Dominion vs determinism 3

[Ben1445]

There was an actual philosophical debate on that very subject a few years ago which we have a film recording of.

I guess the question comes down to how independent it is and how corrupt the will itself is. Now I'm not saying that there is not a level of our own will that is certainly "it's own" in the sense that God can justly judge it. I think the Calvinists are saying that while that is true, it is also true that as a matter of record and evidence and scripture this will is so defective that it will not as one of it's free choices, come to God in a real way. And, I think that classic Arminianism says pretty much the same thing.

Not so independent as to make one God, who can alter any circumstance. But independent enough to be able to alter some circumstances, like go to the coffee shop that makes better coffee, or go get ingredients to make ice cream because there is nothing like homemade ice cream. Not so independent as to will the ice cream into the freezer whenever I want it.
I cannot will my Saviour into existence. But there is no need. He has already expressed His will in the matter.

 

[DaveXR650]

Not so independent as to make one God, who can alter any circumstance. But independent enough to be able to alter some circumstances, like go to the coffee shop that makes better coffee, or go get ingredients to make ice cream because there is nothing like homemade ice cream. Not so independent as to will the ice cream into the freezer whenever I want it.
I cannot will my Saviour into existence. But there is no need. He has already expressed His will in the matter.

I think you are right. @JonC and I were talking initially about Robert Picirilli in posts above. I just purchased his later book called "God in Eternity and Time" and although I just started it, he seems to be taking a different approach where he emphasizes the aspect that God, as the author of creation, which occurred at a certain point in time has also created us to be in that time frame and has created our abilities of perception and knowledge of God specifically to act within that created framework. So we need not worry about the truth of contingency, or second causes, or how can God "see" the future without controlling it also because the fact is the world is as it is and our interaction with God, is indeed the way He created it and the way he wants us to interact with Him in it. Bottom line is that if you are aware of God, and his offer of salvation, and He chooses to present it to you as a choice, then you do have a choice. At at that level I think we all agree.

And along the same lines, I think God has chosen to create us with a degree of spontaneity, and active motion, which all mammals have to some degree, which he did so because he wanted to and has chosen to be indifferent to the seemingly random choices we make. It certainly makes life more interesting to us, and it even allows for social peace in that we easily can choose an alternative item so there is less competition for each thing that interests us. So it would be alright to say that whatever the combination of true free will or influences we experience, God probably doesn't care whether we pick coffee or tea on a given day and if you wanted to claim "his will" at all it would be that he's leaving it to you.

 

[JonC]

Yeah. Here we go. The arbiter which actually is internal is you. What you are doing is saying that there are these influences which this impartial free will evaluates and then chooses from. That's not wrong, it's just not complete. Calvinism says that the reason you don't come to Christ by yourself is that your arbiter or will has a proclivity to embrace the influences of the flesh and reject the better influences.

As you can see, Arminianism agrees totally. Specifically, they agree with Calvinists that by and of himself he can neither think, will, nor do any thing that is truly good.

That's true. That's why I said that this is identical to Calvinism at that point of natural inability. In fact, I like the way the Arminians like Picirilli or Forlines word these things better than the way the Calvinists do. However, when it comes to intellectual honestly, the Arminians run into a problem when they insist that this saving influence can be successfully resisted. Because by saying that they are saying that this gracious "influence" is not the only thing leading to our salvation - there still has to be an inner self or will that indeed does have enough of it's own virtue to at least consent to salvation or choose wisely from the influences. If you leave it there then fine. But the fact is if you follow the logic in defending Arminianism you end up admitting to a more libertarian view of free will because you are always reserving that small, but uninfluenced apex decision maker at the very core of who you are - which indeed is deciding for Christ.

So try to not misunderstand me. They may be right. Lennox may be right. But my point is this, if God's grace, selective or prevenient, is not the deciding factor, you are either an Arminian who has an unsurmountable contradiction with your system, or you move on to a libertarian free will which solves all the logical problems at least. I'm not picking at you. You say you don't believe either so why take offense. But to me, that is an insurmountable problem for the Classic Arminian.

I do not take offense. My point is each view has to be examined within its own system, even if one believes that system has contradictions - we are talking about religious philosophy and there are plenty of contradictions to go around (Calvinism has plenty of its own as well).

I respect the integrity of each theology (Classic Arminianism, Weslyian Arminianism, Calvinism, Amyraldianism...whatever). I do not need to believe them accurate to desire they be explored in their own context.


The "meat" of the argument here is simply not libertarian free will but the power which chooses.

Calvinism typically holds that free-will theology places that choice in the hands of man. Within Calvinism if a man can resist God's will then thar man demonstrates a power greater than God, which causes issues with Calvinistic sovereignty. If man can, by the influence of the Spirit, choose God OR by the influence of the flesh reject Him then (per a Calvinistic system) man is capable of saving himself by at least repressing the desire of the flesh.


But Classic Arminianism views it from a different angle. Man, through only his will, can only reject God. Man, by the influence of the Spirit, can accept God. God acts in such a way that both are legitimate possibilities.


This is philosophy (NOT theology). The perception can be shifted to accommodate either situation or find either an internal contradiction.

 

[DaveXR650]

The "meat" of the argument here is simply not libertarian free will but the power which chooses.

In that case it is squarely about including libertarian free will. When it comes to Arminianism vs Calvinism, I remember that in days past the controversial issue was at the other end of soteriology, about whether one could quit or lose their salvation, and we fundy Baptists were all in the "Calvinist" camp because of our OSAS views. That was the issue, because as Baptists, we believed completely in free will as to coming to Christ, although we did acknowledge the work of the Spirit, we also acknowledged many things in preaching, the invitation, and so on which were clearly designed to appeal to your free will. Because of the OSAS (once saved always saved) issues, we were never taught Arminianism's views on the front end of coming to Christ, even though most of us were somewhat there in practice. Two people I know have told me regarding their salvation that "at least I had sense enough to believe", and both were fundamentalists. In John R. Rice's book "FALSE DOCTRINES" in chapter 7, which is on "hyper-Calvinism" which is actually Calvinism, he fleshes this out and clearly he favors more of a natural free will ability than Arminius did, insisting that we all have some light, some ability, naturally.

Bottom line is that Baptists in our country are more free will oriented than Arminius on the front end and completely Calvinistic determinists on the back end. So the idea that it is somehow intellectually dishonest to want to bring in what Christians actually believe is ridiculous and if you want to continue to bring up that theme then it's your thread but I will not be participating further, at least with you.

If you are interested in going on, without the repeated accusations of dishonestly, I do have a point which I think is worth discussing and more relevant to the original title of these threads. I'll do another post on it below.

 

[DaveXR650]

I do have a point which I think is worth discussing and more relevant to the original title of these threads. I'll do another post on it below.

I have the book by Ken Wilson, "THE FOUNDATION OF AUGUSTINIAN CALVINISM", which came out in 2019. His premise is that Augustine's determinism came from later writings where he purportedly reverted back to his Manicheism of his younger days. This book was ridiculed by some notable Calvinists who frequent the debate circuit but it's been 6 or 7 years and still I have not seen a serious rebuttal so I'm beginning to wonder.
What is pertinent to this discussion is that he gives page after page of quotes from the early church fathers on how the will of man operates and it seems none of them support an inability like Calvinism states it, and that's not all. It seems many, if not most of the quotes indicate an amount of natural ability and free will that is much closer aligned to Lennox and the fundamental Baptists than even Arminius, not to mention Calvin.

So my question is, were most common people in the era before Augustine, of the assumption that you indeed have an actual free will, one that exceeded the definitions certainly of Calvinists, but also of Arminius. And were their views, where ever they originated, the result of thinking about how the mind functions or of how deterministic overall reality is.

 

[Psalty]

I have the book by Ken Wilson, "THE FOUNDATION OF AUGUSTINIAN CALVINISM", which came out in 2019. His premise is that Augustine's determinism came from later writings where he purportedly reverted back to his Manicheism of his younger days. This book was ridiculed by some notable Calvinists who frequent the debate circuit but it's been 6 or 7 years and still I have not seen a serious rebuttal so I'm beginning to wonder.
What is pertinent to this discussion is that he gives page after page of quotes from the early church fathers on how the will of man operates and it seems none of them support an inability like Calvinism states it, and that's not all. It seems many, if not most of the quotes indicate an amount of natural ability and free will that is much closer aligned to Lennox and the fundamental Baptists than even Arminius, not to mention Calvin.

So my question is, were most common people in the era before Augustine, of the assumption that you indeed have an actual free will, one that exceeded the definitions certainly of Calvinists, but also of Arminius. And were their views, where ever they originated, the result of thinking about how the mind functions or of how deterministic overall reality is.

There is a great book by David Bercot called A Dictionary of Early Christian Beliefs. It is arranged alphabetically that helps drill into many topics from Pre-Nicene council writings of early christians.

I highly recommend using it as a starting point to consider Ken Wilsons work. Edit: I actually think it is very useful for consulting for bible study in general, after studying scripture.

 

[Psalty]

I’ll jump in on this concept briefly with a bird’s eye view.

But each time you choose coffee, or tea, at that time there was only one choice you could have made and had that been your choice. The time you chose tea was because the influences pushing you to tea were greater than coffee that time. Maybe you noticed that the coffee had been on "brew" for 2 hours and you thought it might taste burnt, but you never make a choice without prior influences which in fact, determine your free will choice. And this is what those who advocate libertarian free will deny. They insist that for it to be a free will choice "they could have chosen the other" but in fact that is only technically true, looking back as a possibility. The truth is, the information you had, combined with your various and often competing inclinations resulted in one choice you could make - unless one of those precursors were to change.

I think there are a couple problems with this.

1. We can imagine a scenario where all factors are balanced: brewed at same time, place, conditions etc. And we can imagine both options being chosen given a series of the same choice. This is as controlled of a scenario as we can get.

2. While it is possible for the determinist/calvinist to say that any series of alternating choices with all factors controlled for was determined, yet it erodes any sense of the term choice and simply back to a basic statement of determinism being true. To state that anything that occurs is what is determined is simply a restatement of a determinist premise. One must make an actual argument to persuade that this is the case, especially when considering that the world as it presents itself is that a person may choose among many options.

And like I discussed above, I personally tend to like classic Arminianism, but the problem is that based on the truth of how your will works, the Arminian argument, pleasant and self satisfying as it is for those of us who chose wisely, fails to account for that power we insist on keeping to refuse such grace - when they just previously admitted that you have to be given the inclinations to come to Christ in the first place and would not do so without "grace". So they have a grace which is essential, and by definition effectual in those that are saved, yet can be resisted in the case of those who are not saved. How is this any different than Calvinism's general call to everyone, the call that is effectual to the elect but refused by the non-elect? I wish someone would explain that.

Was this last wuestiin answered for you? I wont repeat if it was.

 

[Ben1445]

I have the book by Ken Wilson, "THE FOUNDATION OF AUGUSTINIAN CALVINISM", which came out in 2019. His premise is that Augustine's determinism came from later writings where he purportedly reverted back to his Manicheism of his younger days. This book was ridiculed by some notable Calvinists who frequent the debate circuit but it's been 6 or 7 years and still I have not seen a serious rebuttal so I'm beginning to wonder.
What is pertinent to this discussion is that he gives page after page of quotes from the early church fathers on how the will of man operates and it seems none of them support an inability like Calvinism states it, and that's not all. It seems many, if not most of the quotes indicate an amount of natural ability and free will that is much closer aligned to Lennox and the fundamental Baptists than even Arminius, not to mention Calvin.

So my question is, were most common people in the era before Augustine, of the assumption that you indeed have an actual free will, one that exceeded the definitions certainly of Calvinists, but also of Arminius. And were their views, where ever they originated, the result of thinking about how the mind functions or of how deterministic overall reality is.

Psalms 115:16
The heaven, even the heavens, are the LORD's:
but the earth hath he given to the children of men.

 

[DaveXR650]

One must make an actual argument to persuade that this is the case, especially when considering that the world as it presents itself is that a person may choose among many options.

This is true not only in that the things that influence a person's choice are many and changing, and often subconscious that even deliberately using a simple example like we used is not completely explainable. With the coffee/tea choice for instance you may well have a subconscious influence caused by the time you picked up your coffee after forgetting about it and being unexpectedly cool now it gagged you when you took a sip. In addition to that, a legitimate influence could be that you had read the Bible and felt convicted that spending big bucks at the coffee shop was foolish and materialistic and that influenced you to choose tea the next time. What I'm saying is all these things, and I will accept self directed things, influence your choice - but the influences do in the end, determine your choice.

I am not trying here to appeal to determinism on the part of God. I am appealing to this as the reality of the makeup of ourselves as humans and I am tying it to our inclinations and proclivities as fallen humans. Richard Baxter for instance, one of my favorite Puritan writers but not a good Calvinist, said the following regarding our will, (the bolded parts are by me):

"Your will is naturally a free, that is, a self-determining faculty, but it is viciously inclined, and backward to do good; and therefore we see, by sad experience, that it hath not a virtuous moral freedom. But that is the wickedness of it which deserveth the punishment."

Notice that Baxter says the will is your own, and it is free and self-determining. But that it is in itself, prone to wickedness. This is where I think the Calvinists and Arminians are correct. The thing to remember in this, which even many Calvinists forget when defending Calvinism, is that the concept of actual or potential freedom of the will is not the real issue. It is the depravity and wickedness of the actual will. The "inability" to do right is not an absolute inability but a moral inability. This is as far as I will personally go in the inability and I will not appeal to sovereignty or any type of desire by God that this be so. But I think we can be blamed.

 

[DaveXR650]

There is a great book by David Bercot called A Dictionary of Early Christian Beliefs. It is arranged alphabetically that helps drill into many topics from Pre-Nicene council writings of early christians.

I think I will pick up a copy of that. I think @JonC introduced me to Bercot in one of our atonement debates but I didn't know about this particular book. I am fairly new to reading the church fathers. I have almost all their writings, which I got from Kindle, but it overwhelms my device, is poorly indexed and so big, I can't tell where to begin. So this might help. Thanks.

 

[DaveXR650]

Was this last wuestiin answered for you? I wont repeat if it was.

I wrestle with it but I think what is happening is that if you are a Calvinist and your view of our free will is based upon what you think the condition of our free will is, then you are going to be a little softer on your understanding of effectual grace and reprobation than if your primary understanding of our will is based upon strict determinism.

The reason I say that is some of the best Calvinist writers I like seem to have no issue with the concept of believing that we should be able to understand and obey the gospel, but don't, or can't only because we truly don't want to. This is far different than if the reason was that we were determined not to be able to. To me this is a truly important hinge to carefully consider.

 

[DaveXR650]

Oh yeah. And so when you discuss this I think it is worthwhile to ask this question: By yourself, endowed with only your universally God given human capacities of understanding, at a purely natural level, are you able to cry out to God, to realize your need of God's grace and forgiveness, and repent in the most basic meaning of changing your own mind regarding your current life? Both Calvinism and Arminianism claim that you cannot do this without grace (I mean drawing and enlightening grace, beyond the effective merits of God's provision in Christ). But many people in practice and in their teaching believe you can. This is libertarian free will in the sense that you are truly free to choose the other path - not that you have the ability to successfully live the other path, but you can at least ask for help, without additional grace.

 

[JonC]

In that case it is squarely about including libertarian free will.

Thr reason it is not actually about libertarian free-will is both choices are a result of external and internal influences.

The influence to reject God is internal and ontological to "natural man" (men with a "mind set on the flesh"). The influence to choose God is external to natural man and the work of the Spirit to choose God. The agency of choice (the facility making the choice) is not the will but the mind.


Now, within a Calvinistic framework it would be libertarian free will because the faculty of choice is the will. Man would have to have an internal objective and uninfluenced will capable of choosing without being subject to any internal or external influences.

But within Classical Arminianism it is the mind of man that plans his way, not the will of man. And typically this is viewed in degrees (man chooses to accept one thing via the work of the Spirit that is contrary to a "mind set on the flesh" which leads to another thing). Think of a process, like drawing a man from one mindset to another, in steps or stages. Like persuasion.


That said, if you were to take free-will from Classical Arminianism and place it within Calvinism you would easily be able to call it "libertarian free-will".

On the same line if thought, if you were to take Calvinistic predestination from Calvinism and place it within free-will theology you would easily be able to call it "fatilism".


This is why I encourage members who want to discuss opposing positions to be intellectually honest with the opposing system. It is too easy to extract one philosophy or issue from an opposing view and "defeat" it by presupposing a commonality that does not exist.

 

[Ben1445]

The trouble with determinism is that anything outside of the individual’s control is perceived as immutable. It is akin to saying “Since there is nothing that I can do to change everything, and/or there is someone or Someone who has ability to change things that I have no control over, they must be controlling everything that affects my decisions so I am forced into my decisions.”
This is nothing more than the living a simulation conspiracy theory with a plot twist.
We are not in a simulation we do have ability to make independent decisions and alter the course of history.

2 Kings 13:19
And the man of God was wroth with him, and said, Thou shouldest have smitten five or six times; then hadst thou smitten Syria till thou hadst consumed it: whereas now thou shalt smite Syria but thrice.

God allows us to make eternal decisions in respect to ourselves as well as in this world.

 

[JonC]

I believe the biblical balance is compatabilism.

If our decisions determine the future then we should be terrified to inaction (remember Sound of Thunder...one wrong move, no matter how small...).

If our actions and choices are externally predetermined then our decisions do not matter.


Biblically God is in control of the future (He determines the outcome, He works all for the good). But at the same time our decisions do matter (the plans of men belong to men). Knowing the first allows us to confidently act.


Paul's shipwreck is a good example. He knew that the ship would be destroyed but no lives would be lost. This enabled him to act, to tell the sailors that should they leave the ship they would perish.


It is only when we decide to pit two biblical truths that do not fit the Western mindset adequately against one another that we have issues.

 

[DaveXR650]

I believe the biblical balance is compatabilism.

I do too. But I can't figure out how it works. And Robert Picirilli, in "Free Will Revisited", rejects it as a form of determinism, which surprises me. He says "In other words, possessing a free will - or a will, for that matter, as I would contend - rules out determinism and compatibilism.... both of these are forms of determinism, given the idea that determinism and freedom are compatible. Another name for compatibilism is 'soft determinism', after all. My definition, then, is intentionally set against all forms of determinism and in support of self-determinism. It is the very nature of a self to exercise will."

Leroy Forlines quotes several Calvinists, all of whom have different ideas of exactly what "determinism" means, and whether it is compatible with compatibilism. He quotes Feinberg as saying that compatibilism as working because there can exist nonconstraining sufficient conditions which incline the will decisively in one way or another. I don't think Picirilli would agree with that unless you agree to remove the word "decisively".

The big question you would have to get a handle on first I would think would be whether you believe in the possibility of foreseeing the future without determining or at least allowing all that happens. Arminians insist that yes, this can be true. Calvinists agree regarding God knowing the future but believe it is possible because his hand is always ready to make it so, at least to the extent it is necessary for what God ordains to happen to happen. If people are correct in that God can passively "see" what the future holds, in a non-deterministic way, then all this discussion becomes moot because God can indeed allow any level of freedom and then do what is needed on His part to achieve what he wills by simply working around the things people choose to do freely.

And again, I will raise the point that Arminianism will constantly reach out and move toward a libertarian free will as illustrated by what Dr. Picirilli says above in that he is "in support of self-determinism". Which I say goes against official Arminian statements on soteriology as it is a contradiction against the absolute need of prevenient grace prior to salvation.

 

[JonC]

I do too. But I can't figure out how it works.

We can't figure out how it works because we are not qualified. We are not God.

I think we need to take it as it comes in Scripture, believing that man's plans belong to man and the outcome belongs to God. Instead of reasoning away one to accept the other it is best to remember that God's ways are above man's ways.

In the end this topic is pure philosophy. It is an attempt to understand the reality of two truths expressed in Scripture but truths which exceed our understanding. We find it uncomfortable because (like with the Trinity) the biblical truths do not fit our categories.

 

[Psalty]

I believe the biblical balance is compatabilism.

If our decisions determine the future then we should be terrified to inaction (remember Sound of Thunder...one wrong move, no matter how small...).

If our actions and choices are externally predetermined then our decisions do not matter.


Biblically God is in control of the future (He determines the outcome, He works all for the good). But at the same time our decisions do matter (the plans of men belong to men). Knowing the first allows us to confidently act.


Paul's shipwreck is a good example. He knew that the ship would be destroyed but no lives would be lost. This enabled him to act, to tell the sailors that should they leave the ship they would perish.


It is only when we decide to pit two biblical truths that do not fit the Western mindset adequately against one another that we have issues.

You’re going to have to define compatibalism.

Many compatibalists say that God determines, and yet we have a will which He has given to us. They say that we choose what we want but would never choose God. The problem is they never address the fact that they also believe that God is the one who has determined that they will never freely choose Him. Martin et al on this board RUN from addressing this.

Molinists probably have the better answer for how free will and determinism could work at the same time: God simply considered every created world that He could make and chose the one where all free choices matched up with His will.

I disagree with all of these, but the Molinist position is more tenable than the compatibalist word-game that I laid out above, in my mind.

 

[Ben1445]

You’re going to have to define compatibalism.

Many compatibalists say that God determines, and yet we have a will which He has given to us. They say that we choose what we want but would never choose God. The problem is they never address the fact that they also believe that God is the one who has determined that they will never freely choose Him. Martin et al on this board RUN from addressing this.

Molinists probably have the better answer for how free will and determinism could work at the same time: God simply considered every created world that He could make and chose the one where all free choices matched up with His will.

I disagree with all of these, but the Molinist position is more tenable than the compatibalist word-game that I laid out above, in my mind.

I find it easier to just believe that God has the ability to be reactionary.

2 Samuel 22:27
With the pure thou wilt shew thyself pure;
and with the froward thou wilt shew thyself unsavoury.

Psalms 18:26
With the pure thou wilt shew thyself pure;
and with the froward thou wilt shew thyself froward.

These are “if you, then I,” statements.
Just like when God said to Israel if you follow Me I will bless you and if not, a curse.

As far as finding God, Jesus already says that He knocks, If any man hears and opens, He will…

We serve a God Who has presented us with if/then choices.

 

[Psalty]

I find it easier to just believe that God has the ability to be reactionary.

2 Samuel 22:27
With the pure thou wilt shew thyself pure;
and with the froward thou wilt shew thyself unsavoury.

Psalms 18:26
With the pure thou wilt shew thyself pure;
and with the froward thou wilt shew thyself froward.

These are “if you, then I,” statements.
Just like when God said to Israel if you follow Me I will bless you and if not, a curse.

As far as finding God, Jesus already says that He knocks, If any man hears and opens, He will…

We serve a God Who has presented us with if/then choices.

Yes, my view is more in line with this. And that the offer is a genuine offer or “if/then” conditional. It is able to be made, and does not a subversive second will that makes God speak out of both sides of His mouth.

I think the hold up with most calvinists, compatibalist or otherwise, is recognizing that most of us “choice/choose” folks (again, I wont say free will, because I dont believe it is completely free), do believe God can and does reach into time and space and make decisions and makes His own moves.

The problem is when one takes something like the commissioning and ordaining of a prophet and then broadening this to a vast degree by assuming that God actually does this for every human and every choice regarding salvation.