Does anyone understand "Middle Knowledge?"

[TCGreek]

Let me get back to that, TC. I believe that the one I presented was similar to an example he gave because in doing so, he "piled on" the "counterfactuals" that must have been involved ending in the crucifixion of Christ! I mean Judas betrayal, the Pharisees, Pilate, the Herrod, the crowd, etc.

I don't think it is perfect but I think also that it leaves our this one detail --- God CAN predestinate/control those that are His. And that is what all these models of predestination vs. free will leave out. I mean, doesn't that "help" God's "foreknowledge" or "middle knowledge" in the case of Moses, Noah, Jesus, Paul, etc.?

skypair

Skypair, you still haven't given me that illustration from WLC's book. :thumbs:

 

[Benjamin]

Originally Posted by Skypair:
Anyway, William Lane Craig (WLC) defends a position wherein God foreknows all the "counterfactuals" before creation and before He issues His decrees regarding the future.

Originally Posted by TCGreek:
Can you give an example from the book then that WLC used to illustrate his position?

I find a number of things wrong with your illustration, and I don't know if it is fair to WLC's position.

Excuse me for intervening. It’s been a while since looking at WLC’s writings, but while checking on a few things I came across some of what you guys might be addressing here:


“That is to say, God's knowledge of a particular set of propositions depends asymmetrically on His knowledge of a certain other set of propositions and is in this sense posterior to it. In the first, unconditioned moment God knows all possibilia, not only all individual essences, but also all possible worlds. Molina calls such knowledge "natural knowledge" because the content of such knowledge is essential to God and in no way depends on the free decisions of His will. By means of His natural knowledge, then, God has knowledge of every contingent state of affairs which could possibly obtain and of what the exemplification of the individual essence of any free creature could freely choose to do in any such state of affairs that should be actual.
In the second moment, God possesses knowledge of all true counterfactual propositions, including counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. That is to say, He knows what contingent states of affairs would obtain if certain antecedent states of affairs were to obtain; whereas by His natural knowledge God knew what any free creature could do in any set of circumstances, now in this second moment God knows what any free creature would do in any set of circumstances. This is not because the circumstances causally determine the creature's choice, but simply because this is how the creature would freely choose. God thus knows that were He to actualize certain states of affairs, then certain other contingent states of affairs would obtain. Molina calls this counterfactual knowledge "middle knowledge" because it stands in between the first and third moment in divine knowledge. Middle knowledge is like natural knowledge in that such knowledge does not depend on any decision of the divine will; God does not determine which counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are true or false. Thus, if it is true that…” (No Other Name – Dr. William Lane Craig)

 

[Benjamin]

Originally Posted by Skypair:
Let me get back to that, TC. I believe that the one I presented was similar to an example he gave because in doing so, he "piled on" the "counterfactuals" that must have been involved ending in the crucifixion of Christ! I mean Judas betrayal, the Pharisees, Pilate, the Herrod, the crowd, etc.

Originally Posted by TCGreek:
Skypair, you still haven't given me that illustration from WLC's book.

“Third, the Scriptures are replete with counterfactual statements, so that the Christian theist, at least, should be committed to the truth of certain counterfactuals about free, creaturely actions. The Church has never, until the modern age, doubted that God possesses knowledge of true counterfactuals concerning free, creaturely decisions; the whole dispute focused on whether He possessed that knowledge logically prior to the divine creative decree or only posterior to the divine decree. The Church's confidence that God knows such truths is rooted in the Scriptures themselves. To pick but one example, Paul, in reflecting upon God's eternal salvific plan realized in Christ, asserts, "None of the rulers of this age understood this; for if they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory" (I Cor. 2.8). By "the rulers of this age" Paul means either the Jewish and Roman authorities such as Herod and Pilate who were the historical agents who instigated or carried out the crucifixion (cf. Acts 4. 27–28) or, more plausibly, the spiritual principalities and powers who rule "this present evil age" (Gal. 1. 4; cf. I Cor. 2. 6). In either case, we have here a counterfactual about creaturely free actions. So is Paul's assertion true or not? Will we have the temerity to say that Paul was wrong? Since the Church believes that Paul was inspired by the Holy Spirit to write these words, she accepts them as revealed truth from God. Thus, we have strong prima facie warrant for holding that there are true counterfactuals concerning what creatures would freely do under various circumstances.” (Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the “Grounding Objection” - Dr. William Lane Craig)

 

[HankD]

Here is a good way to exercise our free will (or whatever you want to call it):

Proverbs 3

5 Trust in the LORD with all thine heart; and lean not unto thine own understanding.
6 In all thy ways acknowledge him, and he shall direct thy paths.
7 Be not wise in thine own eyes: fear the LORD, and depart from evil.

HankD​

 

[southern_saint]

Martin -- that's the way I feel! I don't feel they have "discovered" anything more than I can get from just reading the Bible!

I hope we get some input to "process" here. :type:

skypair

Absolutely, God's Word was not meant to confuse anyone but to lead man to a saving knowledge of Jesus Christ. :jesus:

 

[skypair]

Skypair, you still haven't given me that illustration from WLC's book. :thumbs:

On page 134. WLC says that the middle knowledge case for divine providence is even stronger than for divine foreknowledge. Then he has us consider Acts 2:23 and 4:27-28, the conspiracy to crucify Jesus said to be based on God's plan.

If we take God's foreknowledge as middle knowledge, then God knows which persons, if members of the Sanhedrin, would vote for Jesus condemnation; which persons, if in Jerusalem, would freely demand Jesus death; ... what Herrod, if king, would freely do;... and Pilate himself, if prefecuture of Palestine in AD 27, would do under pressure from the Jewish leaders and the crowd." Thus, Jesus goes to Jerusalem on that Passover when all these are in place (course, He went every Passover). But do consider, in His previous trips, circumstances weren't right and Jesus/God, by His activities, "ordained" that some of the last ones would fall into place when He "tweeked" some of the "counterfactuals like the Pharisees in Mt 23, like throwing out the moneychangers, like for once instigating that the people honor Him on His entry into the city as "King of the Jews" (challenge to Rome and Pilate), etc.

Do you see what WLC is talking about now? How about the way in which God can use believers or Jesus to bring the "counterfactuals" into play?

skypair

 

[Humblesmith]

I think all these discussions are trying to get at explaining passages like Luke 10:13, where Jesus says "Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the mighty works that were done in you would have been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented a great while ago." So he obviously knows what would have happened if circumstances had been different, and what would be needed to get specific people to repent.

But all these explanations of Molinism/MK seem to me to add up to the following problems:

1. God's knowledge is still knowledge, however you divide it up. Therefore in MK god seems to me to be making the creation decision based on his knowledge. This is a problem, for we then have a god that is in process, making decisions based on things he has known (or possibly even learned). Rather, Peter says that election is according to knowledge, not based on knowledge.

2. The presupposition of all this is to save autonomous free will of man. Therefor MK is proposed to avoid open theism, where God doesn't know the future. If I understand Benjamin's post, he's pointing out that MK refutes OT. But IMO, MK brings up more issues, and is not the ultimate answer.

3. In Benjamin's quotes from WLC, he clearly speaks of God in "moments", and making decisions logically prior to the divine decree to create the actual world. This has God clearly making decisions in sequence. Even if they are a logical sequence, we still have a God who learns based on the free act of a created being. This is a big problem.

4. As Brandon pointed out, the modern advocates of MK have not solved the ontological questions (questions about 'being' or existence). This is because they don't study ontology or metaphysics.


Adding to this problem is that WLC denies the doctrine of the simplicity of God. Here, simplicity means "non-compound" or "not composed." He clearly states in his philosophy book that God has components, and is in time. So in WLC's system, we have a god that has compartments to his knowlege, takes facts in a logical sequence and makes decisions based on created beings, and is limited by time. These are BIG problems.

Now I think WLC denies open theism, but it seems to me to be headed down that path. He has to be inconsistent to deny them.

The solution, as Brandon hinted, is that God works through the free will of man, and is in eternity, not in time. He does not make decisions in sequence, logically or chronologically. He is simple (i.e., one essence), and therefore his decisions and his knowledge are simultaneous. Neither are based on the other.

Excellent thread.

 

[HankD]

Adding to this problem is that WLC denies the doctrine of the simplicity of God. Here, simplicity means "non-compound" or "not composed." He clearly states in his philosophy book that God has components, and is in time. So in WLC's system, we have a god that has compartments to his knowlege, takes facts in a logical sequence and makes decisions based on created beings, and is limited by time. These are BIG problems.

What about when He became flesh and entered the time continuum?

Luke 2:52 And Jesus increased in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God and man.​

HankD

 

[skypair]

I think all these discussions are trying to get at explaining passages like Luke 10:13, where Jesus says "Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the mighty works that were done in you would have been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented a great while ago." So he obviously knows what would have happened if circumstances had been different, and what would be needed to get specific people to repent.

You got some of it right -- those are "counterfactuals." God knew them but prehaps they didn't fit into His plan at that time, right?

Therefore in MK god seems to me to be making the creation decision based on his knowledge. This is a problem, for we then have a god that is in process, making decisions based on things he has known (or possibly even learned). Rather, Peter says that election is according to knowledge, not based on knowledge.

I don't think that Peter's example tells us anything different about God's knowledge just because it says "according to" rather than "based on." Knowledge seems to be first logically in both cases.

2. The position of all this is to save autonomous free will of man. Therefor MK is proposed to avoid open theism, where God doesn't know the future.

Molinism clearly tries to recocile both free will and foreknowledge. Some declare that it is the only system that leaves both intact.

3. In Benjamin's quotes from WLC, he clearly speaks of God in "moments", and making decisions logically prior to the divine decree to create the actual world. This has God clearly making decisions in sequence. Even if they are a logical sequence, we still have a God who learns based on the free act of a created being. This is a big problem.

Well, it is different. But it tries to answer the another problem -- human responsibility. If God foreknows all, then He causes all and is responsible for all, good and evil. Divine determinsim tries to break that link by suggesting "second causes" in every case. But God caused those as well and man cannot be held responsible for evil that he has no control over.

4. As Brandon pointed out, the modern advocates of MK have not solved the ontological questions (questions about 'being' or existence). This is because they don't study ontology or metaphysics.

Adding to this problem is that WLC denies the doctrine of the simplicity of God. Here, simplicity means "non-compound" or "not composed." He clearly states in his philosophy book that God has components, and is in time. So in WLC's system, we have a god that has compartments to his knowlege, takes facts in a logical sequence and makes decisions based on created beings, and is limited by time. These are BIG problems.

Well, there's God the Trinity if that is what you see as a "BIG problem." Then there's God as omniscient, omnipotent, etc.

The solution, as Brandon hinted, is that God works through the free will of man, and is in eternity, not in time. He does not make decisions in sequence, logically or chronologically. He is simple (i.e., one essence), and therefore his decisions and his knowledge are simultaneous. Neither are based on the other.

And yet they come out related in time and logic. Daniel made the prophecy about Christ and 583 years later presented Himself and was cut off. It's hard to imagine, HS, how we would relate these if time and logic were not involved "at both ends."

skypair

 

[Humblesmith]

What about when He became flesh and entered the time continuum?

Luke 2:52 And Jesus increased in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God and man.​

HankD

Christ has two natures, the divine and the human. The human was in time.

 

[Humblesmith]

You got some of it right -- those are "counterfactuals." God knew them but prehaps they didn't fit into His plan at that time, right?

Right.

I don't think that Peter's example tells us anything different about God's knowledge just because it says "according to" rather than "based on." Knowledge seems to be first logically in both cases.

I guess I'd make a case that differs. "based on" means that the foreknowledge was the criteria from which the decision was made. "according to" merely means that it agrees with it; that it is parallel. So if election is "based on" foreknowledge then God had to know what a free creature would do before he made the decision to create or elect. This is a limited god. But if election is "according to" foreknowledge, as the bible says, then foreknowledge is not the criteria from which the decision is made, but rather election agrees with foreknowledge. The decision is solely in God, who is unlimited.

If God foreknows all, then He causes all and is responsible for all, good and evil.

I've heard this before many times, but I guess I don't see how the two are supposed to be connected. Just because God knows that sin will happen does not mean he caused it. I may know my son will choose ice cream over broccoli, but I didn't cause him to choose. The only other alternative, as I understand it, would be to have God not know the future. Again, this results in a limited, finite God.

Well, there's God the Trinity if that is what you see as a "BIG problem." Then there's God as omniscient, omnipotent, etc.

No, that's not what I meant. God is indeed a Trinity. That's not the issue. The issue is that if God has to learn from a creature what the creature will do, or if he has to figure things out in sequence, that is the problem. For then we have a god that is limited, and at one point didn't know all things. A being that has to think in sequence doesn't know all things at the beginning of the sequence. This is true whether we're talking chronological or merely logical. And a God that is partitioned in his thinking is limited.......segmented knowledge, by definition, puts limits on God. A god that is composed of parts raises all kinds of questions about how the parts must have been put together, and whether they have the potential to come apart.

An infinite God does not think in sequence, nor is made up of parts.

And yet they come out related in time and logic. Daniel made the prophecy about Christ and 583 years later presented Himself and was cut off. It's hard to imagine, HS, how we would relate these if time and logic were not involved "at both ends."

It's answered by God being in eternity, not in time. Since he is in one big "now", then he sees the end from the beginning. He merely communicates to us in time, because we're stuck in time. A God that is stuck in time is limited, and not infinite.

Since he's infinite, he's not stuck in time, does not think in sequence, and does not figure things out. He already knows.

 

[webdog]

Christ has two natures, the divine and the human. The human was in time.

They're not separable. Our finite minds cannot fathom this, but they are not separable. That's how the 1st century gnosticism started.

 

[Humblesmith]

I think the language of the Council of Chalcedon described it best.........

“at once complete in Godhead and complete in manhood, truly God and truly man…recognized in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation, the distinction of the natures being in no way annulled by the union.”

You are correct that the two natures are not separable.

 

[Benjamin]

The decision is solely in God, who is unlimited.

Can God make a rock so big that He can not even lift it? :laugh: Can He not be true to His nature and still be Truth? Can He actualize a creation with morally responsible agents having creaturely freedom and determine all aspects of how they act?

 

[Benjamin]

Adding to this problem is that WLC denies the doctrine of the simplicity of God. Here, simplicity means "non-compound" or "not composed." He clearly states in his philosophy book that God has components, and is in time. So in WLC's system, we have a god that has compartments to his knowlege, takes facts in a logical sequence and makes decisions based on created beings, and is limited by time. These are BIG problems.

WLC seems to disagree with the simplicity put forth in the classical view of God’s foreknowledge.

2. The presupposition of all this is to save autonomous free will of man. Therefor MK is proposed to avoid open theism, where God doesn't know the future. If I understand Benjamin's post, he's pointing out that MK refutes OT. But IMO, MK brings up more issues, and is not the ultimate answer.

Now I think WLC denies open theism, but it seems to me to be headed down that path. He has to be inconsistent to deny them.

As for the endeavor of comparing MK to Open Theism; MK attempts to reconcile Divine foreknowledge with creaturely freedoms, it does not deny God’s foreknowledge, but rather disputes the simplicity of man’s classical boxing of this attribute. Match up this MK/OT comparison to a proposal that opposition to widening the view on Divine foreknowledge must acknowledge Divine Determinism as their view, being they are consistent in causal determination due to their interpretation of Divine foreknowledge, and add this with a faulty ontological/metaphysical system for providing irrefutable truths. Thereby, they have just as BIG a problem heading down the path of denying other Divine attributes concerning God’s character while attempting to avoid the implications of assigning moral responsibility of evil on Him. The “BIG” problem being that if God determined all actions in advance, how can our actions logically be free by their view of advanced planning? Some form of indeterminism must be true for creaturely freedoms to exist; MK simply proposes another solution. We could go into moral responsibility of the “first cause” implications on God’s character. There is even greater inconsistency in denying the mutual exclusiveness in the aspects of both (Divine determinism and human free will), logically existing together according to the problematic philosophically examined determinate compatiblist view.

3. In Benjamin's quotes from WLC, he clearly speaks of God in "moments", and making decisions logically prior to the divine decree to create the actual world. This has God clearly making decisions in sequence. Even if they are a logical sequence, we still have a God who learns based on the free act of a created being. This is a big problem.

Compare the implications of the attribute of God being Truth and actualizing a world created with free creatures in time, along with the attribute of God’s Omniscient foreknowledge and fulfilling His purpose/will in that creation to be true, with both (absolute and conditional) intentions. WLC describes Molina’s doctrine as such:

"Molina saw clearly the profound implications a doctrine of middle knowledge could have for the notions of providence and predestination. God's providence is His ordering of things to their ends, either directly or mediately through secondary agents. Molina distinguishes between God's absolute and conditional intentions for creatures. It is, for example, God's absolute intention that no creature should sin and that all should reach beatitude. But it is not within the scope of God's power to control what free creatures would do if placed in any set of circumstances. In certain circumstances, then, creatures would freely sin, despite the fact that God does not will this. Should God then choose to actualize precisely those circumstances, He has no choice but to allow the creature to sin. God's absolute intentions can thus be frustrated by free creatures. But God's conditional intentions, which are based on His middle knowledge and thus take account of what free creatures would do, cannot be so frustrated. It is God's conditional intention to permit many actions on the part of free creatures which He does not absolutely will; but in His infinite wisdom God so orders which states of affairs obtain that His purposes are achieved despite and even through the sinful, free choices of creatures. God thus providentially arranges for everything that does happen by either willing or permitting it, and He causes everything to happen insofar as He concurs with the decisions of free creatures in producing their effects, yet He does so in such a way as to preserve freedom and contingency."

 

[Benjamin]

BTW, WLC addresses ontological and metaphysical “grounding objections” with what constitutes “truth-makers” while very effectively disposing of this argument.

"So what can be said on behalf of the grounding objection? I have said that the grounding objection seems to assume a particular theory about the relationship of truth and reality. The theory presupposed by the grounding objection appears to be a certain construal or version of a view of truth as correspondence which has come to be known as the theory of truth–makers.{5} During the realist revival in the early years of the twentieth century various philosophers turned their attention to the question of the ontology of truth. Logical Atomists such as Russell and Wittgenstein thought that in addition to truth–bearers, whether these be sentences, thoughts, propositions, or what have you, there must also be entities in virtue of which such sentences and/or propositions are true. Various names were employed for these entities, such as "facts" or "states of affairs." Among contemporary philosophers they have come to be known as "truth–makers."

"In conclusion, I think that it is evident that anti–Molinists have not even begun to do the necessary homework in order for their grounding objection to fly. They have yet to articulate their ontology of truth, including the nature of truth–bearers and truth–makers. Nor have they yet presented a systematic account of which truth–bearers require truth–makers. Neither have they applied their theory to counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, much less shown its superiority to competing theories. Of course, it is open to grounding objectors to abjure a theory of truth–makers altogether and to assert that in construing their talk about grounds of truth for counterfactuals of creaturely freedom in terms of truth–makers I have misunderstood or misrepresented them. Perhaps grounds of truth are different from truth–makers. But if this is the case, then anti–Molinists owe us all the more a careful account of what they are talking about. Until they provide that, their grounding objection cannot even hope to get off the ground."

http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/grounding.html

OK… I have 2 essays to write and a 4 hour class to go to tonight, two jobs to bid tomorrow, and a girl turning 16!… SO LEAVE ME ALONE! :laugh: JK

 

[Brandon C. Jones]

Benjamin your last post proves my point. I said the ground objection only gets at the ontological deficiency in a back door way. WLC faces what analytical philosophers give him and responds with ontology of truth and what not. However, there is no mention of ontology proper. There is no mention of premotion or concursus. There is no mention of whether his view entails a possible world without God. He would do well to revisit the historical Molinist debates, but sadly Molina's chief work on ontology is still in Latin only.

In my opinion, WLC has yet to articulate his ontology, especially his affirmation or rejection of divine premotion and concursus, and if he rejects them, then what he replaces them with. If his answer is the same as Molina, then he has possible worlds without God, which in my opinion are not possible.

BJ

 

[skypair]

I guess I'd make a case that differs. "based on" means that the foreknowledge was the criteria from which the decision was made. "according to" merely means that it agrees with it; that it is parallel. So if election is "based on" foreknowledge then God had to know what a free creature would do before he made the decision to create or elect. This is a limited god. But if election is "according to" foreknowledge, as the bible says, then foreknowledge is not the criteria from which the decision is made, but rather election agrees with foreknowledge. The decision is solely in God, who is unlimited.

OK, I see where you are coming from now. So there's an assumption in your interpretation, right? That everyone else might be talking about a "limited god." Suppose God chose to limit Himself. Then what?

I've heard this before many times, but I guess I don't see how the two are supposed to be connected. Just because God knows that sin will happen does not mean he caused it.

Even from Luther -- "God wills what He foreknows and foreknows what He wills."

Erasmus: "Who will try and reform his life?

Luther: "Nobody!"

Erasmus: "Who will believe God love him?

Luther: :Nobody! Nobody can! But the elect will believe it and the rest shall perish without believing it, raging and blaspheming."

Erasmus: "A floodgate of iniquity is ppened by our doctrines.

Luther: "So be it."

Here's the "nub" of the debate --- (1) "Necessarily, If God foreknows that x will happen, then x will happen."

(2) "God foreknows that x will happen."

(3) "Therefore, x will necessarily happen."

If you claim with the Reformers that God wills all that He foreknows, then His will happens and sin is part of that will. That is, God wills/causes sin and remains unlimited in His sovereignty but loses His character.

N, that's not what I meant. God is indeed a Trinity. That's not the issue.

I was merely suggesting it - not claiming it.

If God has to learn from a creature what the creature will do, or if he has to figure things out in sequence, that is the problem. For then we have a god that is limited,...

Are you prepared to tell God how He can and cannot limit Himself if He so desires, "Mr. Clay?"

A being that has to think in sequence doesn't know all things at the beginning of the sequence.

You are flat wrong about this. That He foreknows everything before the sequence begins is called OMNISCIENCE.

You know, hs, God once lowered Himself to "our level" so that He could relate to us. You are in danger of denying that God "spun this whole web" for something other than to call us to Him.

And a God that is partitioned in his thinking is limited.......segmented knowledge, by definition, puts limits on God. A god that is composed of parts raises all kinds of questions about how the parts must have been put together, and whether they have the potential to come apart.

That's exactly what we are attempting to address here, humblesmith. It's NOT as simple as "God foreordained everything including sin." But let me ask you ---- is God causing sin "compatible" with your theology?

It's answered by God being in eternity, not in time. Since he is in one big "now", then he sees the end from the beginning. He merely communicates to us in time, because we're stuck in time. A God that is stuck in time is limited, and not infinite.

This is a contradiction with your previous assertions. If God foreknows/predestined everything, there is no conflict regarding time.

hs, "divine foreknowledge" has this defect (at least) -- how can man be responsible for what God has already decided he will do?

skypair

 

[Humblesmith]

Thereby, they have just as BIG a problem heading down the path of denying other Divine attributes concerning God’s character while attempting to avoid the implications of assigning moral responsibility of evil on Him.

I agree completely.

There is even greater inconsistency in denying the mutual exclusiveness in the aspects of both (Divine determinism and human free will), logically existing together according to the problematic philosophically examined determinate compatiblist view.

I'm not prepared to agree with this....at least not yet. At some point, could we not say that God is so sovereign that he works through free will? Such as Joseph's statement of "You meant it for evil, but God meant it for good?"

The “BIG” problem being that if God determined all actions in advance, how can our actions logically be free by their view of advanced planning?

If God is not in time, then properly speaking, he did not determine all actions "in advance" and doesn't "fore-" anything. He just determined them, and just knew, but not in any sequence. The linchpin to the argument is in squeezing God into time, so that something has to be done in a sequence. In any view of God doing things in time, we have this type of problem, and either end up with a limited God that has to figure things out, or a totally deterministic God that causes sin.

Put God outside of time where he belongs, and these type of questions fade away as so much vapor.

 

[Humblesmith]

Skypair, somehow I'm not following all the leaps here. Let me summarize.

God can indeed limit himself if he so chooses. This is different than saying he is limited in his being. He is not limited in his divine nature.

I do not follow the Reformers all the way into the hole. By saying God allows something, it does not follow that he is the cause. Free creatures cause sin, and God allows it, but does not cause it.

Any definition of God that has him thinking in sequence ends up with God figuring things out, and is ultimately defining God as not omniscient. But he is omniscient, so he must not think in sequence.