Pardon the length, but let me post this on Deut 4.
The first part merely sets up the occasion: If these strictures are met (the four things), then this is the outcome. It is important to note that divorce was not commanded and that remarriage was assumed. Now, as for the reasoning behind this (remarriage is assumed but following a second divorce, the woman cannot return to her first husband), we are not sure. Consider the following options. (The weird words are the Hebrew characters that do not transliterate well. Since I don't want to go correct them all, the letters represent the ervath debar ... the unclean thing.
Remarriage
The particular reason for the prohibition of remarriage to the original spouse is not explicitly stated. Several reasons have been suggested (1-4 are from Kysar, 1978, pp. 24-25).
1. It might be considered adulterous. “This seems unlikely since it is not so stated. Moreover, if the woman’s second marriage is not considered adulterous, why should remarriage to her first husband be deemed adultery?” (Kysar, 1978, p. 25). Furthermore, remarriage to a third husband is not prohibited, thereby ruling this option unlikely since adultery would be adultery whether returning to the original spouse or establishing a marriage with a third (or fourth, fifth, etc.) spouse.
2. It might be a simple instance of a “taboo,” an unwritten, cultural practice beyond explanation to the modern mind removed by centuries.
3. Luck argues that this passage is protection for the woman married to a husband “who is set on ceasing to provide for his covenant partner. This permission makes it possible for her to be provided for by another man (Luck, 1987, p. 65). Laney likewise argues that the bill of divorcement was given to “protect the rejected wife after marriage to another man [though] it does not alter God’s original plan for marriage” (Laney, 1981, p. 33). It may have served to protect the woman and provide for her legitimate subsistence in the occasion of a divorce. A legal divorce instrument would free the woman to remarry and thus avoid prostitution as one of the only means for a woman to support herself (Feinberg, 1993, p. 311). This seems valid reasoning but appears to be a non sequitur to the prohibition against remarriage.
4. Heth concludes with Wenham that the first marriage is irreconcilable after the second divorce or death because the first marriage constituted the establishment of a “close relationship” which would make subsequent remarriage to the original spouse a form of incest. He says, “one thing seems certain: the ‘one-flesh’ bond of marriage is not dissolved by legal or customary divorce nor by sexual relations with a third party.” He concludes, “Deuteronomy has taken the theological logic of Leviticus to its limit” (Heth and Wenham, 1984, p. 110). Yet it is more likely that Heth and Wenham have taken the theological logic of Deuteronomy beyond its limit.
5. It might have discouraged hasty divorce. MacLeod gives five guarantees against hasty divorce: “definite and substantial grounds,” a proper legal instrument, the implication that a public official must be brought in to assure rights and protections, formal dismissal, and irrevocability (MacLeod, pt 2, 1993, p. 30). Thus there were some limits, however broad or narrow they might be, on the divorce. A man could not, as the Pharisees asked, divorce his wife for any reason. Thus, the later rabbinical interpretation that the Pharisees referenced was indeed beyond the scope of the text.
6. It might have protected the second husband from the second thoughts of the first husband who might desire to have his wife return to him. Some have suggested that since the wife had gained a second dowry, the first husband might now be driven by financial gain. In such a case, the rb*d* tw~r+u# for which he originally divorced her has become less important in view of the financial gain (Walton in Brewer, 1998, p. 235).
One of the last two makes the most sense, i.e., it was protecting and encouraging the sanctity of marriage. The precise reason for the prohibition might be only an academic exercise for the NT believer however since the Law is no longer in effect. All of these solutions have their problems. Forced to choose, the protection against hasty divorce and the protection for the second husband against the second thoughts of the first husband seem most attractive. However, the point that rings clearly to the modern theologian is, as Harrell says, “The Old Testament assumes in the Deuteronomic passage the right of the divorced parties to remarry” (Harrell, 1967, p. 71). Whatever the rb*d* tw~r+u# was, and whatever the reason for the prohibition against remarriage to the original spouse, the right of the divorced parties to remarry is accepted rather than prohibited.
Conclusions
In summation, on the basis of this text, we cannot conclude that divorce is “impossible,” that a divorced couple is still married in God’s sight. If such were true, then the “remarriage” to the original spouse would not be a remarriage; it would only be a reconciliation of an existing marriage. We can also conclude that divorce was a reality which, in the text of Scripture in this passage, is neither condemned nor condoned. It is merely accepted as a part of the status quo. This does not suggest that it had divine approval or sanction. The provision of Deuteronomy 24 serves to regulate an area of life that must have been a problem. We can conclude that this passage understood in the light of rb*d* tw~r+u# as well as in the light of Genesis 22 cannot be maintained to permit divorce for any reason. There were definite, though non-preserved standards for which a person might divorce. Lastly we can conclude that the right of remarriage was assumed in the event of a divorce.
