I disagree.
There is nothing within an "Arminian" framework as I understand it that would prevent us from recognizing that there are special cases (e.g., divine inspiration of scripture; various answers to prayer or road to damascus experiences) in which God overwhelmingly intervenes in influencing the human will and thus "determines" human choice. In these cases the means by which God determines human choice may well include decisive conditioning of human choices by way of God's directly intervening in both the person's external and internal (mental) environment so as to bring about the divinely desired outcome, in a way similar to that envisioned by "Calvinists."
If you accept the possibly that in
some cases God guarantees that certain people would will to do certain things, including respond in repentance and faith, why is it that you might even think to argue one must have LFW to be "responsible" for actions? Are the ones in whom God divinely intervenes "responsible" for those actions that God sovereignly determines--whether good or bad?
If
yes, then LFW is not an essential to grant "responsibility" to a person; CFW can also qualify.
If
no, then you would indeed believe that God is a respecter of persons and that He makes
certain people do things of which they should not be held accountable.
In other words, Arminians do not deny the ability of God in intervene and affect man's will. LFW, is the belief that man could have chosen to do other than what he ends up doing. So, even a miraculous sign from God would not necessarily "violate" LFW, it would only influence or "provoke" the will. Scripture speaks about such cases regularly which begs the question as to the purpose of such influence/provoking/persuasion if indeed God's effectual calling is being employed for salvation.
If for every choice or action performed one
could have done otherwise, as in all paths were completely equal, what exactly is the reason or driving force that involves the choice made in particular? Does not everyone choose to do things for a
reason? If all choices are equal both in presentation
and in the will, then how can one truly be "responsible" for merely acting arbitrarily? One is more responsible in court if a
motivation is determined. If no motivation is detected and the action seems
arbitrary, a person can plead
insanity to avoid the consequences of
responsibility.