Who, if not the choosing agent, determines that greatest desire?
Upon what basis does "the choosing agent" determine the greatest desire? Appeal to mystery is fine (you know that I most certainly do so with my view), but your question seems to be circular before an appeal to mystery becomes legitimate.
The ability to do otherwise doesn't deny there is a purpose in what is done, it only acknowledges the freedom of the will to follow another purpose if it so chooses.
So, if I held a gun to someone's head and pulled the trigger, I would have a reason/intention/purpose for doing so (not that it would be good). However, if I
did not pull the trigger, and instead threw the gun on the ground, would you say that the purpose for either of those actions were
the same or
different?
If they were
the same, then I think you would violate the law of non-contradiction.
If they were
different, then you have to determine the intention that changed the action. Perhaps I had an emotional guilt trip. Did I freely choose to have the guilt trip to change my action, or did something affect my greatest desire so that I acted accordingly?
Do desires make determinations, or do people?
People make determinations according to desires. A desire cannot cause something to happen because "it" is powerless without a person. A person cannot determine something to happen without a desire to do something. A desire is part of the will, which is part of the makeup of a person.
Of course, all things created must come ultimately from the decree of the Creator.
What about God? Does he make determinations or do His desires make determinations?
Here is where the "mystery" legitimately comes in, because it is a question about
God (not us). As finite creatures, we can only know things about God that He has revealed about Himself.
Just guessing philosophically, I would say that compatibilism applies to God as well. God's free choices are based on His greatest desires. However, unlike finite, sinful man, God's nature and His desires are perfect and holy. He is the Self-sufficient One, and nothing can supercede Him to cause Him. All His actions are supremely authoritative, without mistake, and without regret (in ultimatum). In our compatibilism, we are subject to the decrees and causes of an outside ontology. In God's compatibilism, His nature and desires are not subject to any other ontology. I would say that this is one distinctive of God that the name
Yahweh (the Self-sufficient One) indicates.
Straw-man. Our appeal to mystery as to how a free moral agent makes a free moral choice doesn't necessitate a vacuum, otherwise there wouldn't be the need for an appeal to mystery. Your overwhelming desire to supply an answer to the deterministic presumption imposes upon our view.
Your view is
dependent on this "appeal to mystery" for its position of wishful thinking, when another explanation is sufficient. We are subject to a created order that is defined by interdependent contingencies. I do not believe you sufficiently solve the problem of circular reasoning in this regard by an appeal to mystery.
If you try to say that
I would have the same problem with my view of God, then I would say that your reasoning is flawed, because it would necessitate that the same definition of man must also be of God. The distinction between the Creator and the creature is an important one, and the First Cause cannot be defined by the limitations of His own creation.
Not at all. It requires a bigger view of God than the idea that His sovereignty demands complete and total determination of every thing that happens, but it doesn't require a abandonment of the biblical teaching of omniscience.
I have seen and heard this polemic that a view of God with creatures that have libertarian free will makes God "greater" than if His creatures act according to His ultimate decree. I would disagree. If a man creates a machine that malfunctions according to his ultimate intent, is that man "greater" than one who is capable of creating a machine that functions exactly as he intended? The One Who is ultimately self-sufficient ("Yahweh") should not have part of the definition of His eternal being--His perfect knowledge--dependent upon His own creation. Such "backwards" determinism (or "two-way" determinism) makes God
NOT the "Self-sufficient One."
The idea is that this somehow unprovable, inexplicable appeal to mystery that is libertarian free will is necessary to regard God in the highest sense is flawed, in my opinion. Libertarian free will for the finite creature subject to contingencies makes humans like little "gods" who contribute to the created order
ex nihilo in the same way that God Himself does. Their immaterial
ex nihilo creations have both material and immaterial effects that are somehow independent of both material and immaterial causes, but intermingled with actual material and immaterial cause-effect relationships. To me, this is untenable.
Yet, many people just require such paradox as necessarily true for moral responsibility and personhood, when the criteria itself beg the question. Philosophers that debate the subject of free will and determinism argue that both determinism and indeterminism are logically impossible, and that both compatibilism and incompatibilism are logically impossible. The factor that is missing from this quandary is
God. Without God, moral responsibility faces the logical insufficiency of determinism, indeterminism, compatibilism, and incompatibilism. The appeal to mystery that depends on the solution of God resolves the logical inconsistency of these opposing problems, and compatibilism is allowed to thrive here. Attempting to reconcile the existence of God and incompatibilism relegates the appeal to mystery to the finite creation rather than where it belongs: in the hands of the infinite Creator.
When one thinks of omniscience as a finite guy with a crystal ball looking down the corridors of time to see what will certainly happen and then making decisions based on what he foresees, then YES, you are right, you would have to take away the guys crystal ball (i.e. deny foresight), but I don't believe God's knowledge of all things is limited to a finite linear timeline bound by cause and effect. He is the great I AM. He Knows all things because he is present as all things happen, not because he determined all things to happen. To insist that the only way for God to KNOW what will happen is for him to DETERMINE it to happen is a very finite, small and limited way of thinking about God, IMO.
Yes, but your problem is that you have an ontological interdependency between Creator and creation. A creature must have his being defined by the Creator for his existence, yet you have the alleged libertarianly free decisions present in God's eternal knowledge. You have part of God's being "backwards" dependent on the
ex nihilo contributions of His own creation that He was "free" to create. To me, this makes God not self-sufficient and "free" to create according to His ultimate desire, because He can only create according to the dictates of His eternal knowledge that is dependent on other autonomous ontologies. For God to be "Yahweh" (the Self-sufficient One), His eternal being must be entirely sufficient within Himself and uncaused by anything outside Himself.
This is why both Calvinism and Open Theism "fill the gap" in the inherent logical inconsistencies of the Arminian or "simple foreknowledge" view. For libertarian free will to be true, God
cannot know what free creatures would do. If God even knows what free creatures would do, how can they be truly "free"? If God does know, upon what basis does He know something entirely undetermined such that the agent "could have done otherwise"?
However, for this to be the case, God's eternal knowledge would be imperfect and "measurable" such that it could be increased.
If you and I see problems inherent in a view of God Who's core eternal being can be defined in a fashion of imperfection such that it can grow indefinitely, then you have to evaluate the problems also inherent in the "simple foreknowledge" view. You cannot just assume it because you do not like the alternatives.