When Charles Lindbergh visited Germany several times in 1937-38, he was impressed with the Luftwaffe's aircraft & advised a US commission the US should build more & better military aircraft. His advice wasn't heeded much til the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor & the superiority of the Japanese planes was seen.
But Hitler planted the seed of doom for the Luftwaffe by making Hermann Goering its head. While Goering had been an excellent WW1 flier with 22 victories & winning the Blue Max. But as a commander of an air force, he was vastly unqualified. He knew nothing of strategy, believed "his" Luftwaffe could do anything an air force was capable of, including supplying land forces, & some of his appointments into high office in the Luftwaffe were disastrous.
Perhaps his worst move was making Ernst Udet as head of equipment production. Udet had been a brilliant WW1 pilot with 62 victories & a squadron commander, but he knew nothing about aircraft production & development, & hated administrative duties. He cancelled a Heinkel Co. turbojet in 1937 that would've been WW2's best aircraft, at least at the war's start. He cancelled a heavy bomber being made by the Junkers Co. as unnecessary. He almost cancelled Messerschmitt's jet, delaying its manufacture til it was too late for it to really affect the war's outcome. He allowed all german aircraft production to become clogged with bureaucratic paper work, left parts manufacture haphazard, & was poor at procuring raw materials for plane-making. Thus, aircraft production fell far behind that of Britain. (Udet killed himself in 1941, but the damage by then was irreversible.)
And Goering tried several projects that didn't work. In the Battle of Britain against the RAF, he began with the right strategy - Bomb the radar towers & bases, and the sector airfields that vectored the RAF fighters onto the german formations. But he became dissatisfied because the destruction of radar facilities wasn't going fast enough to suit him, & his attacks of Fighter Command weren't going fast enough to please him, either. Unknown to Goering, his attacks were quite-effective, & Fighter Command was in peril. But he abandoned his war against Fighter Command for other British targets, giving the British the respite they needed to strengthen Fighter Command to make effective resistance.
Goering's attempts to prevent the Dunkirk evacuation failed, as did his attempt to fully supply the German forces in Russia from the air. And his failure to put people in charge of production to keep the Luftwaffe adequately supplied with planes, fuel, & parts led to its being overwhelmed.
But Hitler planted the seed of doom for the Luftwaffe by making Hermann Goering its head. While Goering had been an excellent WW1 flier with 22 victories & winning the Blue Max. But as a commander of an air force, he was vastly unqualified. He knew nothing of strategy, believed "his" Luftwaffe could do anything an air force was capable of, including supplying land forces, & some of his appointments into high office in the Luftwaffe were disastrous.
Perhaps his worst move was making Ernst Udet as head of equipment production. Udet had been a brilliant WW1 pilot with 62 victories & a squadron commander, but he knew nothing about aircraft production & development, & hated administrative duties. He cancelled a Heinkel Co. turbojet in 1937 that would've been WW2's best aircraft, at least at the war's start. He cancelled a heavy bomber being made by the Junkers Co. as unnecessary. He almost cancelled Messerschmitt's jet, delaying its manufacture til it was too late for it to really affect the war's outcome. He allowed all german aircraft production to become clogged with bureaucratic paper work, left parts manufacture haphazard, & was poor at procuring raw materials for plane-making. Thus, aircraft production fell far behind that of Britain. (Udet killed himself in 1941, but the damage by then was irreversible.)
And Goering tried several projects that didn't work. In the Battle of Britain against the RAF, he began with the right strategy - Bomb the radar towers & bases, and the sector airfields that vectored the RAF fighters onto the german formations. But he became dissatisfied because the destruction of radar facilities wasn't going fast enough to suit him, & his attacks of Fighter Command weren't going fast enough to please him, either. Unknown to Goering, his attacks were quite-effective, & Fighter Command was in peril. But he abandoned his war against Fighter Command for other British targets, giving the British the respite they needed to strengthen Fighter Command to make effective resistance.
Goering's attempts to prevent the Dunkirk evacuation failed, as did his attempt to fully supply the German forces in Russia from the air. And his failure to put people in charge of production to keep the Luftwaffe adequately supplied with planes, fuel, & parts led to its being overwhelmed.