P321
Principle: Faculties, habits and acts are specified by their object as part of definition of Free Will
The essence of Liberty consists in the dominating indifference of the Will with regard to every object proposed by the reason as at the moment good in one aspect, and not good in another, according to the formula of St. Thomas:
STh., I-II q.10 a.2
If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to it of necessity
My Comment: What this is saying is that “Each” object has good aspects and bad aspects about it. This means the Will will not look at “any” object with absolute Necessity. If the object always looked perfect the Will would always seek it. (All of this is a reminder too that the Intellect is involved and not just the Will; the intellect seems to have a lot to do with the object)
Even when the Will, in fact, actually Wills this object, when it is already determined to Will this, it is still inclined freely toward this with a dominating indifference that is no longer potential but actual.
My Comment: This means the Will is really free (dominating indifference) all the way through to the act.
The Thomists also say in opposition to Suarez, that not even His absolute power can God move our Will by necessity to Will a certain object, the indifference of judgement remaining as it is, so long as we judge the object to be good in one aspect and not so in another.
“Although the will wills the last end by a certain necessary inclination, it is nevertheless in no way to be granted that it is forced to will it. For force is nothing else but the infliction of some violence. According to the Philosopher that is violent “whose principle is outside it with the being which suffers the violence contributing nothing.” The throwing of a stone upward would be an example, because the stone of itself is not at all inclined to that motion. But seeing that the will is an inclination by the fact of its being an appetite, it cannot happen that the will should will anything without having an inclination to it. Thus it is impossible for the will to will anything by force or violently even though it does will something by a natural inclination. It is therefore evident that the will does not will anything necessarily with the necessity of force, yet it does will something necessarily with the necessity of natural inclination.” (Questiones Disputatae de Veritate, q.22, a.5)
My Comment: The Dominating Indifference ensures that man’s Will is truly free and that God cannot override this and move us by necessity to a particular object. God cannot override this because He is already the one actualizing the dominating indifference.
The Divine Motion is the cause of our Free Act
Free Act depends on 3 different Causalities:
P322
(1) the objective attraction of a particular good
(2) the direction of the intellect in forming a practical judgement
(3) the efficiency or production of the free choice of the Will
The Divine Motion transcends and actualizes these 3 causes without violating free Will.
(9) Premotion 6
P324
The Divine Motion and the Physical Act of Sin Principle
God is not the cause of sin directly or indirectly
Directly - inclining our Will to sin
Indirectly - by neglecting to keep us from sinning
This divine permission is not the cause of sin. This permission allows sin to happen. If God did not permit it, did not allow it to happen, there would be no sin.
This divine permission is not a punishment - why? Because the first sin or the sin by which the just person separates from God, causes the withdrawal of Grace.
My Comment: The sin causes the withdrawal of Grace; not the permission to sin.
P325
Divine Permission of Sin
It is a non-conservation of a certain created liberty in good
It is not a good
It is not an evil
It is not a privation of a good due to us
It is a negation of a good not due to us
Philosophy teaches that privation means more than negation
My Comment: A Negation of a good not due to us means God can give to each person what He wants.
God did not owe it to Himself to preserve Lucifer or Adam in a state of innocence from every transgression
Permission of sin is not a punishment
but withdrawal of Grace is a punishment:
STh., I-II q.79 a.3
Aquinas: The other thing is the withdrawal of grace, the result of which is that the mind is not enlightened by God to see aright, and man’s heart is not softened to live aright; and as regards this God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.
My Comment: GL says that Calvin believed withdrawal of grace means permission of sin .
Aquinas says withdrawal of grace means more than just permission of sin. This withdrawal
also means punishment for sin.
Permission of a second sin is a punishment for the first sin (STh., I-II q.79 a.3)
Divine Cause (Physical Premotion) and the Physical Act of Sin
Augustine, On the Trinity 3.4.9
And so it comes to pass that the will of God is the first and the highest cause of all corporeal appearances and motions. For nothing is done visibly or sensibly, unless either by command or permission....
STh., I-II q.79 a.2
I answer that, The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in both respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode of its being, must be derived from the First Being, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. v.). Again every action is caused by something existing in act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as it is in act: and every being in act is reduced to the First Act, viz. God, as to its cause, Who is act by His Essence. Therefore God is the cause of every action, in so far as it is an action.—But sin denotes a being and an action with a defect: and this defect is from created cause, viz. the free-will, as falling away from the order of the First Agent, viz. God. Consequently this defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but to the free-will: even as the defect of limping is reduced to a crooked leg as its cause, but not to the motive power, which nevertheless causes whatever there is of movement in the limping. Accordingly God is the cause of the act of sin: and yet He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act to have a defect.
My Propositions:
God is the cause of the ACT of sin
God is NOT the cause of sin
God is NOT the cause of sin because He is NOT the cause of the defect
P326
The Divine Concurrence explained by St. Thomas (above) is not the Simultaneous Concurrence of Molina. Using the analogy of two men rowing a boat, neither of the two men rowing the boat moves the other. This divine concurrence precedes the physical act of sin or it would not be the cause of it. This means the divine concurrence is not a simultaneous concurrence but, rather, a Premotion. It is a Predetermining but not a necessitating Premotion.
Divine Motion presupposes in God an eternal decree which is:
Positive and effective as regards the physical entity of sin
Permissive as regards the deficiency
Independently of this twofold decree on God’s part, sin was merely possible, but it was not either a conditional or absolute future.
P327
For instance, if from all eternity God had not permitted it, the sin of Judas would not have happened; it would have been merely possible. But God having permitted it from all eternity to happen in this particular manner, place, and time, it had to happen freely and infallibly at this particular time and not before, with its particular kind of malice and not any other. Therefore the sin of Judas presupposed an eternal decree, positive as regards the physical entity of the act, permissive as regards its deficiency. It is the same with every sin that happens in time.
My Propositions:
Without God’s permission, the sin of Judas would not have happened
Without God’s permission, the sin of Judas would only have been possible
With God’s permission from all eternity it had to happen in a particular manner, place and time and not before
With God’s permission, it had to happen freely and infallibly
With God’s permission, it had to happen with a particular kind of malice
The decree regarding the sin of Judas was positive as to the physical entity of the act
The decree regarding the sin of Judaswas permissive as to its deficiency.
Principle: Faculties, habits and acts are specified by their object as part of definition of Free Will
The essence of Liberty consists in the dominating indifference of the Will with regard to every object proposed by the reason as at the moment good in one aspect, and not good in another, according to the formula of St. Thomas:
STh., I-II q.10 a.2
If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to it of necessity
My Comment: What this is saying is that “Each” object has good aspects and bad aspects about it. This means the Will will not look at “any” object with absolute Necessity. If the object always looked perfect the Will would always seek it. (All of this is a reminder too that the Intellect is involved and not just the Will; the intellect seems to have a lot to do with the object)
Even when the Will, in fact, actually Wills this object, when it is already determined to Will this, it is still inclined freely toward this with a dominating indifference that is no longer potential but actual.
My Comment: This means the Will is really free (dominating indifference) all the way through to the act.
The Thomists also say in opposition to Suarez, that not even His absolute power can God move our Will by necessity to Will a certain object, the indifference of judgement remaining as it is, so long as we judge the object to be good in one aspect and not so in another.
“Although the will wills the last end by a certain necessary inclination, it is nevertheless in no way to be granted that it is forced to will it. For force is nothing else but the infliction of some violence. According to the Philosopher that is violent “whose principle is outside it with the being which suffers the violence contributing nothing.” The throwing of a stone upward would be an example, because the stone of itself is not at all inclined to that motion. But seeing that the will is an inclination by the fact of its being an appetite, it cannot happen that the will should will anything without having an inclination to it. Thus it is impossible for the will to will anything by force or violently even though it does will something by a natural inclination. It is therefore evident that the will does not will anything necessarily with the necessity of force, yet it does will something necessarily with the necessity of natural inclination.” (Questiones Disputatae de Veritate, q.22, a.5)
My Comment: The Dominating Indifference ensures that man’s Will is truly free and that God cannot override this and move us by necessity to a particular object. God cannot override this because He is already the one actualizing the dominating indifference.
The Divine Motion is the cause of our Free Act
Free Act depends on 3 different Causalities:
P322
(1) the objective attraction of a particular good
(2) the direction of the intellect in forming a practical judgement
(3) the efficiency or production of the free choice of the Will
The Divine Motion transcends and actualizes these 3 causes without violating free Will.
(9) Premotion 6
P324
The Divine Motion and the Physical Act of Sin Principle
God is not the cause of sin directly or indirectly
Directly - inclining our Will to sin
Indirectly - by neglecting to keep us from sinning
This divine permission is not the cause of sin. This permission allows sin to happen. If God did not permit it, did not allow it to happen, there would be no sin.
This divine permission is not a punishment - why? Because the first sin or the sin by which the just person separates from God, causes the withdrawal of Grace.
My Comment: The sin causes the withdrawal of Grace; not the permission to sin.
P325
Divine Permission of Sin
It is a non-conservation of a certain created liberty in good
It is not a good
It is not an evil
It is not a privation of a good due to us
It is a negation of a good not due to us
Philosophy teaches that privation means more than negation
My Comment: A Negation of a good not due to us means God can give to each person what He wants.
God did not owe it to Himself to preserve Lucifer or Adam in a state of innocence from every transgression
Permission of sin is not a punishment
but withdrawal of Grace is a punishment:
STh., I-II q.79 a.3
Aquinas: The other thing is the withdrawal of grace, the result of which is that the mind is not enlightened by God to see aright, and man’s heart is not softened to live aright; and as regards this God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.
My Comment: GL says that Calvin believed withdrawal of grace means permission of sin .
Aquinas says withdrawal of grace means more than just permission of sin. This withdrawal
also means punishment for sin.
Permission of a second sin is a punishment for the first sin (STh., I-II q.79 a.3)
Divine Cause (Physical Premotion) and the Physical Act of Sin
Augustine, On the Trinity 3.4.9
And so it comes to pass that the will of God is the first and the highest cause of all corporeal appearances and motions. For nothing is done visibly or sensibly, unless either by command or permission....
STh., I-II q.79 a.2
I answer that, The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in both respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode of its being, must be derived from the First Being, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. v.). Again every action is caused by something existing in act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as it is in act: and every being in act is reduced to the First Act, viz. God, as to its cause, Who is act by His Essence. Therefore God is the cause of every action, in so far as it is an action.—But sin denotes a being and an action with a defect: and this defect is from created cause, viz. the free-will, as falling away from the order of the First Agent, viz. God. Consequently this defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but to the free-will: even as the defect of limping is reduced to a crooked leg as its cause, but not to the motive power, which nevertheless causes whatever there is of movement in the limping. Accordingly God is the cause of the act of sin: and yet He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act to have a defect.
My Propositions:
God is the cause of the ACT of sin
God is NOT the cause of sin
God is NOT the cause of sin because He is NOT the cause of the defect
P326
The Divine Concurrence explained by St. Thomas (above) is not the Simultaneous Concurrence of Molina. Using the analogy of two men rowing a boat, neither of the two men rowing the boat moves the other. This divine concurrence precedes the physical act of sin or it would not be the cause of it. This means the divine concurrence is not a simultaneous concurrence but, rather, a Premotion. It is a Predetermining but not a necessitating Premotion.
Divine Motion presupposes in God an eternal decree which is:
Positive and effective as regards the physical entity of sin
Permissive as regards the deficiency
Independently of this twofold decree on God’s part, sin was merely possible, but it was not either a conditional or absolute future.
P327
For instance, if from all eternity God had not permitted it, the sin of Judas would not have happened; it would have been merely possible. But God having permitted it from all eternity to happen in this particular manner, place, and time, it had to happen freely and infallibly at this particular time and not before, with its particular kind of malice and not any other. Therefore the sin of Judas presupposed an eternal decree, positive as regards the physical entity of the act, permissive as regards its deficiency. It is the same with every sin that happens in time.
My Propositions:
Without God’s permission, the sin of Judas would not have happened
Without God’s permission, the sin of Judas would only have been possible
With God’s permission from all eternity it had to happen in a particular manner, place and time and not before
With God’s permission, it had to happen freely and infallibly
With God’s permission, it had to happen with a particular kind of malice
The decree regarding the sin of Judas was positive as to the physical entity of the act
The decree regarding the sin of Judaswas permissive as to its deficiency.