorist had that function enabled); previously called numbers would not, but the FBI could get this info from the wireless phone provider. This leads me to believe the FBI is looking for something that is not readily available.

Also, from the article:
If the FBI is successful in forcing Apple to comply with its request, it would also set a precedent for other countries to follow and ask Apple to provide their authorities with the same software tool.

Yes, this is the boogieman that Apple is presenting to the public. Again, according to my scenario, the FBI would not get a software tool. All of the messing around with Apple's code would be done by Apple engineers on their turf with the FBI getting nothing except the data on the phone.

 

Who have no jurisdiction in the U.S.

 

How could that be when it was reset after they obtained it?

Except that is not what the FBI is requesting.

 

Doesn't Apple sell in those countries?

 

I don't know. But it's described in the article you posted.

Yes it is. Here's what the FBI is asking:

[Provide] the FBI with a signed iPhone Software file, recovery bundle, or other Software Image File (“SIF”) that can be loaded onto the SUBJECT DEVICE. The SIF will load and run from Random Access Memory (“RAM”) and will not modify the iOS on the actual phone, the user data partition or system partition on the device’s flash memory. The SIF will be coded by Apple with a unique identifier of the phone so that the SIF would only load and execute on the SUBJECT DEVICE. The SIF will be loaded via Device Firmware Upgrade (“DFU”) mode, recovery mode, or other applicable mode available to the FBI. Once active on the SUBJECT DEVICE, the SIF will accomplish the three functions specified in paragraph 2. The SIF will be loaded on the SUBJECT DEVICE at either a government facility, or alternatively, at an Apple facility; if the latter, Apple shall provide the government with remote access to the SUBJECT DEVICE through a computer allowed the government to conduct passcode recovery analysis.

Again in plain English, the FBI wants Apple to create a special version of iOS that only works on the one iPhone they have recovered. This customized version of iOS (*ahem* FBiOS) will ignore passcode entry delays, will not erase the device after any number of incorrect attempts, and will allow the FBI to hook up an external device to facilitate guessing the passcode. The FBI will send Apple the recovered iPhone so that this customized version of iOS never physically leaves the Apple campus.

As many jailbreakers are familiar, firmware can be loaded via Device Firmware Upgrade (DFU) Mode. Once an iPhone enters DFU mode, it will accept a new firmware image over a USB cable. Before any firmware image is loaded by an iPhone, the device first checks whether the firmware has a valid signature from Apple. This signature check is why the FBI cannot load new software onto an iPhone on their own — the FBI does not have the secret keys that Apple uses to sign firmware.

http://blog.trailofbits.com/2016/02/17/apple-can-comply-with-the-fbi-court-order/

 

Sure. Now supposing the Malaysian police get a search warrant to hack into a terror suspect's phone. How far do you think a court order from a Malaysian judge will get with Apple?

 

In the chaotic aftermath of the shootings in San Bernardino, Calif., in December, FBI investigators seeking to recover data from the iPhone of one of the shooters asked a technician in the California county to reset the phone’s iCloud password.

But that action foreclosed the possibility of an automatic backup to the Apple iCloud servers that might have turned up more clues to the origins of the terrorist attack that killed 14 people.

“The county and the FBI were working together cooperatively to obtain data, and at the point when it became clear the only way to accomplish the task at hand was to reset the iCloud password, the FBI asked the county to do so, and the county complied,” David Wert, a spokesman for San Bernardino County, said in an email.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/worl...0-11e5-be55-2cc3c1e4b76b_story.html?tid=a_inl

 

OK, let's go with the idea the FBI told San Bernardino officials to reset the password.

Now back to the topic at hand...why won't Apple cooperate with the FBI? They're not asking for a backdoor, they're asking Apple to open up this one phone, and this one phone only, and that Apple can control the circumstances.

 

Because Apple would create the tool to do it. Then, with that tool in existence, they would be asked to do it again for how many other purposes, by the government?

 

There is no new "tool" that is needed to be created. Just alter some lines of code in their existing OS, load it onto the phone and digitally sign it. I'm pretty sure the FBI can alter the necessary code, but they can't digitally sign it to make it operational.

And Apple is not being asked to do anything, they are being ordered by a Federal court. The FBI has a search warrant. Obviously, there are compelling reasons here. I just can't believe that Apple would put up such a fight over one phone when the potential for a public relations nightmare exists in the form of another terrorist attack, the clues which might prevent such a thing could be on this particular phone. FWIW, the owner of the phone, San Bernardino, has agreed to allow the FBI to gain access to the phone.

 

A distinction without a difference.

 

Right now Apple is in charge of securing the code for their OS and their method of digitially signing their OS. If they were to do as the FBI is requesting they would be in charge of securing the code for their modified OS and their method of digitially signing their modified OS.

So, you want to talk about a distinction without a difference? In both cases Apple is responsible for securing their proprietary information. We are trusting Apple to keep this secret. Now, what's the problem?