Modeling Molinism

[Benjamin]

which

Let me put it this way... If you were to be confronted with this problem by a believer, if he were to propose the following problem, what would you say to him?


If it's possible that I may be able to commit an untold number of sins (which, I believe to be true for all of us) then there are imaginary worlds in which I commit one of those sins. So, if we were analyze all of the possible worlds in which I exist, we would see that I have committed all sins that were possible. I had no control over which world God chose to actualize. I guess I just got lucky that he chose this world, right? (hmmm... lucky so far anyways). How does Mo manage this tension?

And you still didn't answer the question.

Let it not be said that I have not given every opportunity I can think of for the opponent to come clean or that I am unwilling to help him with his “problem”. Let’s try it this way:

First regarding your question, which revealingly assumes “if” God foreknows all things He must have determined all things and thereby this belief “causes” a tension for the opponent, tell me, “What is the truth that the Molinism argument is grounded on and that they stand on?”

1) On exactly “how” God can foreknow all things and not determine them because of this truth being logically presented as true through CCFs and thereby resting on His ability to do this through His knowledge while He maintains the attributes of both foreknowledge and LFW?

Or

2) On that God “does” foreknow all things and not determine them because of this truth being logically presented as true through CCFs and thereby resting on His ability to do this through His knowledge while He maintains the attributes of both foreknowledge and LFW?

If (1) you have used a fallacy in attempting to demand an answer to this question to your satisfaction of understanding “how” and are using this to make your conclusion that the argument of Molinism cannot be true based on a misrepresentation of the Molinist argument and are ignorantly or disingenuously asking this question while trying to appear to win the argument.

If (2) then you have once again disregarded the topic of this thread in asking this question which is to accurately reflect a model of the Molinist argument, your interest in “how” is noted and understandable, but the answer to your question being to your satisfaction has no bearing on whether or not the actual Molinist ground argument is true or not because your question does not apply to the grounding argument itself. It is a merely a fallacious demand which is intended to imply the Molinist argument does not stand in truth based on a misrepresentation of the Molinist argument.

If you honestly address my question showing you recognize the differences between your model and what your demands amount to pertaining to the actual Molinist grounding argument which they stand on and then I will give you an “explanation” of “how” God foreknowing all things and Him not determining all things “could” be true relating to the “actual” Molinist grounding argument which is logically proven to be true and thereby admitting your question is only following the presentation of the true Molinist grounding argument and true conclusion to that argument. I will then help a believer with his “problem”. Otherwise, I believe I will be inclined take your question as a none other than part of a continuous attempt to fallaciously win the argument through a misrepresentation you have made against Molinism and will not waste anymore time.

 

[HeirofSalvation]

Originally Posted by humblethinker
Let me put it this way... If you were to be confronted with this problem by a believer, if he were to propose the following problem, what would you say to him?

I would begin by pointing out it's flaws:

If it's possible that I may be able to commit an untold number of sins (which, I believe to be true for all of us) then there are imaginary worlds in which I commit one of those sins.

1.) That simply doesn't follow....It MAY be the case, that there is a world in which you did...but there might not be
2.) You use of the word "imaginary" is telling...It seems to reveal that you believe that the actions of free creatures are conceived of in God's mind, rather than the mind of the creature themselves. What God "imagines" are the circumstances...What the creatures "imagine" are their own actions.

So, if we were analyze all of the possible worlds in which I exist, we would see that I have committed all sins that were possible.

Perhaps if you could analyze all those possible worlds, but, you can't...so you don't know that at all. It may not even be a reasonable assumption to make. There may indeed be no possible World wherein you EVER make that decision, or ever commit those sins.

I had no control over which world God chose to actualize.

No...You only control your own actions in the world that he DID actualize. What World you find yourself in is God's choosing...What you do in that World is YOUR choosing.

I guess I just got lucky that he chose this world, right?

"Luck" is only meaningful when we assume complete randomness...Neither God's choice of "World" nor your individual actions have anything to do with "Luck".

How does Mo manage this tension?

By demonstrating that the "tension" does not exist.

 

[humblethinker]

(HoS, in this reply I'm employing some third person verbage but only for the sake of conversation flow. I don't intend to put distance between us personally. Thank you for engaging in this conversation. It has brought about some thoughts for which until now I have not considered much deeper than a cursory observation, if even at all.)

(Also… I appreciate the fact that you did not think I meant to use the word 'imaginary' in a bad light. At first I thought you had. I can see how that word in this discussion can seem to be pejorative or loaded and may therefore communicate a meaning for which I do not intend. I will attempt to explain the concept differently but just know that if I use it again I'm not intending to trivialize or imbue it with meaning that would make the act look silly. Also, while responding to you I sensed that we need to confirm that prior to creation of all the possible worlds had their own complete set of 'history' and that any time we refer to 'an other world' then that world -with it's complete set of history- was actually one which he chose not to actualize.)

I would begin by pointing out it's flaws:

Thank you HoS. This is exactly what I was hoping for. Your reply has been helpful.

#1) Regarding:

HT's point: If it's possible that I may be able to commit an untold number of sins (which, I believe to be true for all of us) then there are imaginary worlds in which I commit one of those sins.
HoS said, "1.) That simply doesn't follow....It MAY be the case, that there is a world in which you did...but there might not be
​

I see what you're saying I think: In pure self contemplation, there may be sins that I imagine to be possible, but my thought of their potentiality doesn't mean that there is a world in which it did come about. If this is what you meant I say, 'good point, I agree.'

To further clarify our model, if the possibility to sin actually exists in this world it necessarily indicates that there is another world in which it did occur. Correct? This goes to the point for which we agree, "Among all possible worlds God chose to actualize this one." We don't know all the things that are possible but we do know at least some of them, correct?
​

#2) Regarding:

HoS said: 2.) You use of the word "imaginary" is telling...It seems to reveal that you believe that the actions of free creatures are conceived of in God's mind, rather than the mind of the creature themselves. What God "imagines" are the circumstances...What the creatures "imagine" are their own actions.​

I'll grant you your point here. I think this raises some points of interest for which we might talk about later though. Just to make some of the problems known (I'm not expecting a reply right now… ):
1) Are there possible alternative worlds in which there are people who never exist in this world?
2) If there is a fallacy in thinking that the actions of free creatures are conceived in God's mind, rather than the mind of the creature himself, then it seems that it must be the case that the creature actually would exist in this world, correct? Otherwise we have God knowing the truth of a matter that is determined by a creature that never even exists to think thoughts and as such there would be no truth in the matter to be known by God.
3) So, it is the case that God holds me accountable for actions I do in this world which he chose to actualize while I did not do those actions in some or all other worlds which he chose not to actualize.

(Again, I'm not looking for a reply to these right now, maybe later though I'll readdress these issues. Benjamin made some valid concerns above that I'd like to address but for now I'd just like to stay focused like a laser beam. There's so much for me to get distracted by in this whole conversation and I appreciate you journeying with me through it.)
​

#3) Regarding:

HT says: So, if we were [to] analyze all of the possible worlds in which I exist, we would see that I have committed all sins that were possible.
HoS replieserhaps if you could analyze all those possible worlds, but, you can't...so you don't know that at all. It may not even be a reasonable assumption to make. There may indeed be no possible World wherein you EVER make that decision, or ever commit those sins.
​

I grant you that I can't analyze them and also that I'm not always aware of the possibilities of how I might act. I see what you're saying and if I may first reassert a point I made just above: If it is truly possible that I may act a certain way in this world then it is necessarily the case that there is a world in which I did act that way. So, if God were to make available to us all of the possible worlds in which I were to have existed, we would be able to then identify at least all of the sins that were possible for me to have committed in this world.

If this holds true then to further mold our model, we could propose that our world is the 'anchor' by which all other worlds would have had the ontological status of 'possible', correct? Therefore, if the obtainence of an event is not possible in this world, then while there may be other worlds in which said event occurs, those other worlds did not have the ontological status of 'possible'.
​

#4) Regarding:

HT says: I had no control over which world God chose to actualize.
HoS replies: No...You only control your own actions in the world that he DID actualize. What World you find yourself in is God's choosing...What you do in that World is YOUR choosing.
​

I find the following phrase of yours interesting and I don't want to understand it to mean something it doesn't: "you only control your own actions in the world that he DID actualize." I find this fascinating. It seems that on one hand I am not in control of the 'me' in other worlds yet on the other hand the assertion of self determination in the other worlds is a proof against which my actions in this world will be judged. The proof of an alternative self determining act is the evidence that justifies God holding me accountable in this world. Yet, Molinism states that I can not control my actions in other worlds? The self determining proof that "I" created is a determination in which "I" cannot control? Surely God only holds us accountable for actions in our control, for which we make a determining contribution, correct? It seems at first that Molinism would uphold the idea that there is a sense of a 'homogeneity of personhood' between the 'me' in this world and the 'me' in the other worlds, yet, I cannot control the actions of the 'me' in the other worlds. This causes me to consider whether it is even possible for the 'me' to be the same 'me' in the other world? This seems contrary to my intuition of what 'personhood' is. It seems to indicate that my personhood and character is not one of 'becoming' but one of revealing. This runs counter to my understanding of personal identity. I am of the opinion that free creatures are necessarily creatures for whom their character, that is to say their identity -who they are- is in a state of 'becoming'. It seems I would have to re-adjust my concept of the self if I were to accept Molinism. This seems to be a HUGE issue for which I have not given much thought yet, nor do I look forward to rebuilding my concept of the self, but I am at least willing to start if reality is so. However, it seems plausible that Molinism does not reflect reality... this is theology's task, correct? To create a model that reflects reality ? What is ontologically real is only what God thinks to be real. It can also be said this way, 'Our goal in theology is to present a model that better explains and reflects revelation.'

Regarding this phrase: " What World you find yourself in is God's choosing...What you do in that World is YOUR choosing." It seems to me that the meticulous providence of Molinism is demonstrated by the idea that every set of circumstances in which one finds himself to be is due to the meticulous and manipulative choosing of God, such that there is no set of circumstances in which anyone ever finds themselves that God did not choose to occur prior to creation. I'm not laying a claim of culpability here, I'm just recognizing that since something had to happen it is the case that everything that does happen in this world exists because of God meticulously choosing this world. So, observation that 'it' did happen is due to the fact that there was no other world which God would have been able to choose and still achieve his purposes.
​

#5) Regarding:

HT said: I guess I just got lucky that he chose this world, right?
HoS replies: "Luck" is only meaningful when we assume complete randomness...Neither God's choice of "World" nor your individual actions have anything to do with "Luck".​

While I was saying this tongue-in-cheek, I think you make a good point. The act of sentient beings 'choosing' is not attributable to luck. It is interesting to consider though, that it seems according to Molinism there are some circumstances and events that could not be otherwise in order for God to achieve his purposes; that in this, he had no alternative choice in the matter.
​

#6) Regarding:

HT said: How does Mo manage this tension?
HoS replies: By demonstrating that the "tension" does not exist.​

See my comments above.​

 

[Benjamin]

I’m going to step back as I’m obviously not getting my points across, but will offer the below from notes hitting on % and possible worlds (being most of rest is in my words I'll leave that be as they seems to be mostly adding difficulties to the present directions desired here ) thinking them relevant to discussion at hand concerning “sovereign control” in possible worlds pertaining to the Molinist’ model in contrast to other models which hold to a “deterministic sovereign control” as a necessarily truth or related and thus relevant alternatives regarding forfeiture of foreknowledge. By what should be HT confirmed authentic Molinist:

William Lane Craig explains, "It is up to God whether we find ourselves in a world in which we are predestined, but it is up to us whether we are predestined in the world in which we find ourselves."

Keathley explains a scenario that fits in with the above using the ambulance analogy. “Imagine you wake up and discover that you are in an ambulance being transported to the emergency room. You clearly require serious medical help. If you do nothing, you will be delivered to the hospital. However, if for whatever reason you demand to be let out, the driver will comply. He may express his concern, warn you of the consequences, but he will abide by your wishes. You receive no credit for being taken to the hospital, you receive all the blame for getting out. This is a picture of the Molinist view of salvation.”

 

[Cypress]

William Lane Craig explains, "It is up to God whether we find ourselves in a world in which we are predestined, but it is up to us whether we are predestined in the world in which we find ourselves

This is bizarre. All the logical hoops jumped through to explain the mere possibility that molinism and other possible worlds are true,when they should be easily understood from scripture. Why would we ever surmise about other possible worlds that God considered unless our system required them. It certainly is not warranted from scripture IMO.

 

[Benjamin]

This is bizarre. All the logical hoops jumped through to explain the mere possibility that molinism and other possible worlds are true,when they should be easily understood from scripture. Why would we ever surmise about other possible worlds that God considered unless our system required them. It certainly is not warranted from scripture IMO.

Scripture shows through Counterfactuals of Creaturely Freedoms that that all things are not pre-determined according to God's foreknowledge in creation as being logic. Molinism is merely expressing these things (LFW) are logically possible within the type of knowledge God has (not to exclude Him knowing all things) and giving explanations how this (logical conclusion) can be observed.

 

[Benjamin]

This is bizarre. All the logical hoops jumped through to explain the mere possibility that molinism and other possible worlds are true,when they should be easily understood from scripture. Why would we ever surmise about other possible worlds that God considered unless our system required them. It certainly is not warranted from scripture IMO.

Oh, and in case you missed it, I believe us to be in agreement that it is rather bizarre that LFW and Divine foreknowledge aren’t accepted on "face value" since the sciiptures show both true. That’s good enough for me as the ole saying goes, “God said it, I believe it, and that settles it!” I guess “some people” just like to be difficult and want it explained logically. Pertaining to that, the second point I believe being missed by my opponent is that Molinism then stands on the grounds (model) that if it is logically true that it is seen in CCFs and if God exists and His Word is true then it follows that it is logically true that LFW and foreknowledge exist, again, that seems that also that would be enough to logically to except standing on the model and all that is left is trying to explain how it (this proven logic necessary truth) “could” or one might say “must” logically follow to be true that this true miraculous feat of God’s is related to His type of knowledge.

BTW, it seems you are understanding the point I’ve been trying to make about sticking to model according to what it is based on as true (scriptural CCFs) and if so, thanks, I then appreciate hearing someone was getting what I’ve been trying to explain and this makes me very happy that my time has not been completely wasted trying to put it into words! :smilewinkgrin:

 

[humblethinker]

This [the ambulence story above] is a picture of the Molinist view of salvation.”

I agree with that but it does not distinguish Molinism but rather confirms that it is part of the bigger set of theology that affirms LFW.

 

[Benjamin]

In the ambulance model it is confirming LFW it also dispels determinism. That fact that the “driver” expresses his concerns and warns of the consequences confirms that he knows what things will happen due to the patient changing the circumstances (CCFs) thereby maintaining foreknowledge while allowing for LFW…These things (LFW + foreknowledge w/o determinism) distinguish the Molinism model from other views. Seems to me the model is complete.

 

[HeirofSalvation]

(Also… I appreciate the fact that you did not think I meant to use the word 'imaginary' in a bad light. At first I thought you had. I can see how that word in this discussion can seem to be pejorative or loaded and may therefore communicate a meaning for which I do not intend. I will attempt to explain the concept differently but just know that if I use it again I'm not intending to trivialize or imbue it with meaning that would make the act look silly.

You are correct...I don't think you meant to use the word "imagine" perjoratively (didn't think it for a second) but, it does to me seem to reveal that there is something about Molinism that you are missing.

Also, while responding to you I sensed that we need to confirm that prior to creation of all the possible worlds had their own complete set of 'history' and that any time we refer to 'an other world' then that world -with it's complete set of history- was actually one which he chose not to actualize.)

Yes...of course, we are taking lee-way with the word "history" which is, of course, not exactly correct, but for lack of better terms, yes.

I see what you're saying I think: In pure self contemplation, there may be sins that I imagine to be possible, but my thought of their potentiality doesn't mean that there is a world in which it did come about. If this is what you meant I say, 'good point, I agree.'

Yes, it's what I mean...I can for instance imagine myself (as I am) being perfectly capable of say....robbing a bank...in some other reality, at least for a few years after it's glorification in "POINT BREAK", and my being a stupid teenager, but, I can't imagine certain sins ever being a temptation for some people. Or, at least, I don't think we have sufficient reason to think they would be.

To further clarify our model, if the possibility to sin actually exists in this world it necessarily indicates that there is another world in which it did occur. Correct?

I certainly don't think that either...especially not necessarily. I think we mis-use that term quite often around here. Many things are deductively provable, but that doesn't make them necessarry. We might go so far as to say very plausibly...but, we cannot be certain, and it is decidedly not necessarry.
I will use my "Bank-rob" example. At my age....I must have thought that collectively, the ex-president surfer dudes exemplified by Patrick Swayze (in his coolest era) made "bank-robbing" (as long as you were a kewl surfer who used creative masks) was kinda cool. Thus, in some alternative world where I was more destitute and had a worse back-ground, and evil friends who encouraged me the wrong way, I can see a reasonable possibility that I might (given the sheer number of possible realities) that I might rob a bank. We can sort of appeal to numerous rolls of the dice like Evolutionists usually do. But, nonetheless despite the fact that I think it quite plausible, I cannot know that inescapably, and it certainly does not render it necessary. It may simply be the case that there is no set of circumstances, wherein I actually would do that.

1) Are there possible alternative worlds in which there are people who never exist in this world?

I believe so, and I also think most Molinists would say the same thing.

2) If there is a fallacy in thinking that the actions of free creatures are conceived in God's mind, rather than the mind of the creature himself, then it seems that it must be the case that the creature actually would exist in this world, correct? Otherwise we have God knowing the truth of a matter that is determined by a creature that never even exists to think thoughts and as such there would be no truth in the matter to be known by God.

Actually, I don't think I agree. If you think about it, you are still seeking for a "grounding" for counterfactuals which Molinists don't think are necessary, or even available. It is probably very difficult for most non-Mols to accept the way Molinists think about these things. It is kind of like "Algebra" for a lot of people....it makes ZERO sense until one day (allegedly) the whole thing "clicks" all at once....which it never did for me, and subsequently I still insist it is all pure witchcraft. Molinists just posit God's knowing these possibilities as "facts" about people who NEVER exist....they only "ground" it, in God's being a super-genius. That's it.
You know how Calvinists sometimes seem to worship God's "Sovereignty" and "Power" more than they seem to worship God himself??? Like some of them are more enamored with the idea of sheer power, than they are the person who possesses it? (This phenomenon is usually exhibitted by angry males in their early twenties, who, if Muslims, would be suicide bombers)....I think you know the type....
Molinists are kind of like that regarding God's Omniscience.

3) So, it is the case that God holds me accountable for actions I do in this world which he chose to actualize while I did not do those actions in some or all other worlds which he chose not to actualize.

I don't KNOW that you have done things in "This World" that you would not have done in another...but, it seems, of course to be a plausible assumption.

I appreciate you journeying with me through it.

Thank you ...On that note, on another thread (mostly from frustration) I suggested that you were LESS than curious, and somewhat dis-ingenuous and merely trying to lay traps...That was probably an unfair rush to judgement, and if so, I apologize.

If it is truly possible that I may act a certain way in this world then it is necessarily the case that there is a world in which I did act that way.

No, I don't think so....Your use of the word "history" above may be telling as well.

So, if God were to make available to us all of the possible worlds in which I were to have existed, we would be able to then identify at least all of the sins that were possible for me to have committed in this world.

Well certainly.

If this holds true then to further mold our model, we could propose that our world is the 'anchor' by which all other worlds would have had the ontological status of 'possible', correct? Therefore, if the obtainence of an event is not possible in this world, then while there may be other worlds in which said event occurs, those other worlds did not have the ontological status of 'possible'.

We don't like to use the word "possible"...ontologically possible or not. We have been through this, a lot, before. We can only know what obviously obtains, of course, but, for all I know, this is the ONLY possible world where I exist, but there could be about 755,000,125 worlds where YOU do.

I find the following phrase of yours interesting and I don't want to understand it to mean something it doesn't: "you only control your own actions in the world that he DID actualize." I find this fascinating.

Actually, I think you completely misunderstood it, we will probably have to get into more detail about it later.

It seems that on one hand I am not in control of the 'me' in other worlds

No, you completely are....My statement was only meant to convey our own culpability given the circumstances in which we find ourselves, had God actualized another world, we would be equally as culpable. There is no reason to even think of culpability in a world which does not exist, only to know that were God to have actualized another world wherein there is true LFW...then we would subsequently be equally responsible for our own actions...I think you are reading FAR MORE into that statement than it intends.

Yet, Molinism states that I can not control my actions in other worlds?

It states no such thing. I think you completely mis-understood the quote.....Forgive my editting, but the rest of your paragraph follows from this mistake.

Regarding this phrase: " What World you find yourself in is God's choosing...What you do in that World is YOUR choosing." It seems to me that the meticulous providence of Molinism is demonstrated by the idea that every set of circumstances in which one finds himself to be is due to the meticulous and manipulative choosing of God, such that there is no set of circumstances in which anyone ever finds themselves that God did not choose to occur prior to creation.

Correct, I guess, I don't know why you insisted on describing God's choosing as both "meticulous" AND "manipulative"...that seems unnecessary, but otherwise, it is correct as far as I can tell.

I'm not laying a claim of culpability here, I'm just recognizing that since something had to happen it is the case that everything that does happen in this world exists because of God meticulously choosing this world

.
"Had to happen" is the problem. That is not Molinism, that is this mistake of confusing certainty with necessity. Certainty is not necessity. Things are only certain in that God is aware of them, but nothing renders it necessary....and further, no Molinist believes that certainty implies necessity.

So, observation that 'it' did happen is due to the fact that there was no other world which God would have been able to choose and still achieve his purposes.

Taken by itself...this statement is, of course, true.


I apologize for some editting....I think I addressed everything appropriately. If not, please let me know.

 

[Yeshua1]

In the ambulance model it is confirming LFW it also dispels determinism. That fact that the “driver” expresses his concerns and warns of the consequences confirms that he knows what things will happen due to the patient changing the circumstances (CCFs) thereby maintaining foreknowledge while allowing for LFW…These things (LFW + foreknowledge w/o determinism) distinguish the Molinism model from other views. Seems to me the model is complete.

Does the Sovereignity of God as per the biblical model allow for ANYTHING that ver happens to either outside of His direct control though, or else permitted by his will to happen?

 

[Benjamin]

Does the Sovereignity of God as per the biblical model allow for ANYTHING that ver happens to either outside of His direct control though, or else permitted by his will to happen?

First, are you talking about true Biblical Divine sovereignty which shows "God’s Providence and Sovereign Control over Divinely Designed LFW creatures" and Him genuinely allowiing for things to happen as per the Molinist model ...or the Calvinist/Determinist systematically forced "biblical interpretations" which insist on their beliefs that God could only be sovereign through practicing “Determinist Sovereign Control” according to the Determinist model that God causes all things to happen which leads to theological fatalism?

 

[Yeshua1]

First, are you talking about true Biblical Divine sovereignty which shows "God’s Providence and Sovereign Control over Divinely Designed LFW creatures" and Him genuinely allowiing for things to happen as per the Molinist model ...or the Calvinist/Determinist systematically forced "biblical interpretations" which insist on their beliefs that God could only be sovereign through practicing “Determinist Sovereign Control” according to the Determinist model that God causes all things to happen which leads to theological fatalism?

can anything ever happen that he either did not determine to happen? that he either did it Himself or else permitted it, and could have stepped in to stop it any time?

 

[Benjamin]

can anything ever happen that he either did not determine to happen? that he either did it Himself or else permitted it, and could have stepped in to stop it any time?

That is a good question. If you go back throguh the thread (which the topic of is, "Modeling Molinism") CCFs have been discussed which relate to your question demonstating that things do happen which are not pre-determined and how that (CCFS) applies. Several times, as a matter of fact.

.

Now, I see you diregarded my question which related to yours and had prurpose. It seems you might have missed how it relates. I'll explain; it was a hint that this thread in about "Modeling Molinism" not "Modeling Determinism".

This thread has managed to stay on topic for 6 pages. Knowing your habits to disregard the topic to input your agenda of Determinism which commonly leads into derailing threads; I was "heading you off at the pass" meaning giving you a friendly reminder that if you would like to "present" and "discuss" another model of God's sovereign control the right thing to do is start another thread on the subject or you could simply take your practice elsewhere as far as I am concerned.

I would like to keep this thread on topic. Do you now understand what I am saying to you and why I am saying it?

 

[humblethinker]

The self in the worlds of Molinism

Since my last post I've continued to consider the idea of the self and how it can be understood in the view of Molinism. In the view of OVT I do not find the difficulties that are arising with Molinism. So, some questions when I imagine that Molinism is the current reality:

How similar do the selves of the other worlds have to be in order to be the same self? How dissimilar can they be and still be considered the same self?
Is there a transworld self identity that is homogenous? I'm having a hard time accepting the me of some of the other worlds as still being me.
My view of the self is that I am a creature who is in the process of becoming. This 'becoming' is to some degree self determined. I am the person who made the specific choices in my life and these choices and the choices of other people on their own same progression are commingling and the self that I am is specifically not the self of other possible self determining acts. Imo, this life of self determining is part of God's way of sharing his creative ability with his creatures.

Are there other possible worlds in which the biological parents I have in this world are not the same parents?

Are there other worlds in which I don't speak English? That I was not male? Are there other worlds in which I was born a hermaphrodite? Are there other worlds in which my personality is not INTP but ENTJ... Or ISTP?

In all possible worlds must I have married the same woman as I have in this world? The "Oneness" which we are both currently engaged in and still becoming, how different can that be and how similar must it be compared to the other worlds and still be the same transworld "oneness"?

My idea of identity and the 'self' would seem to be obliterated if I were to accept Molinism. I need to be re-educated in what the 'self' is or have explained to me how Molinism is compatible with my understanding of the self. Can you suggest any reading on the topic in a Molinistic worldview?

 

[Yeshua1]

we seperate the predetermined Will of God though into that which he decreed and determined to be done, and that which he has permitted and allowed...

Do you see anything tht ever occurs without him still retaing soverengty over it?

 

[OldRegular]

HT, I don't mean to derail this thread or the purpose of it so I apologize if this is out of line…

I see in much of this discussion a tendency towards an almost deistic concept of God and his relationship to his creation which we must be careful to guard against. Scripture clearly reveals a God who is involved and directly active with his creation. So much so that he even sent his only begotten son to live among us, interact with us and ultimately die for us. I tend towards an understanding that has God exhaustively and profoundly involved in his creation. I am not suggesting the discussion IS deistic, but just noticing a tendency to downplay the intimate and active aspect that God deals with his creation. The analogy of setting a record in motion and sitting back and enjoying the arrangements that he chose suggests that things that happen though understood by God are only really the consequence of what he has arranged and set in motion and not by virtue of his direct involvement. We might argue about the degree but I think we can agree that God is not passive in the unfolding in time of his plan for his creation.

It seems to me that the idea of trying to divide the knowledge of God through some exercise of logic is asinine. Is this simply an attempt to justify the doctrine of "freewillism"?

The most famous distinctive in Molinism is its affirmation that God has middle knowledge (scienta media). Molinism holds that God’s knowledge consists of three logical moments. These “moments” of knowledge are not to be thought of as chronological; rather, they are to be understood as “logical.” In other words, one moment does not come before another moment in time; instead, one moment is logically prior to the other moments. The Molinist differentiates between three different moments of knowledge which are respectively called natural knowledge, middle knowledge and free knowledge.

1. Natural Knowledge – This is God’s knowledge of all necessary and all possible truths. In this “moment” God knows every possible combination of causes and effects. He also knows all the truths of logic and all moral truths.

2. Middle Knowledge – This is God’s knowledge of what a free creature would do in any given circumstance. This knowledge is knowledge of what philosophers call counterfactuals.

3. Free Knowledge – This is God’s knowledge of what He decided to create. God’s free knowledge is His knowledge of the actual world as it is.

From: http://www.gotquestions.org/molinism.html

 

[Benjamin]

Since my last post I've continued to consider the idea of the self and how it can be understood in the view of Molinism. In the view of OVT I do not find the difficulties that are arising with Molinism. So, some questions when I imagine that Molinism is the current reality:

What difficulty is that? That if God foreknows all things he must have determined all things and OVT doesn’t have that difficulty because they forfeit foreknowledge? If not, how does OVT keep these “difficulties” from “arising”??? Rhetorical question...

Is there a transworld self identity that is homogenous? I'm having a hard time accepting the me of some of the other worlds as still being me.
My view of the self is that I am a creature who is in the process of becoming. This 'becoming' is to some degree self determined. I am the person who made the specific choices in my life and these choices and the choices of other people on their own same progression are commingling and the self that I am is specifically not the self of other possible self determining acts. Imo, this life of self determining is part of God's way of sharing his creative ability with his creatures.

Are there other possible worlds in which the biological parents I have in this world are not the same parents?

Are there other worlds in which I don't speak English? That I was not male? Are there other worlds in which I was born a hermaphrodite? Are there other worlds in which my personality is not INTP but ENTJ... Or ISTP?

In all possible worlds must I have married the same woman as I have in this world? The "Oneness" which we are both currently engaged in and still becoming, how different can that be and how similar must it be compared to the other worlds and still be the same transworld "oneness"?

My idea of identity and the 'self' would seem to be obliterated if I were to accept Molinism.

The Molinist model maintains LFW (self identity), it does not disregard God’s sovereignty which is a view centers on God’s “provident control” (“management” of your LFW through His influences to draw you to Him, but not in disregard of your LFW) so “your self” is not violated through being placed in any certain world, God’s plan is to genuinely give you the Light you need to respond to His influences. His judgment in the matter of what world “you” end up in is on-going and His judgment at the end of the matter will righteously be just in that “you” have had the opportunity to accept His gift of salvation, freely.

So no, you do not have the kind of freedom to choose your own world. The kind of Divine sovereignty Molinism presents is that God “providently controls” (- with the purpose to influence you, not determine you) the worlds while you freely choose within those worlds. God’s judgment (provident sovereign control) is on-going in the matter:

William Lane Craig explains, "It is up to God whether we find ourselves in a world in which we are predestined, but it is up to us whether we are predestined in the world in which we find ourselves."

Can you suggest any reading on the topic in a Molinistic worldview?

Maybe if applied how you think "your self" would not be maintained according to Keathley's Molinist model I could find specific reading on the the type of world view you are looking for.

Ahh, here's a thought: http://www.amazon.com/dp/0805431985/?tag=baptis04-20 I want this book myself having read clips from it.

 

[Benjamin]

It seems to me that the idea of trying to divide the knowledge of God through some exercise of logic is asinine.

Maybe you have a better explanation of how does all He says He does while you maintain all His attributes, including that of foreknowlwdge? ...nevermind, this thread isn't about the "Determinist Model! Call it what you will, this action of yours doesn't discount the Molinist model in any way.

Is this simply an attempt to justify the doctrine of "freewillism"?

No, it is a system which works to maintain all of God's atributes, His "genuine" judgment of LFW creatures, and Provident Sovereign Control in the world.

 

[Benjamin]

we seperate the predetermined Will of God though into that which he decreed and determined to be done, and that which he has permitted and allowed...

Good for you and your Determinist Model.

Probably best to just ignore your post, but I'll try to explain once more, but:

Please do not continue to neglect my careful explanation and request for you to show some simple respect for maintaining the subject of this topic:

Again, “Molinism” (the subject of the topic) maintains "God’s Providence and Sovereign Control over Divinely Designed LFW creatures" and Him genuinely allowing for things to happen as per the Molinist model”.

Do you see anything tht ever occurs without him still retaing soverengty over it?

So by what should be clearly obvious if you bothered to read the thread, No, as per the Molinist’ model view of God’s sovereignty.

Now, once again, if you would like to discuss how the Molinist Model maintains “its” view of God’s sovereignty I would be glad to point you to prior posts which do so. BUT!!! If you are intent on “presenting and discussing” the “Determinist’ Model” in disregard of the topic of THIS thread those “trolling” types of “presentations” are NOT welcome here in this thread!

Why have you again disregarded the purpose of this simply put request?:

http://www.baptistboard.com/showpost.php?p=1933879&postcount=60