Did FDR deliberately allow the Pearl Harbor attack ?

[robycop3]

This is a question that has raged for many years, and its answer has come forth only after the deaths of virtually every govt. & military official in power when the attack occurred.

That answer is: THE BLAME FOR UNPREPAREDNESS FOR THAT ATTACK MUST BE SHARED BY MANY !
First, there was an almost-universal contempt for Japan's military prowess. They were viewed as having inferior equipment, being a lot less in population & resources than us, & being physically & mentally inferior to us. Our boys paid no attention to their modern ships & aircraft, & especially their optics, their determined character, their eyesight & hearing being equal to ours, & the fact that a small man can shoot as well as a large man, while presenting a smaller target. They didn't believe Japan would commit "national seppuku" by attacking us.

Second, as relations deterioriated between the nations, it appeared that Japan would attack the Philippines or Malaya if they attacked anyone at all, or they'd possibly attack Russia if German victory seemed imminent over Russia.

The US govt. didn't know Japan was in a hurry to create the "Southeast Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" & saw the US oil embargo, brought about by Japan's activity against China, as a huge threat to her military capability. Meanwhile, the US wanted to drag out negotiations to end this embargo long enough to complete a large military buildup in the Philippines to serve as a deterrent to Japan's attacking there or Malaya.

Before relations deterioriated, then-Sec. of State henry Stimson declared, "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail", referring to the Intelligence Depts. of the govt. & military, thus resulting in both those intel orgs being understaffed. When relations deterioriated, there was a vast volume of radio intercepts pouring into those orgs, resulting in a backlog of deciphering and evaluations of their significance. Still, there was little indication of the planned PH attack. However, early in 1941, Sec. of Navy Frank Knox had sent a letter to now-Sec. of War Stimson, advising him thatanj attack on PH was very possible, & that defenses against air attack were lacking. Stimson forwarded that letter to Gen. Walter Short, Commander of Hawaii air defense, & Adm. Husband Kimmel, Pacific Navy Commander. here is where Short & Kimmel's share of the blame comes in. Knox had even accurately advised that PH was vulnerable from the north, which was where the attack came from, & that recon should be stepped up there. However, neither Short nor Kimmel beefed up that recon, being more-concerned with possible sabotage by the large Japanese population of Hawaii.

But those 2 commanders were not apprised of ANY intel suggesting an attack pn PH might be imminent, still being told that Japan would likely attack in a place much-closer to Japan. There had been frequent "imminent war alerts" sent out by the govt. so those commanders had become a little jaded to them, but even when indicators had begun to come in that PH might be attacked, they were NOT advised ! (Putting a base on full war alert costs $$, & the commanders didn't want to waste money when attack didn't seem imminent.) Thus, they were caught with their pants down by the attack.

The Intel Depts. also had to choose what was important to send to FDR for immediate attention, & were usually a few days behind due to the aforementioned understaffing & the vast volume of intercepts. Thus, FDR was not aware of the impending PH attack, either. Also, the Japanese were successful in dispatching their carriers for the attack without being detected.

When news of the attack came to FDR's attention, he immediately acted with great dispatch in ordering the mobilization of all our military. Later that day, he learned that the attack had come BEFORE Japan had declared war, and his anger over that was evident in his speech to Congress asking for a declaration of war.

Yes, the blame must be shared by the top military command, & the Depts. of State & War. They under-estimated Japan's ability to wage war, & had inadequate intel orgs to keep up with events. While it was well-known FDR was highly-sympathetic to Britain, he certainly didn't deliberately allow the PH attack to occur as a causus belli for an excuse to join Britain against the Axis.

 

[InTheLight]

My dad was in the Army Signal Corps in Hawaii (starting in early 1942) and he would often tell me what he had heard about the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor from his colleagues that were there when the attack occurred.

He claimed that General Walter Short was well aware of Japan's plans to attack PH, and had been warned on Saturday, December 6th that it could happen any day, perhaps even the very next day. Short, having heard these warnings many times, went out partying and got drunk that Saturday night.

As to FDR my dad said he had been told that FDR knew about an attack, likely coming in December, but failed to take action because he wanted to go to war in Europe and saw a Japanese attack as a way to get in the fight against Hitler. Thus, FDR "allowed" the attack to happen.

I never really believed it. I'm merely repeating what I'd heard umpteen times from my dad. None of this is new, it's been around for 79 years now.

Sent from my Pixel 2 XL using Tapatalk

 

[robycop3]

My dad was in the Army Signal Corps in Hawaii (starting in early 1942) and he would often tell me what he had heard about the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor from his colleagues that were there when the attack occurred.

He claimed that General Walter Short was well aware of Japan's plans to attack PH, and had been warned on Saturday, December 6th that it could happen any day, perhaps even the very next day. Short, having heard these warnings many times, went out partying and got drunk that Saturday night.

As to FDR my dad said he had been told that FDR knew about an attack, likely coming in December, but failed to take action because he wanted to go to war in Europe and saw a Japanese attack as a way to get in the fight against Hitler. Thus, FDR "allowed" the attack to happen.

I never really believed it. I'm merely repeating what I'd heard umpteen times from my dad. None of this is new, it's been around for 79 years now.

Sent from my Pixel 2 XL using Tapatalk

I believe I found the most-reliable sources, next to the actual transcripts of the intercepts of Japanese radio traffic, most of which are still boxed upstairs in the National Archives.

The reason so much of that traffic was classified was to protect the reputations of many of the officers & bureaucrats involved. Both Short & Kimmel had been very-able officers before the attack, but they were made scapegoats for the attack in the great game of PTOA that occurs in govt. & military when something goes wrong. (Look at all the excuses made after the space shuttle disaster.)

As I said, Short & Kimmel bear SOME blame for being caught off-guard, but certainly not the MAJORITY of it. More falls on the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff, & on the bureaucrats of the State & War Depts.

Far as FDR goes, he was advised daily about the progress of negotiations with the Japanese diplomats. And, as I said earlier, the intel brought to him was often several days old due to the sheer volume an understaffed intel org had to sift through. And Japanese pre-planning played no small part. Their plans were in place, so no radio traffic at all had to be used when the carriers set sail. And the Japanese used the carriers' known call signs when they were actually talking to other ships that had been told of their "new" call signs. Remember, the Japanese had been planning this attack for some time before launching it, so it went almost like clockwork. (However, after the attack, some of their codes had been recovered by the USN from a downed plane, leading to better deciphering of their further plans.)

Somebody simply told your dad wrong. (My dad was in the ETO & didn't know much about the Pacific war.) As you said, the story has been around for 79 years, & it was much-hotter in 1946 than it is now.

 

[carpro]

Let's just say that it looks like FDR took every diplomatic and economic action he could that would likely provoke the Japanese to some kind of drastic action, and leave it at that.

 

[Reynolds]

This is a question that has raged for many years, and its answer has come forth only after the deaths of virtually every govt. & military official in power when the attack occurred.

That answer is: THE BLAME FOR UNPREPAREDNESS FOR THAT ATTACK MUST BE SHARED BY MANY !
First, there was an almost-universal contempt for Japan's military prowess. They were viewed as having inferior equipment, being a lot less in population & resources than us, & being physically & mentally inferior to us. Our boys paid no attention to their modern ships & aircraft, & especially their optics, their determined character, their eyesight & hearing being equal to ours, & the fact that a small man can shoot as well as a large man, while presenting a smaller target. They didn't believe Japan would commit "national seppuku" by attacking us.

Second, as relations deterioriated between the nations, it appeared that Japan would attack the Philippines or Malaya if they attacked anyone at all, or they'd possibly attack Russia if German victory seemed imminent over Russia.

The US govt. didn't know Japan was in a hurry to create the "Southeast Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" & saw the US oil embargo, brought about by Japan's activity against China, as a huge threat to her military capability. Meanwhile, the US wanted to drag out negotiations to end this embargo long enough to complete a large military buildup in the Philippines to serve as a deterrent to Japan's attacking there or Malaya.

Before relations deterioriated, then-Sec. of State henry Stimson declared, "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail", referring to the Intelligence Depts. of the govt. & military, thus resulting in both those intel orgs being understaffed. When relations deterioriated, there was a vast volume of radio intercepts pouring into those orgs, resulting in a backlog of deciphering and evaluations of their significance. Still, there was little indication of the planned PH attack. However, early in 1941, Sec. of Navy Frank Knox had sent a letter to now-Sec. of War Stimson, advising him thatanj attack on PH was very possible, & that defenses against air attack were lacking. Stimson forwarded that letter to Gen. Walter Short, Commander of Hawaii air defense, & Adm. Husband Kimmel, Pacific Navy Commander. here is where Short & Kimmel's share of the blame comes in. Knox had even accurately advised that PH was vulnerable from the north, which was where the attack came from, & that recon should be stepped up there. However, neither Short nor Kimmel beefed up that recon, being more-concerned with possible sabotage by the large Japanese population of Hawaii.

But those 2 commanders were not apprised of ANY intel suggesting an attack pn PH might be imminent, still being told that Japan would likely attack in a place much-closer to Japan. There had been frequent "imminent war alerts" sent out by the govt. so those commanders had become a little jaded to them, but even when indicators had begun to come in that PH might be attacked, they were NOT advised ! (Putting a base on full war alert costs $$, & the commanders didn't want to waste money when attack didn't seem imminent.) Thus, they were caught with their pants down by the attack.

The Intel Depts. also had to choose what was important to send to FDR for immediate attention, & were usually a few days behind due to the aforementioned understaffing & the vast volume of intercepts. Thus, FDR was not aware of the impending PH attack, either. Also, the Japanese were successful in dispatching their carriers for the attack without being detected.

When news of the attack came to FDR's attention, he immediately acted with great dispatch in ordering the mobilization of all our military. Later that day, he learned that the attack had come BEFORE Japan had declared war, and his anger over that was evident in his speech to Congress asking for a declaration of war.

Yes, the blame must be shared by the top military command, & the Depts. of State & War. They under-estimated Japan's ability to wage war, & had inadequate intel orgs to keep up with events. While it was well-known FDR was highly-sympathetic to Britain, he certainly didn't deliberately allow the PH attack to occur as a causus belli for an excuse to join Britain against the Axis.

I am sure he knew. Thats why the carriers were not there.

 

[Reformed]

Conspiracy theorists love these topics, mostly because the topics never have neat tied-off answers.

I was a young Air Force morse intercept operator that was stationed at RAF Chicksands, England. In the spring of 1981, my flight (platoon in the Army and Marine Corps) had to attend a briefing by a retired Navy signals intelligence officer. This gentleman was a morse code operator stationed at Pearl Harbor in 1941. He was on duty during the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941. One of the things he spoke to us about was the lack of signals intelligence (SIGINT). Throughout the summer and autumn of 1941, Army and Navy SIGINT operators made regular intercept of Japanese morse code and voice transmissions on HF frequencies at listening posts at Pearl Harbor and Manila in the Philippines. All the messages were coded, which means all intercepted traffic was examined by analysts who were tasked with determining what the transmissions meant. To this end, code breakers worked with the analysts. None of the intercepted transmissions pointed to any specific action against Pearl Harbor or the Philippines.

In late autumn of 1941 Japanese morse and intercept traffic slowed down considerably. It did not stop, it was cut to less than half. Two weeks before the attacks (Pearl Harbor and the Philippines), intercepted Japanese traffic was reduced even further. Most of the transmissions during this period were operational tests with no traffic being passed. When the impending attacks were within the 72 hour launch window virtually all Japanese HF transmissions ceased. This lack of SIGINT was highly unusual and was a definite concern for the war department. No one knew for sure that a Japanese attack was imminent, but suspicions were high that something was up. Unfortunately, there were no stepped up reconnaissance flights or naval patrols in the waters west of Hawaii. Had the Japanese fleet been spotted just one hour before its planes launched, the damage done to the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor would have been less severe.

The lesson this retired officer taught us was to raise an alert if formerly active targets all of a sudden go silent. The lack of activity is often more valuable intelligence than activity itself. The funny thing is that nearly two years before I arrived at Chicksands, Soviet Air Force morse and voice targets reduced transmissions to almost nil 48 hours before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on 25 December 1979. It was a repeat of what Japan had done in 1941. The difference this time was that the Pentagon took this lack of SIGINT as an indication that the Soviets were going to invade Afghanistan.

What did I take out of this briefing? FDR did not have advance knowledge of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor or the Philippines. However, there was credible intelligence that an attack was possible somewhere against U.S. interests. This knowledge should have lead to increased reconnaissance. This puts a healthy dose of blame on those responsible for that decision.

 

[RighteousnessTemperance&]

Conspiracy theorists love these topics, mostly because the topics never have neat tied-off answers.

I was a young Air Force morse intercept operator that was stationed at RAF Chicksands, England. In the spring of 1981, my flight (platoon in the Army and Marine Corps) had to attend a briefing by a retired Navy signals intelligence officer. This gentleman was a morse code operator stationed at Pearl Harbor in 1941. He was on duty during the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941. One of the things he spoke to us about was the lack of signals intelligence (SIGINT). Throughout the summer and autumn of 1941, Army and Navy SIGINT operators made regular intercept of Japanese morse code and voice transmissions on HF frequencies at listening posts at Pearl Harbor and Manila in the Philippines. All the messages were coded, which means all intercepted traffic was examined by analysts who were tasked with determining what the transmissions meant. To this end, code breakers worked with the analysts. None of the intercepted transmissions pointed to any specific action against Pearl Harbor or the Philippines.

In late autumn of 1941 Japanese morse and intercept traffic slowed down considerably. It did not stop, it was cut to less than half. Two weeks before the attacks (Pearl Harbor and the Philippines), intercepted Japanese traffic was reduced even further. Most of the transmissions during this period were operational tests with no traffic being passed. When the impending attacks were within the 72 hour launch window virtually all Japanese HF transmissions ceased. This lack of SIGINT was highly unusual and was a definite concern for the war department. No one knew for sure that a Japanese attack was imminent, but suspicions were high that something was up. Unfortunately, there were no stepped up reconnaissance flights or naval patrols in the waters west of Hawaii. Had the Japanese fleet been spotted just one hour before its planes launched, the damage done to the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor would have been less severe.

The lesson this retired officer taught us was to raise an alert if formerly active targets all of a sudden go silent. The lack of activity is often more valuable intelligence than activity itself. The funny thing is that nearly two years before I arrived at Chicksands, Soviet Air Force morse and voice targets reduced transmissions to almost nil 48 hours before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on 25 December 1979. It was a repeat of what Japan had done in 1941. The difference this time was that the Pentagon took this lack of SIGINT as an indication that the Soviets were going to invade Afghanistan.

What did I take out of this briefing? FDR did not have advance knowledge of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor or the Philippines. However, there was credible intelligence that an attack was possible somewhere against U.S. interests. This knowledge should have lead to increased reconnaissance. This puts a healthy dose of blame on those responsible for that decision.

Most informative and useful. Thanks for relaying.

 

[robycop3]

The civilian USA powers-that-were then were actively negotiating with the Japanese diplomats to attempt to reach a modus vivendi, that is, a temporary arrangement both sides could live with til a more-permanent settlement could be reached. However, on Nov. 26 or 27, some intel reached FDR, presumably about a Japanese troop convoy that had left Shanghai, apparently heading for Thailand. This intel was rumored to have come from Churchill. (It was no secret Churchill wanted more American help, & FDR wanted an excuse to provide it.) Soon after, the American delegation presented a plan they knew the Japanese wouldn't accept, that included a complete withdrawal from China. Thus, negotiations ended, for then.

The USA was on war alert then, as they knew Japan had no real alternatives with their oil supply from the USA cut off, which would soon immobilize their military. However, they shortly re-opened negotiations in one last attempt to prevent war.

All indications were pointing to a Japanese attack against Malaya, the Philippines, or Thailand. The USA under-estimated Japan's ability to conduct simultaneous attacks, & there was no recent intel pointing to an attack on PH. The USA tried to rush more bombers to the Philippines to deter Japan from starting a war; they were still doing that when they attacked PH. Yes, the USA was on war alert, but in the wrong area !

However, Japan made a HUGE mistake ! the attack was supposed to come AFTER a declaration of war, but their Dept. of Diplomacy messed up, & their US Embassy was slow in deciphering the war declaration message, so that declaration wasn't presented to the USA until AFTER the PH attack weas over. That fueled the massive amount of anger against Japan, as it turned the PH attack into a SNEAK attack, in much the same manner as Germany had attacked Russia. Just about every American still living will tell you that the fact of a sneak attack made them work that much harder against Japan.

There's no doubt that Yamamoto was horrified when he learned of the diplomatic SNAFU. There's some doubt that he uttered the words, "I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve" but some of his staff said he did indeed make that statement. He had studied at Harvard & had been posted in the USA for several years, & knew American nature & capability quite well. He knew the Americans would fight extra-hard because of the sneak attack.

 

[RighteousnessTemperance&]

...
However, Japan made a HUGE mistake ! the attack was supposed to come AFTER a declaration of war, but their Dept. of Diplomacy messed up, & their US Embassy was slow in deciphering the war declaration message, so that declaration wasn't presented to the USA until AFTER the PH attack weas over. That fueled the massive amount of anger against Japan, as it turned the PH attack into a SNEAK attack, in much the same manner as Germany had attacked Russia. Just about every American still living will tell you that the fact of a sneak attack made them work that much harder against Japan.
...

What real evidence is there that this was actually the case? How serious was the "error"?

What constituted a sneak attack at the time? How many seconds after declaring war did a nation have to wait before striking in order that it not be construed as a "sneak attack"?

 

[robycop3]

What real evidence is there that this was actually the case? How serious was the "error"?

What constituted a sneak attack at the time? How many seconds after declaring war did a nation have to wait before striking in order that it not be construed as a "sneak attack"?

The declaration of war wasn't handed to Mssrs. Stimson & Hull until a full 1.5 hours AFTER the PH attack had occurred. The times were recorded by their offices. The declaration arrived about 1430 hrs. while the attack began 1248, EST, Washington DC time. Hull had been informed before he met with the Japanese diplomats, who didn't know about the attack themselves, & were surprised at his angry demeanor toward them. Those Japanese had no advance warning of the attack, either. (At least our govt. arranged for them to safely leave the country.)

 

[RighteousnessTemperance&]

The declaration of war wasn't handed to Mssrs. Stimson & Hull until a full 1.5 hours AFTER the PH attack had occurred. The times were recorded by their offices. The declaration arrived about 1430 hrs. while the attack began 1248, EST, Washington DC time. Hull had been informed before he met with the Japanese diplomats, who didn't know about the attack themselves, & were surprised at his angry demeanor toward them. Those Japanese had no advance warning of the attack, either. (At least our govt. arranged for them to safely leave the country.)

I may have been unclear. Perhaps if you listed all of the times, and explained what is meant by "their Dept of Diplomacy" a case could be made for an unintentional delay. Need: time the message was sent by Japan, time the message was rec'd by the Japanese Embassy in the US, the normal amount of time to decode that length of message and deliver, the amount of time it actually took. But you also have to demonstrate that the message wasn't deliberately delayed during or after decoding. On what basis must that be assumed? Were they drinking too much sake to perform their duties? How many committed seppuku for their gross error?

What safeguards were in place to avoid such a catastrophic diplomatic mistake? Did they really care?