Arminian View Consequentially Different?

[HeirofSalvation]

I was asking because you were using terms that set off my molinism detector.

Molinism tries to "harmonize" the sovereign election of God with libertarian free will for man by arguing the following:

1. God knows what any free creature will do given any set of conditions.
2. God desires that every human be saved.
3. All the countless contingency paths can be organized in the computer-like mind of God as "possible universes."
4. God chose to "actualize" the "best" universe, which is the one in which the maximum number of people are saved by their free choice.
5. In some "universes" some individuals are saved wherein in others they are not.
6. There are some people who would never be saved in any "universe."

It seems that quite a few today are resurrecting de Molina's Jesuit philosophical conjecturing because it seems appealing. However, the ramifications are rather negative if one thinks about it.
For example, it would appear that salvation with God is a "numbers game," in which God is concerned with numbers, but people who could be saved in an alternate "universe" do not given the chance because the "universe" that God "actualized" does not provide the contingencies necessary for their free choice for salvation.
Another problem is that it violates libertarian free will, although the Molinist would try to argue otherwise. If God knows infallibly what any person would do given the set of circumstances, then the choice is not truly "free," but is dictated by the environment.

Ruh roh, I may be stepping in to stew here.....(I am partial to Molinism, but not dogmatically so) But it is the best explanation I am aware of to date. But I would answer some of your objections:
4. God chose to "actualize" the "best" universe, which is the one in which the maximum number of people are saved by their free choice.
Accurate as far as it goes but one possibility is that the "Best" universe is one wherein the greatest ratio or proportion of saved vs. unsaved is in view.
but people who could be saved in an alternate "universe" do not given the chance because the "universe" that God "actualized" does not provide the contingencies necessary for their free choice for salvation.
This is true as far as it goes, but an alternative possibility is that the universe God "actualized" is one wherein there are NONE of these people.. but rather the unsaved are those who like in (6) would NEVER come in any possible world... I would guess (given Molinism) that that is the way it is, that this world is entirely inhabitted by those who would NEVER come.
If God knows infallibly what any person would do given the set of circumstances, then the choice is not truly "free," but is dictated by the environment.[/QUOTE]I disagree with this... in my first post I argue that Foreknowledge does not violate free will.. after all... The set of circumstances God chose to actualize was dictated by their "choice". Not the other way around.
For example, it would appear that salvation with God is a "numbers game," in which God is concerned with numbers,I think you are correct with this.. as a Molinist I have considered this and your critique here is correct. It does seem rather too simple doesn't it. This is a difficulty, for now, that I simply live with. Fortunately, it is not impossible that this is indeed how it really is even if it seems rather elementary.
I appreciate your critique:thumbsup:
Then again who was it who said: "I had Molinism once, but it turned out I was just really bored" :laugh:
Sorry I haven't figured out how to break apart your post yet so I quoted you in Bold I am trying to learn:tear:

 

[HeirofSalvation]

An interesting article, I believe you have to sign up to get it. (Reasonablefaith.org) His contention is that simply Divine Forknowledge does not interfere with free will a choice can indeed be free and foreknown without fatalism.

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5202

 

[Skandelon]

The implications of Molinism are negative to the Molinist's own reasons for embracing Molinism itself.

Oh, now I'm following you. Sorry, I misunderstood what you were saying. You may have a point.

 

[Cypress]

Oh, now I'm following you. Sorry, I misunderstood what you were saying. You may have a point.

He does indeed. http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/zimmerman/Anti.Molinist.arg.proofs.pdf

 

[humblethinker]

An interesting article, I believe you have to sign up to get it. (Reasonablefaith.org) His contention is that simply Divine Forknowledge does not interfere with free will a choice can indeed be free and foreknown without fatalism.

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5202

:thumbs:
This is a very good read.

It still seems to me that, while it may iron out some of the logical problems I would have with an exhaustively specific and certain foreknowledge, there are wrinkles that this iron appears unable to address. One of the wrinkles is regarding the character of God in His apparently genuine offer of salvation to those people whom he knows could believe but also knows that they shall not believe at the time of the appeal and shall not ever believe thereafter? Unless I appeal to the Parachute of Paradox, how could I not question the genuineness of God's appeal? Therefore, it seems to me that the Arminian and Calvinist both have a problem with the idea of a genuine appeal of salvation, the only difference being when the ripcord is pulled. This specifically relates to the title of this thread which was asking if the Arminian view is consequentially different than the Calvinist view. The Open Theist view seems to honor the idea of a genuine appeal... no parachute required.

The article seems to presume that God has made "predictions of complete certainty" about everything that will ever occur. (How can something be a prediction when it is actually certain? It is therefore no longer a prediction but a determination that is made. A prediction would be anything between 0 and 1 with 0 and 1 being certainly not and certainly, respectively.)

 

[HeirofSalvation]

:thumbs:
This is a very good read.

It still seems to me that, while it may iron out some of the logical problems I would have with an exhaustively specific and certain foreknowledge, there are wrinkles that this iron appears unable to address. One of the wrinkles is regarding the character of God in His apparently genuine offer of salvation to those people whom he knows could believe but also knows that they shall not believe at the time of the appeal and shall not ever believe thereafter? Unless I appeal to the Parachute of Paradox, how could I not question the genuineness of God's appeal? Therefore, it seems to me that the Arminian and Calvinist both have a problem with the idea of a genuine appeal of salvation, the only difference being when the ripcord is pulled. This specifically relates to the title of this thread which was asking if the Arminian view is consequentially different than the Calvinist view. The Open Theist view seems to honor the idea of a genuine appeal... no parachute required.

The article seems to presume that God has made "predictions of complete certainty" about everything that will ever occur. (How can something be a prediction when it is actually certain? It is therefore no longer a prediction but a determination that is made. A prediction would be anything between 0 and 1 with 0 and 1 being certainly not and certainly, respectively.)

One of the wrinkles is regarding the character of God in His apparently genuine offer of salvation to those people whom he knows could believe but also knows that they shall not believe at the time of the appeal and shall not ever believe thereafter?

The Molinist account does not assume this. If there are such possible beings (I would assume there are) God might very well not have included them in the world that he chose to actualize. Possibly (I would guess this is what God would choose to do) only those who would NEVER accept Christ under ANY circumstances are included in the world God actualized. I think you ARE correct :thumbsup: that God's Universal genuine offer of salvation is compromised if the world that God chose to create contains such people.

The article seems to presume that God has made "predictions of complete certainty" about everything that will ever occur. (How can something be a prediction when it is actually certain? It is therefore no longer a prediction but a determination that is made.

The Molinist account views God as having exhaustive knowledge of all possibilities his Omniscience works something like this- God has 3 types of knowledge:

1.) NATURAL KNOWLEDGE: God knows all necessary truths/ He believes all necessarily true propositions and believes no false ones. (this is not debatable)

3.) I will go back to 2.) because it is the debatable one (that Molinism hangs on). God has exhaustive FREE KNOWLEDGE: basically, God knows everything there is to know about the world he created and everyone in it, including all future events.

2.) MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE: God has perfect knowledge of all counterfactuals of free creaturely decisions: Thus, God would know with certainty the answer to the question: If Peter were in circumstances A/ would he have denied Christ 3 times? Would he if placed in circumstances B? Is there ANY set of circumstances that king Aggrippa could be placed in where he would freely choose to accept Christ? (this is the debatable one obviously).

But mind you. Many claim that knowledge like this is unknowable. The Molinist believes it is, Therefore: God knows with the certainty of his FREE KNOWLEDGE since he elected to actualize the particular world he did, all "future" decisions of his creatures, because he is exhaustively aware of how they will react in any set of circumstances.

It's the best answer I have ever heard: and I am not the foremost authority on the topic but for now, I feel it answers the most questions and creates the fewest problems. I find Open Theism to be Theologically incorrect. Thus, I need to find a system whereby foreknowledge/ election/ predestination (things I believe the Bible teaches) are accounted for and Libertarian Free Will (which I think is also patently obvious Biblically). I am always open to critiques about it. It isn't perfect.

 

[humblethinker]

If there are such possible beings (I would assume there are) God might very well not have included them in the world that he chose to actualize. Possibly (I would guess this is what God would choose to do) only those who would NEVER accept Christ under ANY circumstances are included in the world God actualized. I think you ARE correct that God's Universal genuine offer of salvation is compromised if the world that God chose to create contains such people.

Just to clarify, the 'beings' you are referring to are those humans who will never excercise 'saving' faith and He knows this to be the case, correct? That being assumed, you proposed that God has included them in the world he chose to actualize. It seems that you are implicating yourself in the view that the genuineness of God's offer of salvation is compromised. I don't think you believe this though... are you saying that he did NOT choose to include those people in the world he chose to actualize?

I find Open Theism to be Theologically incorrect. Thus, I need to find a system whereby foreknowledge/ election/ predestination (things I believe the Bible teaches) are accounted for and Libertarian Free Will (which I think is also patently obvious Biblically). I am always open to critiques about it. It isn't perfect.

:thumbsup: As I understand it, I don't exactly see how OT is Theologically incorrect or how it necessarily violates scripture. However, I definately do see how others that have a misunderstanding of OT (which seems to be a lot on the BB) would think that.

 

[quantumfaith]

Kudos, gratitude and applause for the civil tone of discussion and debate. It is refreshing. Blessings to all.

 

[HeirofSalvation]

Just to clarify, the 'beings' you are referring to are those humans who will never excercise 'saving' faith and He knows this to be the case, correct? That being assumed, you proposed that God has included them in the world he chose to actualize. It seems that you are implicating yourself in the view that the genuineness of God's offer of salvation is compromised. I don't think you believe this though... are you saying that he did NOT choose to include those people in the world he chose to actualize?




:thumbsup: As I understand it, I don't exactly see how OT is Theologically incorrect or how it necessarily violates scripture. However, I definately do see how others that have a misunderstanding of OT (which seems to be a lot on the BB) would think that.

Just to clarify, the 'beings' you are referring to are those humans who will never excercise 'saving' faith and He knows this to be the case, correct?

Yes, these would, I assume, be the only ones whom God would actualize. Were God to actualize those who might under certain circumstances then, yes, I think the genuiness of God's call to salvation would be compromised.

That being assumed, you proposed that God has included them in the world he chose to actualize. It seems that you are implicating yourself in the view that the genuineness of God's offer of salvation is compromised.

Well, it would not be compromised in the sense that God might truly desire their salvation. As in, he would truly wish that it were otherwise. His Character is not implicated in this respect. A Calvinistic explanation for instance, I would argue, cannot escape the logical conclusion that God well, quite frankly.."takes pleasure in the death of the wicked". Moreover, I believe in a truly unlimited atonement, thus, at least the provision for their salvation has been secured. And in that sense it is genuine as well. The average Molinist would, I think, say that there are no feasibleworlds (wherein the sum total of God's purposes are met) God could actualize wherein ONLY those who would accept Christ of their own free will would be created. As in, if there were one, it might contain say, a grand total of........6 people. The moment God wants more than that....drat..... the incurably unsalvageable.

However, I definately do see how others that have a misunderstanding of OT

I must confess, I am no authority on the topic myself, so if I misrepressent the view PLEASE do tell.:thumbs: As I understand it, (correct me if I am wrong) God does not have exhaustive foreknowledge of ALL future-tense propositions, specifically, those dealing with creaturely freedom, inasmuch as God (at least for the time being) inhabits time and experiences change along with us. Or, to put it differently, the "future" does not even exist and it is therefore unintelligible to even suggest there is such a thing as a true or false future-tense proposition. This, at least, being the key element. Subsequently, there is no predestination or individual election to salvation inasmuch as that would automatically negate free will. Lemme know if I am mistaken. :thumbs:

 

[HeirofSalvation]

Kudos, gratitude and applause for the civil tone of discussion and debate. It is refreshing. Blessings to all.

Do you think the OT's here would WANT to pick a fight on this board? They would be out-numbered by my estimation at about 1,274,4569.253 to roughly...6 :tonofbricks:
As far as Molinists are concerned.. i am positive that there is at least.....1 :smilewinkgrin:

 

[humblethinker]

I must confess, I am no authority on the topic myself, so if I misrepressent the view PLEASE do tell.:thumbs:

I am not an authority on the matter either. It just seemed to me that the view that many people have is the view that is easiest for them to caricature. While I agree that some OT views may warrant those caricatured views, there seem to be other reasonable views of OT that would not deserve the caricaturization.

As I understand it, (correct me if I am wrong) God does not have exhaustive foreknowledge of ALL future-tense propositions, specifically, those dealing with creaturely freedom, inasmuch as God (at least for the time being) inhabits time and experiences change along with us.

Maybe a modification: God does have exhaustive foreknowledge of ALL future-tense propositions. Regarding creaturely freedom, it may be the case that God has chosen to create a world in which He does not know which one of the propositions may be actualized but he does know that one of the propositions will be actualized and that nothing other than possible futute propositions are options for actualization.

Regarding how it could be that God not know the certainty of which options will be actualized... It may be the case that he chose not to know or it may be the case that the certainty of future actualizations is something that is not knowable unless it is predetermined (and then, of course, it is therefore foreknown).

Or, to put it differently, the "future" does not even exist and it is therefore unintelligible to even suggest there is such a thing as a true or false future-tense proposition. This, at least, being the key element. Subsequently, there is no predestination or individual election to salvation inasmuch as that would automatically negate free will. Lemme know if I am mistaken. :thumbs:

possibly... (see my above comments). It seems you have given a fair attempt at communicating what OT is... I appreciate that. I'm not sure to what degree of OT I would ascribe to... some of my comments are expressions and comments that help me to understand what is the case and what is not the case.

I would also like to share some comments by Roger Olson (found here) that would be applicable:

"There is no single, universally agreed-on definition of open theism," said Roger Olson, professor of theology at Baylor University's Truett Theological Seminary in Waco.
"Generally speaking, however, it is the belief that God is truly personal and interactive with people, such that the 'effectual, fervent prayers' of God's people can make a genuine difference in the way God acts," explained Olson, who is not an open theist but does take its approach seriously. "Scripture portrays God as changing his mind in response to such prayers.
"Open theism says that God has freely chosen to limit himself so that he does not foreordain or cause all that happens. The future is partly open because it depends on what human persons decide to do."
....."The main line of biblical argument in favor of open theism is all the instances in which God relents in response to prayer," Olson said. "For example, God granted King Hezekiah more time to live after declaring he would die very soon. God changed his mind in response to prayer.
"Open theists interpret this very literally--God changed his mind in response to prayer."
At least three dozen biblical texts report God changed his mind, Sanders noted.
The Old Testament repeatedly says God changed his mind in response to his people, Roark added. "Love is always open and dynamic and thus open to change its course in its genuine involvement and interaction with the loved one."
The primary theological consideration in favor of open theism is that "Scripture portrays God as loving and personal, and to be both loving and personal is to interact," Olson said. "A being who cannot be acted upon--who cannot be affected by other persons--is neither truly personal nor loving.
"The God of the Bible is a God who goes on a journey through history with his people. He remains superior to them in his omnipotence, but he condescends to allow them to affect his smaller plans and ways. In the end, of course, God's great plan for human history will be achieved, even if some people misuse their free will and are excluded from enjoying God's redemption."
.... "Open theists argue that their view of God and God's foreknowledge is consistent with the ordinary Christian's prayer life," Olson stressed. "Christians pray as if their prayers can make a real difference in the way God acts."
[Bruce] Ware has called open theism "unacceptable as a viable, acceptable model within evangelicalism."
But Olson said evangelicals and traditional Baptists need to make room for dialogue with open theists.
"The open theists are not arguing against Scripture; they are arguing against a traditional interpretation of Scripture," he said. "Their unanimous appeal is to Scripture itself and not to philosophy or experience or tradition. While they respect and use those sources and norms, they do not rely on them over or against the Bible.
"Open theism will always remain at most a 'minority report' within evangelical Christian and Baptist circles," Olson said. "Rather than get all worked up about it and go on a witch hunt to root out open theists, let's keep discussion about it open, civil and constructive."
​

 

[HeirofSalvation]

Maybe a modification: God does have exhaustive foreknowledge of ALL future-tense propositions. Regarding creaturely freedom, it may be the case that God has chosen to create a world in which He does not know which one of the propositions may be actualized but he does know that one of the propositions will be actualized and that nothing other than possible futute propositions are options for actualization.

Thank you for your post. I stand corrected..... sorry it has taken so long to respond I have been fighting the good fight against Calvinism...although I find this thread infinitely more engaging and fruitful. I looked up some of the older threads and saw some of your responses about this earlier... and sort of self-corrected before you posted this... I think you have a fair assessment of a reasonable form of OT.

I really think this argument then boils down to well frankly....don't tell anyone...Philosophy not Theology inasmuch as you would NEVER deny propositions like absolute sovereignty....exhaustive foreknowlege (as you corrected).....etc. If we don't speak too loud... the witch hunters won't know we are here and they won't burn us at the stake.

But it would behoove us to take it one step at a time. I would suggest one proposition first...

1.) There is an absolute truth value to all future-tense propositions... and they are exhaustively knowable, falsifiable or verifyable. Including counterfactuals of creaturely freedom... in other words..and I was challenged early on in this post that I was making a distinction without meaning that certainty is NOT necessity thus it escapes determinism. The distinction is very subtle..no doubt... but I think very real too... I will try to link some articles or discussions about it soon if I can find them. Thoughts?? This is where I would challenge OT.

 

[humblethinker]

Thank you for your post. I stand corrected..... sorry it has taken so long to respond I have been fighting the good fight against Calvinism...although I find this thread infinitely more engaging and fruitful. I looked up some of the older threads and saw some of your responses about this earlier... and sort of self-corrected before you posted this... I think you have a fair assessment of a reasonable form of OT.

Thank you.

I really think this argument then boils down to well frankly....don't tell anyone...Philosophy not Theology [snip]

Interesting that you mention that since I just now, while reading Roger Olson's book, "Arminian Theology - Myths and Realities", he voiced much the same! If I may quote him on pps 198-199:

"Conclusion. The upshot is that classical Arminianism may involve a paradox, God's exhaustive and infallible foreknowledge (simple foreknowledge) together with libertarian free will. Middle knowledge is no help because it assumes the possibility of counterfactuals of freedom and leads to determinism. Open theism takes too much away from the biblical doctrine of predestination. Just as Calvinists often claim that they are biblically warranted to believe in both unconditional foreordination of sin and human responsibility for sin, so Arminians claim they are justified in embracing both exhaustive and infallible divine foreknowledge and libertarian free will because both are necessary for a sound biblical worldview. And, not all philosophers believe they are necessarily logically incompatible."​

His footnote, however, interestingly reads,

"Some readers may wonder if I am affirming a logical contradiction here. I am not intentionally and certainly not comfortably doing so. I acknowledge a difficulty but am not convinced it is a sheer contradiction. Because I feel the weight of the open theist critique of classical Arminianism I remain open to open theism while remaining a classical Arminian awaiting help to relieve the paradox from philosopy."(emphasis mine)​

How many classical Arminians on this BB might relate to his footnote?!? As a classical Arminian, I recognized my cognitive disonance in the beliefe that God has created a world such that I am free, and morally accountable, but yet not free to act in any other way than what God knew that I certainly would act. The resulting status of reality is that 'acting otherwise' was not possible, regardless of whether it was by determinism or foreknowledge, it could be no other way. Hence, the title of this thread which asks, "Is the [classical] Arminian view consequentially different?". And, subsequent to posting this thread, I recognized the cognitive dissonance in beliefe that God's appeal to believe is a genuine one in the greatest meaning of the idea, but yet He already knew that the one He was appealing to would never believe in any possible way. To me, this is like violating the law of non-contradiction... Maybe I'm starting to get too loudly ;-) ...? I digress...

[snip] inasmuch as you would NEVER deny propositions like absolute sovereignty....exhaustive foreknowlege (as you corrected).....etc. If we don't speak too loud... the witch hunters won't know we are here and they won't burn us at the stake.

But it would behoove us to take it one step at a time.

HOS, you may not know this, but I am prone to go whole-hog... I will attempt to take it one step at a time though, sounds like wise advice, and for many other reasons as well.

I would suggest one proposition first...

1.) There is an absolute truth value to all future-tense propositions... and they are exhaustively knowable, falsifiable or verifyable. Including counterfactuals of creaturely freedom...

I'm not quite sure I could agree with this, as I'm sure that you would understand. Does your view square with the logic of our current reality? Can the law of non-contradiction be violated? Is it logically possible to know what a genuinely free person wouold do? I do see where you're going with that though...

in other words..and I was challenged early on in this post that I was making a distinction without meaning that certainty is NOT necessity thus it escapes determinism. The distinction is very subtle..no doubt... but I think very real too... I will try to link some articles or discussions about it soon if I can find them. Thoughts?? This is where I would challenge OT.

I think it is a good thing to challenge it here. I will definately consider it, especially being that I am just a couple weeks into being informed of and understanding open theism.

I do find it interesting that in the same book and pages as noted above, and it seems that you would agree with him, Olson says,

"I consider open theism a legitimate evangelical and Arminian option even though I have not yet adopted it as my own perspective."​

 

[quantumfaith]

Thank you.


Interesting that you mention that since I just now, while reading Roger Olson's book, "Arminian Theology - Myths and Realities", he voiced much the same! If I may quote him on pps 198-199:

"Conclusion. The upshot is that classical Arminianism may involve a paradox, God's exhaustive and infallible foreknowledge (simple foreknowledge) together with libertarian free will. Middle knowledge is no help because it assumes the possibility of counterfactuals of freedom and leads to determinism. Open theism takes too much away from the biblical doctrine of predestination. Just as Calvinists often claim that they are biblically warranted to believe in both unconditional foreordination of sin and human responsibility for sin, so Arminians claim they are justified in embracing both exhaustive and infallible divine foreknowledge and libertarian free will because both are necessary for a sound biblical worldview. And, not all philosophers believe they are necessarily logically incompatible."​

His footnote, however, interestingly reads,

"Some readers may wonder if I am affirming a logical contradiction here. I am not intentionally and certainly not comfortably doing so. I acknowledge a difficulty but am not convinced it is a sheer contradiction. Because I feel the weight of the open theist critique of classical Arminianism I remain open to open theism while remaining a classical Arminian awaiting help to relieve the paradox from philosopy."(emphasis mine)​

How many classical Arminians on this BB might relate to his footnote?!? As a classical Arminian, I recognized my cognitive disonance in the beliefe that God has created a world such that I am free, and morally accountable, but yet not free to act in any other way than what God knew that I certainly would act. The resulting status of reality is that 'acting otherwise' was not possible, regardless of whether it was by determinism or foreknowledge, it could be no other way. Hence, the title of this thread which asks, "Is the [classical] Arminian view consequentially different?". And, subsequent to posting this thread, I recognized the cognitive dissonance in beliefe that God's appeal to believe is a genuine one in the greatest meaning of the idea, but yet He already knew that the one He was appealing to would never believe in any possible way. To me, this is like violating the law of non-contradiction... Maybe I'm starting to get too loudly ;-) ...? I digress...


HOS, you may not know this, but I am prone to go whole-hog... I will attempt to take it one step at a time though, sounds like wise advice, and for many other reasons as well.



I'm not quite sure I could agree with this, as I'm sure that you would understand. Does your view square with the logic of our current reality? Can the law of non-contradiction be violated? Is it logically possible to know what a genuinely free person wouold do? I do see where you're going with that though...


I think it is a good thing to challenge it here. I will definately consider it, especially being that I am just a couple weeks into being informed of and understanding open theism.

I do find it interesting that in the same book and pages as noted above, and it seems that you would agree with him, Olson says,

"I consider open theism a legitimate evangelical and Arminian option even though I have not yet adopted it as my own perspective."​

:thumbs::thumbs::thumbs:

 

[HeirofSalvation]

I think it is a good thing to challenge it here. I will definately consider it, especially being that I am just a couple weeks into being informed of and understanding open theism.

Lol..and I am about 5 mos. into my understanding of Molinism...we make a fine sounding board huh.

certainty is NOT necessity thus it escapes determinism. The distinction is very subtle..no doubt... but I think very real too...

I will take 1 min. to bolster my argument about certainty not applying necessity by attempting to refute the validity of a simple Modus Ponens: This argument being essentially plagiarised from WLC's book "The Only Wise God"

Necessarily if God forknows x then x will happen
God foreknows x
Therefore x will necessarily happen

This reasoning is logically fallacious however...in order for the conclusion to be necessary BOTH the antecendent AND the consequent have to be necessary. Simply put 1 necessary premise is inadequate to supply a necessay conclusion...consider this:

Necessarily if Jones is a bachelor Jones is unmarried (this is true by definition)
Jones is a bachelor
Therefore: Jones is necessarily unmarried

But this is not true... It is not necessary that Jones be unmarried he very well could have gotten married if he wished...moreover.. he presumably could get married in the future. The argument should work like this:

Necessarily if Jones is a bachelor Jones is unmarried (this is true by definition)
Jones is a bachelor
Therefore: Jones is unmarried
Similarly then...

Necessarily if God forknows x then x will happen
God foreknows x
Therefore x will happen

The content of God's foreknowledge: (What it is that he knows) is thus contingent upon the future action...What we should infer is that.....

Whatever occurs God necessarily foreknows it
If x occurs necessarily God foreknew it
If Y occurs necessarily God foreknew Y
x did not occur....Y occured..
Therefore God foreknew Y

I will stop here, in an attempt not to go "whole hog". and leave this link..........just for fun!.......http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R1ckoCBtXvU

 

[humblethinker]

What we should infer is that.....

Whatever occurs God necessarily foreknows it
If x occurs necessarily God foreknew it
If Y occurs necessarily God foreknew Y
x did not occur....Y occured..
Therefore God foreknew Y

If this is the case, then would you mind helping me to reconcile the following:

Assuming a being who has certain foreknowledge of the free choices of its creatures, how is it the case that this being's appeal to his creatures to do otherwise is to be considered genuine? How is it that God is genuine and that his appeal to the unbeliever is a genuine appeal?

Open theism seems to resolve the cognitive dissonance that is unavoidable in believing that God knows what I will do and he also knows that it cannot ever be the case that I do otherwise, yet he still engages in a genuine appeal for me to do otherwise.

 

[HeirofSalvation]

Well, he knows that you will not do it, not that you cannot do it. I assume it is genuine in the sense that:
1.) His character is such that he truly desires that your choice would be other than it is and
2.) He has at least provided sufficient grace for you to accept his appeal to salvation. I believe in something like prevenient grace bestowed on all people whereby any who are willing are capable of believing on Christ for salvation.

As an example: If we take the story of the rich young ruler: presumably, there was sufficient grace for him to follow Christ. The Bible says that Jesus looked upon him and he loved him. If Christ knew that the rich young ruler would refuse his offer, Christ nonetheless loved him, and truly desired his repentance. Christ also wept over Jerusalem, knowing that he would be rejected. I guess I see genuineness is sufficiently represented by God's character, and not that he must hold some falsifiable belief that there is a true likelihood of something occuring which will not in fact occur. Possibility is enough to satisfy that for me.

It is important I think, what one's view of the nature of time is. God knows what he knows timelessly, he doesn't peer into the future and percieve what will occur.

 

[seekingthetruth]

D doesnt make any sense at all.

God knows all, period.

It is impossible to act contrary to God's forknowledge. He knows.

Further, "forknowledge" is a human concept. God doesnt need to have forknowledge of the future because He is already there. God created time so He is not confined by it.

He is in the past, the present, and the future.

Therefore your premise is illogical, and senseless.

John

 

[seekingthetruth]

Here I am, sitting here waiting for tomorrow.

Do you really think that God is waiting for tomorrow also?

John

 

[HeirofSalvation]

D doesnt make any sense at all.

God knows all, period.

It is impossible to act contrary to God's forknowledge. He knows.

Further, "forknowledge" is a human concept. God doesnt need to have forknowledge of the future because He is already there. God created time so He is not confined by it.

He is in the past, the present, and the future.

Therefore your premise is illogical, and senseless.

John

Whose premises are you calling illogical? To whom is this adressed?

God created time so He is not confined by it.

I am not committed to this idea myself, but some have reasonably argued that God is timeless prior to the creative act, but has become temporal since creation and will become atemporal again!!!! An illustration would be: He created or dug a pond and then got into it, and will then get out of it.

Further, "forknowledge" is a human concept.

It is a Biblical concept; granted, I believe it is somewhat of a condescension on God's part to speak on those terms, but he is trying to convey a property humans cannot relate to to temporal beings

He is in the past, the present, and the future.

He is in if anything, the present. The future does not exist, I think you mean to say he is outside of time altogether.