Exactly. Libertarian free will (LFW) is totally illogical and cannot solve the problem of moral responsibility.Here is my assessment of free-will:
Say someone is choosing an ice cream flavor and have to choose between pistachio and chocolate. Thy choose pistachio. So why did they not choose chocolate. Maybe they're allergic to it and eating it causes an adverse physical reaction and humans are set up physiologically to avoid adverse reactions such as pain. So they have no choice based on their past experience but to choose pistachio.
But say they just don't like the taste of chocolate. Maybe once again it just comes down to their chemical makeup - something in them that makes them not enjoy the taste. Certainly the vast majority of humans enjoy chocolate, but not 100% - some small percentage just don't like the taste, has to be directly correlated to their physical makeup. So even in this case, their choice was dictated by a deterministic factor over which this person had no control.
But say that its not either of the above factors. Say the person had a beloved dog who died recently from eating chocolate, and every time the person sees chocolate it brings up unpleasant memories, so they just naturally choose something else. The person didn't have control over their dog dying, or they didn't choose it anyway. So once again the person's choice against chocolate was due to factors outside of their control.
But say there's a girl behind him, and the reason he doesn't want to choose chocolate is that he knows she like's chocolate as well, and there's very little chocolate left, and he wants her to know that he let her have the last chocolate because he's interested in her. And his motivation here at a fundamental level is a powerful sex drive, predicated without his control on the perpetuation of the species. And also he has at his disposal a brain enabling him to make a series of if-then inferences that lead him to a desired goal of attracting the interest of this girl.
But say that his reason for not choosing chocolate was not related to any coherent reason at all that he or anyone else could even potentially identify. Say there was some truly random firing of some nueron in his brain causing
him to suddenly choose pistachio instead. Or maybe he somehow effectively flipped a coin in his mind consciously, maybe saying (on a whim) "if the next car that goes by outside is a coupe I'll choose chocolate, otherwise not."
So in assessing his so-called "free-will" decision to choose chocolate, we see that it boils down to one of two things: 1) the result of absolute determinstic factors over which the person has no control; or 2) pure randomness. So that is what "free-will" is.
LFW argues that one can only be responsible for an action if, all things being what they are, he could have done otherwise. Although this seems perfectly reasonable, it is neither complete, nor realistic. Let's see how well that works in several examples:
1. You are tried in a court for murder and the evidence is overwhelming that you are guilty. You pulled the trigger on the gun! The judge is deliberating on a sentence based on your motivation for committing the act. If you pulled the trigger with an intention, then it cannot be said that you could have done "otherwise" in the same situation, because your same motivation could not have resulted in you not pulling the trigger. Your attorney attempts to tell the judge that you were not in your right mind, and therefore, there was no real intent in the act. You were under the influence of something, and therefore your action was essentially "random." In other words, you could have done otherwise. Therefore, he argues that you are not responsible for the action, and he tells you to plead insanity.
2. You are in a game show and you are offered a choice between two doors. You will walk through the door of your choice and receive whatever is beyond that door. You choose door #2 and proceed through it. You unexpectedly fall down a pit and onto a searing hot floor. You shout at the host and say "Hey, that is not fair!" The host says, "Why not? You could have chosen door #1. You are responsible for your choice because you could have chosen otherwise."
This is why neither hard determinism (robotic) nor libertarian free will correctly assign moral responsibility. Divine compatibilism is better because it says that the creature makes choices without coercion from outside, but that these choices must align with the creature's nature and his greatest internal desire. LFW necessarily argues that, although nature and greatest desire can "influence" choices, man can ultimately act contrary to anything internal, which is illogical. Upon what logical basis is such a choice made (the definition of insanity), and exactly how can such a choice be culpable? We are responsible precisely because we act according to our nature and greatest desire, and it is motivation and purpose in any act (the "reason") that makes an act morally subject.