Does anyone understand "Middle Knowledge?"

Skypair, you still haven't given me that illustration from WLC's book. :thumbs:

 

Excuse me for intervening. It’s been a while since looking at WLC’s writings, but while checking on a few things I came across some of what you guys might be addressing here:


“That is to say, God's knowledge of a particular set of propositions depends asymmetrically on His knowledge of a certain other set of propositions and is in this sense posterior to it. In the first, unconditioned moment God knows all possibilia, not only all individual essences, but also all possible worlds. Molina calls such knowledge "natural knowledge" because the content of such knowledge is essential to God and in no way depends on the free decisions of His will. By means of His natural knowledge, then, God has knowledge of every contingent state of affairs which could possibly obtain and of what the exemplification of the individual essence of any free creature could freely choose to do in any such state of affairs that should be actual.
In the second moment, God possesses knowledge of all true counterfactual propositions, including counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. That is to say, He knows what contingent states of affairs would obtain if certain antecedent states of affairs were to obtain; whereas by His natural knowledge God knew what any free creature could do in any set of circumstances, now in this second moment God knows what any free creature would do in any set of circumstances. This is not because the circumstances causally determine the creature's choice, but simply because this is how the creature would freely choose. God thus knows that were He to actualize certain states of affairs, then certain other contingent states of affairs would obtain. Molina calls this counterfactual knowledge "middle knowledge" because it stands in between the first and third moment in divine knowledge. Middle knowledge is like natural knowledge in that such knowledge does not depend on any decision of the divine will; God does not determine which counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are true or false. Thus, if it is true that…” (No Other Name – Dr. William Lane Craig)

 

“Third, the Scriptures are replete with counterfactual statements, so that the Christian theist, at least, should be committed to the truth of certain counterfactuals about free, creaturely actions. The Church has never, until the modern age, doubted that God possesses knowledge of true counterfactuals concerning free, creaturely decisions; the whole dispute focused on whether He possessed that knowledge logically prior to the divine creative decree or only posterior to the divine decree. The Church's confidence that God knows such truths is rooted in the Scriptures themselves. To pick but one example, Paul, in reflecting upon God's eternal salvific plan realized in Christ, asserts, "None of the rulers of this age understood this; for if they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory" (I Cor. 2.8). By "the rulers of this age" Paul means either the Jewish and Roman authorities such as Herod and Pilate who were the historical agents who instigated or carried out the crucifixion (cf. Acts 4. 27–28) or, more plausibly, the spiritual principalities and powers who rule "this present evil age" (Gal. 1. 4; cf. I Cor. 2. 6). In either case, we have here a counterfactual about creaturely free actions. So is Paul's assertion true or not? Will we have the temerity to say that Paul was wrong? Since the Church believes that Paul was inspired by the Holy Spirit to write these words, she accepts them as revealed truth from God. Thus, we have strong prima facie warrant for holding that there are true counterfactuals concerning what creatures would freely do under various circumstances.” (Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the “Grounding Objection” - Dr. William Lane Craig)

 

Here is a good way to exercise our free will (or whatever you want to call it):

Proverbs 3

5 Trust in the LORD with all thine heart; and lean not unto thine own understanding.
6 In all thy ways acknowledge him, and he shall direct thy paths.
7 Be not wise in thine own eyes: fear the LORD, and depart from evil.

HankD​

 

Absolutely, God's Word was not meant to confuse anyone but to lead man to a saving knowledge of Jesus Christ. :jesus:

 

I think all these discussions are trying to get at explaining passages like Luke 10:13, where Jesus says "Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the mighty works that were done in you would have been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented a great while ago." So he obviously knows what would have happened if circumstances had been different, and what would be needed to get specific people to repent.

But all these explanations of Molinism/MK seem to me to add up to the following problems:

1. God's knowledge is still knowledge, however you divide it up. Therefore in MK god seems to me to be making the creation decision based on his knowledge. This is a problem, for we then have a god that is in process, making decisions based on things he has known (or possibly even learned). Rather, Peter says that election is according to knowledge, not based on knowledge.

2. The presupposition of all this is to save autonomous free will of man. Therefor MK is proposed to avoid open theism, where God doesn't know the future. If I understand Benjamin's post, he's pointing out that MK refutes OT. But IMO, MK brings up more issues, and is not the ultimate answer.

3. In Benjamin's quotes from WLC, he clearly speaks of God in "moments", and making decisions logically prior to the divine decree to create the actual world. This has God clearly making decisions in sequence. Even if they are a logical sequence, we still have a God who learns based on the free act of a created being. This is a big problem.

4. As Brandon pointed out, the modern advocates of MK have not solved the ontological questions (questions about 'being' or existence). This is because they don't study ontology or metaphysics.


Adding to this problem is that WLC denies the doctrine of the simplicity of God. Here, simplicity means "non-compound" or "not composed." He clearly states in his philosophy book that God has components, and is in time. So in WLC's system, we have a god that has compartments to his knowlege, takes facts in a logical sequence and makes decisions based on created beings, and is limited by time. These are BIG problems.

Now I think WLC denies open theism, but it seems to me to be headed down that path. He has to be inconsistent to deny them.

The solution, as Brandon hinted, is that God works through the free will of man, and is in eternity, not in time. He does not make decisions in sequence, logically or chronologically. He is simple (i.e., one essence), and therefore his decisions and his knowledge are simultaneous. Neither are based on the other.

Excellent thread.

 

What about when He became flesh and entered the time continuum?

Luke 2:52 And Jesus increased in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God and man.​

HankD

 

Christ has two natures, the divine and the human. The human was in time.

 

They're not separable. Our finite minds cannot fathom this, but they are not separable. That's how the 1st century gnosticism started.

 

I think the language of the Council of Chalcedon described it best.........

“at once complete in Godhead and complete in manhood, truly God and truly man…recognized in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation, the distinction of the natures being in no way annulled by the union.”

You are correct that the two natures are not separable.

 

Can God make a rock so big that He can not even lift it? :laugh: Can He not be true to His nature and still be Truth? Can He actualize a creation with morally responsible agents having creaturely freedom and determine all aspects of how they act?

 

WLC seems to disagree with the simplicity put forth in the classical view of God’s foreknowledge.

As for the endeavor of comparing MK to Open Theism; MK attempts to reconcile Divine foreknowledge with creaturely freedoms, it does not deny God’s foreknowledge, but rather disputes the simplicity of man’s classical boxing of this attribute. Match up this MK/OT comparison to a proposal that opposition to widening the view on Divine foreknowledge must acknowledge Divine Determinism as their view, being they are consistent in causal determination due to their interpretation of Divine foreknowledge, and add this with a faulty ontological/metaphysical system for providing irrefutable truths. Thereby, they have just as BIG a problem heading down the path of denying other Divine attributes concerning God’s character while attempting to avoid the implications of assigning moral responsibility of evil on Him. The “BIG” problem being that if God determined all actions in advance, how can our actions logically be free by their view of advanced planning? Some form of indeterminism must be true for creaturely freedoms to exist; MK simply proposes another solution. We could go into moral responsibility of the “first cause” implications on God’s character. There is even greater inconsistency in denying the mutual exclusiveness in the aspects of both (Divine determinism and human free will), logically existing together according to the problematic philosophically examined determinate compatiblist view.

Compare the implications of the attribute of God being Truth and actualizing a world created with free creatures in time, along with the attribute of God’s Omniscient foreknowledge and fulfilling His purpose/will in that creation to be true, with both (absolute and conditional) intentions. WLC describes Molina’s doctrine as such:

"Molina saw clearly the profound implications a doctrine of middle knowledge could have for the notions of providence and predestination. God's providence is His ordering of things to their ends, either directly or mediately through secondary agents. Molina distinguishes between God's absolute and conditional intentions for creatures. It is, for example, God's absolute intention that no creature should sin and that all should reach beatitude. But it is not within the scope of God's power to control what free creatures would do if placed in any set of circumstances. In certain circumstances, then, creatures would freely sin, despite the fact that God does not will this. Should God then choose to actualize precisely those circumstances, He has no choice but to allow the creature to sin. God's absolute intentions can thus be frustrated by free creatures. But God's conditional intentions, which are based on His middle knowledge and thus take account of what free creatures would do, cannot be so frustrated. It is God's conditional intention to permit many actions on the part of free creatures which He does not absolutely will; but in His infinite wisdom God so orders which states of affairs obtain that His purposes are achieved despite and even through the sinful, free choices of creatures. God thus providentially arranges for everything that does happen by either willing or permitting it, and He causes everything to happen insofar as He concurs with the decisions of free creatures in producing their effects, yet He does so in such a way as to preserve freedom and contingency."

 

BTW, WLC addresses ontological and metaphysical “grounding objections” with what constitutes “truth-makers” while very effectively disposing of this argument.

"So what can be said on behalf of the grounding objection? I have said that the grounding objection seems to assume a particular theory about the relationship of truth and reality. The theory presupposed by the grounding objection appears to be a certain construal or version of a view of truth as correspondence which has come to be known as the theory of truth–makers.{5} During the realist revival in the early years of the twentieth century various philosophers turned their attention to the question of the ontology of truth. Logical Atomists such as Russell and Wittgenstein thought that in addition to truth–bearers, whether these be sentences, thoughts, propositions, or what have you, there must also be entities in virtue of which such sentences and/or propositions are true. Various names were employed for these entities, such as "facts" or "states of affairs." Among contemporary philosophers they have come to be known as "truth–makers."

"In conclusion, I think that it is evident that anti–Molinists have not even begun to do the necessary homework in order for their grounding objection to fly. They have yet to articulate their ontology of truth, including the nature of truth–bearers and truth–makers. Nor have they yet presented a systematic account of which truth–bearers require truth–makers. Neither have they applied their theory to counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, much less shown its superiority to competing theories. Of course, it is open to grounding objectors to abjure a theory of truth–makers altogether and to assert that in construing their talk about grounds of truth for counterfactuals of creaturely freedom in terms of truth–makers I have misunderstood or misrepresented them. Perhaps grounds of truth are different from truth–makers. But if this is the case, then anti–Molinists owe us all the more a careful account of what they are talking about. Until they provide that, their grounding objection cannot even hope to get off the ground."

http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/grounding.html

OK… I have 2 essays to write and a 4 hour class to go to tonight, two jobs to bid tomorrow, and a girl turning 16!… SO LEAVE ME ALONE! :laugh: JK

 

Benjamin your last post proves my point. I said the ground objection only gets at the ontological deficiency in a back door way. WLC faces what analytical philosophers give him and responds with ontology of truth and what not. However, there is no mention of ontology proper. There is no mention of premotion or concursus. There is no mention of whether his view entails a possible world without God. He would do well to revisit the historical Molinist debates, but sadly Molina's chief work on ontology is still in Latin only.

In my opinion, WLC has yet to articulate his ontology, especially his affirmation or rejection of divine premotion and concursus, and if he rejects them, then what he replaces them with. If his answer is the same as Molina, then he has possible worlds without God, which in my opinion are not possible.

BJ

 

Skypair, somehow I'm not following all the leaps here. Let me summarize.

God can indeed limit himself if he so chooses. This is different than saying he is limited in his being. He is not limited in his divine nature.

I do not follow the Reformers all the way into the hole. By saying God allows something, it does not follow that he is the cause. Free creatures cause sin, and God allows it, but does not cause it.

Any definition of God that has him thinking in sequence ends up with God figuring things out, and is ultimately defining God as not omniscient. But he is omniscient, so he must not think in sequence.