GL: The Will truly has the power to perform the contrary act, but this act, which is really possible, is never really present under the influence of efficacious grace; for this latter would be no longer efficacious. That is why actual resistance is said to be incompatible with efficacious grace. So Socrates when sitting has it in his power to stand, but he cannot at the same time stand and sit; he must sit, while he is seated.....this affirms an infallible, but non-necessitating Predetermination.
My Comment: Awesome! Socrates explained!!!!
To look at these sayings again:
Socrates when seated can rise, but he is never at the same time both seated and standing (p276)
Just as it is necessary for Socrates to sit whilst he is seated (Consequence), though it is optional for him to be seated (Consequent)(p139)
When putting both the Intellect and Will together, I think Fr Garrigou-LaGrange is saying that it is “possible” for the “Will” to resist but, because the grace is efficacious in this case, the “Intellect” is inclined to the good so the Will is going to do the good. The intellect is directed or inclined stronger toward a particular object and then the Will is moved and then moves itself to that object.
My Comment: It also helps to see the same process when using only our Natural Free Wills.
This is not from the LaGrange’s book but here’s Aquinas’ quote on Socrates:
In this way it is not necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. (STh., I q.19 a.3)
(6) Premotion 3
Non-Necessitating (continued)
P277
Other ways of expressing a non-necessitating predetermination:
From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will. (STh., I q.19 a.8 ad 3)
Now, He foresaw that it would happen contingently. It follows then infallibly that it will be, contingently and not of necessity. (SCG, 3.94)
Compossible = able or possible to coexist with another
GL: The distinction between possible and the compossible is tantamount to the distinction between the divided and composite senses, as St. Thomas points out hence says: “The fact that God Wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so Wills, on account of the immutability (unchanging) of the divine Will, but it is not necessary absolutely.” (STh., I q.23 a.6 ad 3)
Necessity of Consequence = Conditional Necessity
GL: In other words, there is necessity of consequence or a conditional necessity, but not of consequent as in the case of a strict syllogism, the minor of which is contingent. Then he goes on to say:
“so the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated, taking it in a composite sense, though, absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed. (Another place: STh., I q.14 a.13)
P278
St. Thomas speaks just as clearly in his Treatise on Grace:
“God’s intention cannot fail.....Hence if God intends, while moving, that the one whose heart He moves should attain to grace, he will infallibly attain to it, according to Jo. 6:45:
Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me. (STh., I-II q.112 a.3)
“the Holy Ghost, Who does unfailingly whatever He wills to do. Hence it is impossible for these two things to be true at the same time,—that the Holy Ghost should will to move a certain man to an act of charity, and that this man, by sinning, should lose charity. For the gift of perseverance is reckoned among the blessings of God whereby
whoever is delivered, is most certainly delivered, as Augustine says in his book on the Predestination of the saints (
De Dono Persev. xiv.). (STh., II-II q.24 a.11)
So as we see for St. Thomas the foreseeing of a free determination that would depend solely on ourselves is not the foundation for this divine certainty. It has its foundation in a decree of the divine Will, the execution of which is assured by the divine motion.
My Comment: God’s Foreknowledge includes contingencies. This is a conditional necessity.
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This is not from Garrigou-LaGrange’s Book
De Dicto Necessity - Necessity with other possibilities
De Re Necessity - Necessity without other possibilities
Hypothetical Syllogism edit | edit source
The second kind of compound proposition is a
conditional proposition: we can call these statements If/Then statements, where the "
If" part is the antecedant and the part following after "
Then" is the consequent. A conditional that contains conditional statements exclusively is called a pure hypothetical
Syllogism:
Example:
P1: If you study (antecedent), then you will become a good student (consequent).
P2: If you become a good student, then you will go to college (consequent) Therefore, If you study, then you will go to college (consequent)
If x then y
If y then z therefore if x then z
Notice that the first premise and the conclusion have the same antecedent, and the second premise and the conclusion have the same consequent. It should be clear why hypothetical syllogisms provide the clearest example of why syllogisms preserve truth value - for this format also for a set of equivalencies.
My Comment: think of the example of the Ninivites
De Dicto Necessity is something that is done out of necessity without totally excluding other possibilities.
If I choose one thing I could have chosen something else. (Free Will is compatible with Foreknowledge - STh., II-II q.174 a.1)
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All these texts presuppose a divine predetermining but non-necessitating
decree, which extends even to the free mode of our acts; and they affirm the presence of a divine
motion that assures the infallible execution of this decree. In this sense, too, it is justly said to be predetermining and non-necessitating.
My Comment: There are 2 things here:
(1) Decree - Predetermining and non-necessitating
(2) Motion - infallible execution of the decree
P279
Divine Predetermining Non-Necessitating Decree (cont)
It causes the Will infallibly to determine itself, to perform this particular act rather than a certain other, and it causes in us and with us all that there is of reality and goodness in this act. (STh., I q.23 a.5)
Only evil, which is a disorder, is not included within the scope of its causality; it is excluded from the adequate object of Omnipotence, and far more so than sound is from the object of sight (STh., I-II q.79 a.1).
God does not need to create a Motion so that He will have infallible knowledge of our acts. Thomists never claimed this. Some thought this. It’s the other way around: God knows our free acts in His eternal decree, and that His Motion assures its execution in time.
P280
How does the Divine Motion adapt itself to the very nature of the Secondary Cause?
The divine motion is actively modified by our Will which receives it, for the Will, in so far as it receives, is passive. But God adapts Himself in His motion to the nature of Secondary Causes, which means that He moves them according to their nature. Thus a great artist adapts his motion to the various instruments which he uses. (Tommaso Maria Zigliara, Teaching of Sacred Theology, book 3, ch 4, 1800’s)
Heb 13:21 Fit you in all goodness, that you may do his will; doing in you that which is well pleasing in his sight, through Jesus Christ, to whom is glory for ever and ever. Amen.
Aquinas says “When God incites a person to be of good Will, He applies him...inwardly; and this is the way that God alone fits a will (makes him apt), because He alone can change it: ‘The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever he will he will turn (incline) it’ (
Prov 21:1) (Clem Latin Vulgate = inclinabit = turn or Bow (like bow and arrow?). Hence, he says, working in you: ‘It is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish’ (
Phil 2:13). But what will He do? That which is pleasing in his sight, i.e., He will make you will what pleases Him. (Comm on Hebrews,
Heb 13:21, #770).
My Comment: This means that God adapts His motion to our Will after we receive it. This means that God moves us according to our nature.