fighting words
From
http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=13718
What is the Fighting Words Doctrine?
The fighting-words doctrine was first articulated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Chaplinsky was convicted of violating a New Hampshire statute that prohibited the use of offensive, insulting language toward persons in public places after making several inflammatory comments to a city official. The Court, in upholding the statute as constitutional, set down those famous words:There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words — those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.Tellingly, despite continued reaffirmation of the fighting-words doctrine, the Supreme Court has declined to uphold any convictions for fighting words since Chaplinsky.In fact, in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), the Court immediately began a long process of narrowing and reshaping the broad scope of the original fighting-words doctrine. Terminiello was charged with breaching the peace after publicly insulting a group of adversaries. While not addressing whether Terminiello's speech constituted fighting words, the Court found that the breach of the peace statute in question was overbroad because it permitted convictions for both fighting words and constitutionally protected expression. Concluding that speech that merely causes anger or outrage does not amount to fighting words, the Court opined that speech is protected unless the expression is "likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious intolerable evil that rises above mere inconvenience or annoyance." The Court explicitly stated that it would not assume that certain words inevitably provoke violent reactions by individuals. Rather, the Court's analysis focuses on the context in which the words were uttered, not merely the content of the words themselves.The fighting-words doctrine was again reaffirmed in Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). After publicly burning an American flag and making defiant comments regarding the flag, Street was convicted of violating a New York statute making it a misdemeanor to "publicly mutilate, deface, defile, defy, trample upon, or cast contempt upon an American flag either by words or act." The Supreme Court reversed Street's conviction because his comments, considered a possible factor in his conviction, were constitutionally protected by the First Amendment. Emphasizing that the mere offensiveness of words does not strip them of constitutional protection, the Court again noted that fighting words must present an actual threat of immediate violence, not merely offensive content.
What is the Fighting Words Doctrine?
The fighting-words doctrine was first articulated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Chaplinsky was convicted of violating a New Hampshire statute that prohibited the use of offensive, insulting language toward persons in public places after making several inflammatory comments to a city official. The Court, in upholding the statute as constitutional, set down those famous words:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words — those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Tellingly, despite continued reaffirmation of the fighting-words doctrine, the Supreme Court has declined to uphold any convictions for fighting words since Chaplinsky.
In fact, in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), the Court immediately began a long process of narrowing and reshaping the broad scope of the original fighting-words doctrine. Terminiello was charged with breaching the peace after publicly insulting a group of adversaries. While not addressing whether Terminiello's speech constituted fighting words, the Court found that the breach of the peace statute in question was overbroad because it permitted convictions for both fighting words and constitutionally protected expression. Concluding that speech that merely causes anger or outrage does not amount to fighting words, the Court opined that speech is protected unless the expression is "likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious intolerable evil that rises above mere inconvenience or annoyance." The Court explicitly stated that it would not assume that certain words inevitably provoke violent reactions by individuals. Rather, the Court's analysis focuses on the context in which the words were uttered, not merely the content of the words themselves.
The fighting-words doctrine was again reaffirmed in Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). After publicly burning an American flag and making defiant comments regarding the flag, Street was convicted of violating a New York statute making it a misdemeanor to "publicly mutilate, deface, defile, defy, trample upon, or cast contempt upon an American flag either by words or act." The Supreme Court reversed Street's conviction because his comments, considered a possible factor in his conviction, were constitutionally protected by the First Amendment. Emphasizing that the mere offensiveness of words does not strip them of constitutional protection, the Court again noted that fighting words must present an actual threat of immediate violence, not merely offensive content. . . .
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