What is Compatibilism?

[AresMan]

Right, and have you considered that the Omnipotent creator may have chosen to define a creature called "man" as being morally free? I ask because your view doesn't seem to leave much room between the instinctive choices of animals and those of man.

I have explained before the differences between animals and man and my view of "the image of God." Animals do not have moral awareness, animals do not have immaterial parts of their ontology. Animals do not have God-consciousness. Animals are not morally accountable for their actions. Animals do not make morally informed choices and do not feel guilt. Just because the actions of both stem from God's eternal decree does not equate man's choices with the instinct of animals.

What do you mean by 'dependent?' What does our ability of first cause choice have to do with God's self-sufficiency? Why does my ability to choose X or Y make God dependent on my contribution? Is He not great enough to overcome and accomplish His purposes regardless of whether or not I choose X or Y? Is God so small that he must determine that I choose X in order for Him to accomplish His purposes? I think not.

I don't think you are understanding my argument.
1. Part of God's ontology is His eternal, perfect knowledge (or His "foreknowledge").
2. If you are not an Open Theist, God knows exhaustively what His creatures will do.
3. If God's knowledge in this regard is separable from His decree because these facts are determined ex nihilo by separate ontologies whom God Himself created, then God is not self-sufficient. His knowledge (a part of His ontology) is not self-sufficient. It is dependent in part on something ontologically distinct from Himself. There is an interdependence in ontological definition between the Creator and the creation dictating how God must create.

It all boils down to who is truly free in the ultimate sense: God or man. If God is free, man cannot be. If man is free, God cannot be.
Otherwise, in the Open Theist view, both God and man are free, but this position still begs the question on explaining uncaused causes from what itself is caused. It begs the question in how something eternal can have definitive boundaries that can increase and upon what basis. It begs the question as to how something that is infinite can supposedly increase in essence despite the Kalaam argument.

 

[AresMan]

A middle-knowledge view perhaps as well....

Molinism is not a sufficient explanation because it argues out of both sides of the mouth.
On one side it argues libertarian free will: the intrinsic "ability to do otherwise."
On the other side it argues that God "knows what free creatures would do given any set of circumstances."

Try to dodge all you want, but those two ideas conflict. The "ability to do otherwise" is not compatible with "would do given any set of circumstances." Indirectly, and contrary to assertion, Molinism proposes "environmental determinism." Period. It is self-contradictory.

I think this is simply a misunderstanding. God's foreknowledge simply does not HAVE to deny LFW. They are two different things. God knows truths such as choices timelessly does he not? This might be simply a mistake of modal logic. A common one.

If God knows what people will do given any set of contingencies, then people cannot "do otherwise." Their choice at any time is limited to the one that is guaranteed by the set of circumstances that God has arranged through the actuated universe.

Simply on the grounds that it is true. You are appealing to a certain form of truth-making assumption perhaps. What is it that makes a proposition true? I think you are bringing into the idea that something has to have concrete purpose or rather something causal for something to be known, but, If, for instance, truth is simply defined as correspondence with reality, then it does not appear all things must be grounded or "determined" in a certain way that you seem to think. To elaborate: What would make this proposition true?

Sounds like question-begging to me:
1. LFW is true because it is what I think I observe.
2. Because I observe it, it is true.

You expect me to prove my position, but your position is true "just because."
I say LFW cannot be true because it violates the law of non-contradiction.
Prove me wrong.

The President of the United States in 2024 will be a woman.
I would simply argue that it is true if it in fact is the case that in 2024 the president was in fact a woman. It simply corresponds with reality. It does not have to have some form of "determiner" per se

But, according to Molinism, the determiner is the set of conditions set up by God in the universe He actuated based on His "calculation" of "the best world" that would result according to the greatest number of people who would be saved according to all possible contingencies. Molinism is a form of determinism despite the fact that Molinists deny it.

However, for this to be the case, God's eternal knowledge would be imperfect and "measurable" such that it could be increased.

Unless his foreknowledge of actual events is based upon his middle knowledge of all possible counterfactual events. :thumbs:

Until you can resolve the internal conflict between the assertion of LFW and the determinism of the actuated universe, then the argument from Molinism has no real meaning.

 

[HeirofSalvation]

Aresman: I will take the time to respond to the rest of your post later....but this had to be cleared up first:

Sounds like question-begging to me:
1. LFW is true because it is what I think I observe.
2. Because I observe it, it is true.
You expect me to prove my position, but your position is true "just because."
I say LFW cannot be true because it violates the law of non-contradiction.
Prove me wrong.

EASY TRIGGER!!


Not at all what I was saying. I am not Kant or Leibniz, but I am not stupid enough to argue like this. I was anticipating the "grounding objection" and stating that said objection assumes a certain truth-maker theory which is not provable....http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/grounding.html I do not see the knowability of the truth of a future event to be based upon a causal basis as you do. I did not clearly convey what I meant in my first post...so you misunderstood what I was saying. (I was trying to head off the grounding objection at the pass) but I promise you, I was not asserting the truth of my point of view and then attempting to shift burden of proof....You appear to be patently HOSTILE to Molinsm....that is fine....(there are certain belief systems I am positively hostile to myself) but that doesn't mean that the defender of it would argue as foolishly as you suggested.

1. LFW is true because it is what I think I observe.
2. Because I observe it, it is true.

No deductive conclusion can be drawn from one antecedent premise alone....except for a tautology perhaps, did you seriously think I was That daft? Do I sound that daft?

 

[Yeshua1]

I think this is an oversimplification Yeshua; alone and by itself, without modification of any sort, to say that God is "Sovereign" is not to say "God exhaustively and actively causes all things to the smallest of details". Theoretically, a God such as Deists believe in would be "Sovereign"; he would, after all, be Omnipotent would he not? Omnipotence itself necessarily implies "Sovereignty" simply stated. To say that he is "Sovereign" simply is not sufficient to conclude that therefore he has chosen to actively cause all things, either as a primary or secondary mover.

is there ANYTHING that would be outisde though of either his exhaustive knowledge, or His means to intervene as He sees fit?
can anything be hidden to Him, or beyond his means to affect?

Remember, LFW is not the belief that man can choose Anything. God chooses of himself what choices are made available and which are not, and he reserves the right to "choose" for us as he wills, or to harden as he wills. That is sufficient for Sovereignty.

[quote} He ALONE has absolute Sovereignty, as ours is limited do to now being bound up in sin

And to your question, probably not. My immediate guess is that our Wills are far more constrained and limited than was Adam's in the beginning.[/QUOTE]

Yes, as he was alive spiritually at his creation, but we are spiritual dead at our births!

 

[Winman]

Calvinists will not probably not appreciate these two short videos, but this pastor gives a good explanation of what compatibilism truly is.

Part 1

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QSAnOh-VkxQ

Part 2

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JpX2PQf9z_k&feature=relmfu

 

[Skandelon]

Animals do not have moral awareness, animals do not have immaterial parts of their ontology. Animals do not have God-consciousness. Animals are not morally accountable for their actions. Animals do not make morally informed choices and do not feel guilt. Just because the actions of both stem from God's eternal decree does not equate man's choices with the instinct of animals.

It's more than them both stemming from God's eternal decree. I've yet to hear a definition of a human moral choice that has much (if any) distinction from the instinctive response of an animal. Both appear to be a reflexive conditioned responses of an innate nature to a given predetermined set of circumstances. The only real difference is that you call human's choices 'moral' and you say they are held to account for them. You do nothing (IMO) to demonstrate how they are actually distinct by design.

Take us step by step through the instinctive response of an animal and a morally accountable choice of a human. Are they both done 'according to desire' and 'determined by the nature of creature' in such a manner 'they could not have been otherwise?' So, what is the difference besides what you have labelled them?

I don't think you are understanding my argument.
1. Part of God's ontology is His eternal, perfect knowledge (or His "foreknowledge").

I agree, but I don't believe the 'foreknowledge' of an eternal omnipresent infinite Being is like a human with a crystal ball, who is limited to the linear finite constructs of time, space and causal effects. Determinism's logic is based upon this finite presumption and is far too limiting of a view for the transcendent God revealed in Scripture, IMO.

2. If you are not an Open Theist, God knows exhaustively what His creatures will do.

Right, but why? Because he determined them to do what he foreknew they would do? Absurd. That is the finite construct referred to above.

He knows it because He is the I AM. He is omnipresent. He knows it because he is there and experiences it, not because he determined it. The idea of an eternal/infinite being knowing something BEFORE creating it is mysteriously absurd to the finite mind and cannot be the basis of any rational argument or absolute truth, for even the word 'before' presumes a linear timeline of cause and effect. I doubt God is confined by such finite laws or logical constructs.

3. If God's knowledge in this regard is separable from His decree because these facts are determined ex nihilo by separate ontologies whom God Himself created, then God is not self-sufficient. His knowledge (a part of His ontology) is not self-sufficient. It is dependent in part on something ontologically distinct from Himself. There is an interdependence in ontological definition between the Creator and the creation dictating how God must create.

Scripture has no problem presenting God in imminent terms as one learning, growing, responding, adjusting and grieving with man in time, why should we? Appeal to mystery regarding that which we cannot grasp and stop drawing hard and fast conclusions about things we cannot possibly wrap our brains around.

It all boils down to who is truly free in the ultimate sense: God or man. If God is free, man cannot be. If man is free, God cannot be.

What?! That statement itself its self defeating, for if God is truly free and truly omnipotent, then He would be able to create free creatures. Is that just the one thing you believe God is not able to do? To create free moral creatures with the ability of contra-casual choice? Don't you think that is kind of a small view of God to suggest that the only way for Him to create a world where he accomplishes His purposes is to predetermined the actions and events of all His creatures?

 

[Skandelon]

I say LFW cannot be true because it violates the law of non-contradiction.

The law of non-contradiction states that something cannot be both true and not true at the same time when dealing with the same context; and since we are claiming that God (in one context) is a free moral Being who created other free moral beings (in another context), then there is no violation of this law.

Plus, do you believe the doctrine of the Trinity violates the law of non-contradition? God is three. God is one.

 

[HeirofSalvation]

Molinism is not a sufficient explanation because it argues out of both sides of the mouth.
On one side it argues libertarian free will: the intrinsic "ability to do otherwise."
On the other side it argues that God "knows what free creatures would do given any set of circumstances."

Yes, it argues those both and, no, they are not contradictory. I believe you are inadvertently importing your belief in determinism into Molinism. Your argument is simply that Molinism is inherently and OBVIOUSLY self-refuting and incoherent. Given determinism....Molinism would be self-contradictory. Given a prima-facie belief in LFW in the exact same sense as Classical Arminianism necessarily implies Molinism is not determinative. You seem to be arguing from an idea that a Molinistic account is trying to explain Free-Will; it isn't; it assumes LFW and is trying to explain the Sovereignty.

Try to dodge all you want, but those two ideas conflict. The "ability to do otherwise" is not compatible with "would do given any set of circumstances." Indirectly, and contrary to assertion, Molinism proposes "environmental determinism." Period. It is self-contradictory.

If Molinism were that easily dismissed, as patently and obviously self-refuting, then the great minds of the present age who hold to it, would have recognized this by now and rejected it. You are trying to dismiss it out of hand. I think that I would not do this. The contention you are making seems essentially based upon what I quoted above. I believe you are making a simple modal mistake and importing a deterministic view into Molinism which is not there. Molinists do not believe that a set of circumstances determines anything...the believe the moral agent does. The set of circumstances serves not to determine outcome...but to limit available options.

If God knows what people will do given any set of contingencies, then people cannot "do otherwise."

Yes, they can, I think you are of the opinion that the necessity of God's knowing something (he does if it is true) renders the occurence (a free choice) necessary this is a modal error.

Their choice at any time is limited to the one that is guaranteed by the set of circumstances that God has arranged through the actuated universe.

Their available options are, not their choice. Remember...acc. Molinism....the "choice" is logically prior to the decree! and the content of God's foreknowledge is contingent upon the free choice of said creature. The choices-of the creatures serve to limit the set of possible worlds that God can (vis-a-vis his goals) actualize. This is when many Molinists begin to speak of "feasible" worlds.

But, according to Molinism, the determiner is the set of conditions set up by God in the universe He actuated based on His "calculation" of "the best world" that would result according to the greatest number of people who would be saved according to all possible contingencies.

The determiner is the moral agent the "environment" or set of circumstances limits the available options.

Molinism is a form of determinism despite the fact that Molinists deny it

This is the assertion you have made this entire post, and your entire post is bent on this, but this is a bald assertion IMO. You would, I think, need to demonstrate how or why this is the case. You have made the positive assertion that Molinism is Determinism. Why do you say this? If you were to attempt to defend this, I suspect you will HAVE to appeal to deterministic assumptions to do so. Molinism may, or may not be true, but it is not "environmental determinism". It BEGINS with the assertion of LFW and explains it in precisely the same way as say....Skan would....all the other fluff of Molinism is attempting to explain the Sovereignty part. Molinism is prima facie non-deterministic.
This (admittedly rather long) article deals with this precise topic, and it rebutts the idea you have asserted here. Hope you can find the time to read and enjoy it! http://www.reasonablefaith.org/divine-foreknowledge-and-newcombs-paradox

For the sake of brevity...as most are pressed for time....I will copy/paste the conclusion portion of the essay. [emphasis mine]


Newcomb's Paradox and Freedom

But does that mean that in the actual world I am not free to choose otherwise, as Ahern alleges? Are we left with the theological fatalism which prompted our inquiry? By now the answer should be clear. It is I by my freely chosen actions who supply the truth conditions for the future contingent propositions known by God. The semantic relation between a true proposition and the corresponding state of affairs is not only non-causal, but asymmetric, The proposition depends for its truth on which state of affairs obtains, not vice versa. Were I to choose otherwise than I shall, different propositions would have been true than are, and God's knowledge would have been different than it is. Given that God foreknows what I shall choose, it only follows that I shall not choose otherwise, not that I could not. The fact that I cannot actualize worlds in which God's prediction errs is no infringement on my freedom, since all this means is that I am not free to actualize worlds in which I both perform some action a and do not perform a. The Newcomb Paradox provides no reason for thinking that from........

"The player is free-he just cannot escape being 'seen' making his free choice."....

Conclusion

Newcomb's Paradox thus serves as an illustrative vindication of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. A proper understanding of the counterfactual conditionals involved enables us to see that the pastness of God's knowledge serves neither to make God's beliefs counterfactually closed nor to rob us of genuine freedom. It is evident that our decisions determine God's past beliefs about those decisions and do so without invoking an objectionable backward causation. It is also clear that in the context of foreknowledge, backtracking counterfactuals are entirely appropriate and that no alteration of the past occurs. With the justification of the one box strategy, the death of theological fatalism seems ensured.

 

[quantumfaith]

It's more than them both stemming from God's eternal decree. I've yet to hear a definition of a human moral choice that has much (if any) distinction from the instinctive response of an animal. Both appear to be a reflexive conditioned responses of an innate nature to a given predetermined set of circumstances. The only real difference is that you call human's choices 'moral' and you say they are held to account for them. You do nothing (IMO) to demonstrate how they are actually distinct by design.

Take us step by step through the instinctive response of an animal and a morally accountable choice of a human. Are they both done 'according to desire' and 'determined by the nature of creature' in such a manner 'they could not have been otherwise?' So, what is the difference besides what you have labelled them?

I agree, but I don't believe the 'foreknowledge' of an eternal omnipresent infinite Being is like a human with a crystal ball, who is limited to the linear finite constructs of time, space and causal effects. Determinism's logic is based upon this finite presumption and is far too limiting of a view for the transcendent God revealed in Scripture, IMO.

Right, but why? Because he determined them to do what he foreknew they would do? Absurd. That is the finite construct referred to above.

He knows it because He is the I AM. He is omnipresent. He knows it because he is there and experiences it, not because he determined it. The idea of an eternal/infinite being knowing something BEFORE creating it is mysteriously absurd to the finite mind and cannot be the basis of any rational argument or absolute truth, for even the word 'before' presumes a linear timeline of cause and effect. I doubt God is confined by such finite laws or logical constructs.

Scripture has no problem presenting God in imminent terms as one learning, growing, responding, adjusting and grieving with man in time, why should we? Appeal to mystery regarding that which we cannot grasp and stop drawing hard and fast conclusions about things we cannot possibly wrap our brains around.



What?! That statement itself its self defeating, for if God is truly free and truly omnipotent, then He would be able to create free creatures. Is that just the one thing you believe God is not able to do? To create free moral creatures with the ability of contra-casual choice? Don't you think that is kind of a small view of God to suggest that the only way for Him to create a world where he accomplishes His purposes is to predetermined the actions and events of all His creatures?

:thumbs::thumbs::thumbs:

 

[convicted1]

I know very little about "compatibilism", but I know what "combatibilism" is.

It's BAPTISTBOARD!!! :laugh: :wavey:

 

[AresMan]

It's more than them both stemming from God's eternal decree. I've yet to hear a definition of a human moral choice that has much (if any) distinction from the instinctive response of an animal. Both appear to be a reflexive conditioned responses of an innate nature to a given predetermined set of circumstances. The only real difference is that you call human's choices 'moral' and you say they are held to account for them. You do nothing (IMO) to demonstrate how they are actually distinct by design.

Take us step by step through the instinctive response of an animal and a morally accountable choice of a human. Are they both done 'according to desire' and 'determined by the nature of creature' in such a manner 'they could not have been otherwise?' So, what is the difference besides what you have labelled them?

People are morally accountable because God created them and made them morally accountable.
Animals are not created "in the image of God."
Animals are not God-conscious.
Animals do not have moral awareness.
God never gave animals commands.

I agree, but I don't believe the 'foreknowledge' of an eternal omnipresent infinite Being is like a human with a crystal ball, who is limited to the linear finite constructs of time, space and causal effects. Determinism's logic is based upon this finite presumption and is far too limiting of a view for the transcendent God revealed in Scripture, IMO.

No, "determinism" accepts that interdependent contingencies in time are sequential, but usually the compatibilists and determinists gravitate toward Einstein's physics, which require a "time zero," and the Creator must transcend spacetime. Determinists and compatibilists easily understand spacetime as part of the created order and that God is intrinsically independent of all this.
LFW Arminians must logically transpose the interdependent, sequential nature of cause and effect onto the eternal being of God for God's foreknowledge of free creatures to be separate from His eternal, divine decree. It is no coincidence that their Open Theist cousins have to dance around Einstein's physics and the transcendence of God over spacetime to subject God's knowledge and being to the natural sequence of time and accept the logical necessity of LFW.

Right, but why? Because he determined them to do what he foreknew they would do? Absurd. That is the finite construct referred to above.

It is not necessary to believe that God's decree results in Him directly manipulating every little thing. All things happen in accordance with His divine, eternal decree, but many things are the result of secondary causation, tertiary causation, and what not. Not everything that happens if because God directly desired rape over non-rape if all things would logically be equal otherwise. I do not suggest this. I am primarily challenging the necessary inference of ex nihilo creation by creatures other than God contrary to Scripture declaring that Yahweh is the only Creator.

He knows it because He is the I AM. He is omnipresent. He knows it because he is there and experiences it, not because he determined it. The idea of an eternal/infinite being knowing something BEFORE creating it is mysteriously absurd to the finite mind and cannot be the basis of any rational argument or absolute truth, for even the word 'before' presumes a linear timeline of cause and effect. I doubt God is confined by such finite laws or logical constructs.

Is not God's "foreknowledge" a part of His omniscience, which is a part of the definition of His ontology?
If so, then for LFW to exist, part of the makeup of God is dependent on the free actions of the creatures that He created. This requires an interdependence of God's ontology on something He creates. This is contrary to the name of God as Yahweh--the Self-sufficient One. God cannot be self-sufficient if part of His definition is dependent on separate ontologies.

I understand that you are trying to entertain your idea of LFW as a necessary mystery, but I believe it violates the law of non-contradiction.

Scripture has no problem presenting God in imminent terms as one learning, growing, responding, adjusting and grieving with man in time, why should we? Appeal to mystery regarding that which we cannot grasp and stop drawing hard and fast conclusions about things we cannot possibly wrap our brains around.

The mystery of these anthropopathic passages about God's memory, limited awareness of past or present, and so on is similar to the mystery of the anthropomorphic passages about God being in a location, His "go[ing] down [to] see," His having body parts, and so on. These passages are to communicate to us in language we finite beings can understand to grasp the concept that our Creator is personal and relational. We should not, however, expect to understand them as defining God as personal and relational in the same way we are such that these concepts limit God the way we are limited in our experience and knowledge.

For instance, Open Theists love to use this verse to prove their theology:

Gen 22:12 And he said, Lay not thine hand upon the lad, neither do thou any thing unto him: for now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son from me.

They treat anthropopathic explanations as cop outs. However, this passage is also similar to another passage that would go beyond the limits of even openness theology if taken literally in all aspects:

Gen 18:20 And the Lord said, Because the cry of Sodom and Gomorrah is great, and because their sin is very grievous;
Gen 18:21 I will go down now, and see whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it, which is come unto me; and if not, I will know.

Both passages have God indicating that He "learns" the future actions of man. However, this latter passage has God
1. not omnipresent because He has to "go down"
2. not omniscient of the future because He has to "know"
3. not omnipresent and limited to senses because He has to "see" to know
4. not omniscient of the present because He does not know if Sodom and Gomorrah are acting "according to [their] cry" unless He "sees" it
5. not omniscient of the past because He has to "see" "if they have done"

To be consistent, one cannot rely on the anthropopathic statements from God being literal limitations of His being while the anthropomorphic statements are figurative. Both the anthropopathisms AND the anthropomorphisms are expressions that are intended to be understood by finite minds for purposes of relation, not definitions and limitations of God's transcendent being.

What?! That statement itself its self defeating, for if God is truly free and truly omnipotent, then He would be able to create free creatures. Is that just the one thing you believe God is not able to do? To create free moral creatures with the ability of contra-casual choice? Don't you think that is kind of a small view of God to suggest that the only way for Him to create a world where he accomplishes His purposes is to predetermined the actions and events of all His creatures?

Can God create a rock so big that He cannot lift it?
I believe your question is along the same lines, although you would contend otherwise.

Do you think it is a small view of man as a free creature to be "unable" to create something (e.g. a machine invention) that itself has the same free will that they have? There is no requirement that the creation define the Creator. We cannot define the limitations of God based on our perceptions of who we are.

Tit 1:2 In hope of eternal life, which God, that cannot lie, promised before the world began;

Heb 6:18 That by two immutable things, in which it was impossible for God to lie, we might have a strong consolation, who have fled for refuge to lay hold upon the hope set before us:

What?! Is that something that God cannot do? He does not have the ability to lie? Don't you think that is kind of a small view of God to suggest that He cannot lie?

I have suggested that one of the mysteries is that compatibilism applies even to God: His actions are according to His strongest desire and He cannot contradict His nature. However, unlike God, we are not self-sufficient. Only Yahweh is the Self-sufficient One. God's perfect, divine nature is in perfect harmony and accord with His eternal decree. There is no way to say that compatibilism "limits" God as the Self-sufficient One because there is no frustration between the nature of God and His actions.

LFW suggestions that God Himself has to have the real ability to lie. Yes, Open Theists that I know in person, who are the most vocal proponents of LFW necessarily insist that God must have the real ability to do "evil" for His goodness to be "genuine." God cannot be "truly loving" if He is "denied" the ability also to "hate" the exact same object. In other words, consistent LFW suggests a zoorastrian concept of the intrinsically eternal concepts of good and evil that transcend the self-sufficiency of God.

 

[AresMan]

The law of non-contradiction states that something cannot be both true and not true at the same time when dealing with the same context; and since we are claiming that God (in one context) is a free moral Being who created other free moral beings (in another context), then there is no violation of this law.

Plus, do you believe the doctrine of the Trinity violates the law of non-contradition? God is three. God is one.

Category error.

The Trinity is not "God is three. God is one." God is not three in the same category in which He is one.

God is one Being. God is three Persons.
Being is what makes someone what he is.
Person is what makes someone who he is.

Our being is shared by only one person. Those of us who try to have our being shared by more than one person are called schizophrenic and usually wear jackets with long sleeves fastened in back and sit in rooms made of rubber.

God's being is shared exhaustively by three coequal, coeternal persons. In Christ pan to pleroma tes theotetos dwells in bodily form (Col 2:9). God is not 1/3 the Father, 1/3 the Son, and 1/3 the Holy Spirit, but rather 100% the Father, 100% the Son, and 100% the Holy Spirit, yet these Persons are distinct and interrelate.

The mystery of the Trinity is in how the ontology of God can be exhausted by these three Persons. There is no comparison to my problems with the tautology of LFW. I still contend that it violates the law of non-contradiction because it violates the definition of Yahweh.

 

[AresMan]

Aresman: I will take the time to respond to the rest of your post later....but this had to be cleared up first:



EASY TRIGGER!!


Not at all what I was saying. I am not Kant or Leibniz, but I am not stupid enough to argue like this. I was anticipating the "grounding objection" and stating that said objection assumes a certain truth-maker theory which is not provable....http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/grounding.html

My apologies if I misunderstood (or appeared that I misunderstood) what you were saying. I was trying to understand what you were saying based on key phrases that stood out to me:

Simply on the grounds that it is true. You are appealing to a certain form of truth-making assumption perhaps. What is it that makes a proposition true? I think you are bringing into the idea that something has to have concrete purpose or rather something causal for something to be known, but, If, for instance, truth is simply defined as correspondence with reality, then it does not appear all things must be grounded or "determined" in a certain way that you seem to think. To elaborate: What would make this proposition true?

...

No deductive conclusion can be drawn from one antecedent premise alone....except for a tautology perhaps, did you seriously think I was That daft? Do I sound that daft?

Sounds like question-begging to me:
1. LFW is true because it is what I think I observe.
2. Because I observe it, it is true.

You expect me to prove my position, but your position is true "just because."
I say LFW cannot be true because it violates the law of non-contradiction.
Prove me wrong.

The bolded parts are what I was trying to understand was the basis for your argument. It seemed to me that you were saying that LFW was entirely definitive in nature and empirically testable, and that my arguments against it clearly contradicted observable truth because my logic demanded it.

I don't think I was understanding you as daft, but rather that you were arguing LFW by an "impossibility of the contrary" argument, and I was trying to underplay that.

I do not see the knowability of the truth of a future event to be based upon a causal basis as you do.

I did not clearly convey what I meant in my first post...so you misunderstood what I was saying. (I was trying to head off the grounding objection at the pass) but I promise you, I was not asserting the truth of my point of view and then attempting to shift burden of proof....You appear to be patently HOSTILE to Molinsm....that is fine....(there are certain belief systems I am positively hostile to myself) but that doesn't mean that the defender of it would argue as foolishly as you suggested.

If I am perceived as "hostile" to Molinism it is only in reply to the recent resurrection of, and rally to a philosophical system invented by a Jesuit directly intended by the Catholic church to counter the surging influence of the Reformation at the time. Molinism was ultimately discarded largely by Catholics and Jesuits, yet seems to be gaining a new foothold among Arminian Protestants.

The idea I get from popular Molinist apologists is that Molinism is that grand solution to the problem of LFW and God's sovereignty, and that it magically harmonizes them both (of course, to preserve LFW). It's the new wonderful idea that all the elites are embracing.

The problem is that it leaves the glaring question that it introduces in its own definition. Molinists themselves say both that creatures have LFW ("the ability to do otherwise") AND that God "knows what free creatures would do given any set of conditions." The proof texts of Molinism--Matthew 11:23 and Luke 10:13--obviously demonstrate the latter, but not necessarily the former for those who perceive the contradiction between the former and latter statements.

According to LFW, the "ability to do otherwise" must, in some way, transcend all "influences," including intrinsic factors such as nature and character, and extrinsic factors such as environment and acts of penetration. If a free creature "would do" something "given a set of conditions," then LFW cannot be true because the real choice amounts to one outcome. If God's knowledge in this regard according to "middle knowledge" is definitive based on the world that God actuated among all possible worlds, then LFW is still only an illusion of choice, but limited to a predetermined outcome according to how the environment is stacked. The wonder of Molinism fades away when this truth is revealed, because the explanation boils down to the exact same that any other Arminism tries to use to explain God's "foreknowledge" of what LFW produces. Molinism simply abstracts the explanation with a cloudy middle layer of "middle knowledge."

 

[HeirofSalvation]

If I am perceived as "hostile" to Molinism it is only in reply to the recent resurrection of, and rally to a philosophical system invented by a Jesuit directly intended by the Catholic church to counter the surging influence of the Reformation at the time. Molinism was ultimately discarded largely by Catholics and Jesuits, yet seems to be gaining a new foothold among Arminian Protestants.

I understand this...but is this not a genetic fallacy? Molina may indeed have had the worst of possible intentions himself...but he might have also been correct For all their ills, The RCC has always understood something as difficult to wrap one's head around as the Trinity correctly. (I think). Moreover, a lot of the basic notions it is built on have been argued to pre-date his systematization of it in his writings. Some believe Balthasar Hubmaier held many of the same basic ideas.

The idea I get from popular Molinist apologists is that Molinism is that grand solution to the problem of LFW and God's sovereignty, and that it magically harmonizes them both (of course, to preserve LFW). It's the new wonderful idea that all the elites are embracing.

Of course! :thumbs: Isn't that why any point of view has been embraced? There is nothing wrong with that. If Molinism is thought to solve the most problems while also creating the least...and also seems perfectly plausible and supportable....why not embrace the idea? I think all ideas gain their footholds this way. Including popular understandings of Calvinism and Classical Arminianism. Somewhere...deep down....in the minds of Calvinists and Classical Arminians alike, there is a tacit objection to the idea that they have for 500+ years waged the hard fight against one anothers Theology, and along comes these newcomers who (not having fought the same hard fight) breeze by so "easily" and make it seem so simple, and that is just SO NOT FAIR!! They must earn their spurs! Not to worry....soon enough, the withering criticism will come from both sides. :smilewinkgrin:

The problem is that it leaves the glaring question that it introduces in its own definition. Molinists themselves say both that creatures have LFW ("the ability to do otherwise") AND that God "knows what free creatures would do given any set of conditions." The proof texts of Molinism--Matthew 11:23 and Luke 10:13--obviously demonstrate the latter, but not necessarily the former for those who perceive the contradiction between the former and latter statements.

True, they do not Necessarily demonstrate the former. The former is assumed prima facie. They are only used to demonstrate that there are presumably True propositions about counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. There are, of course, other proof-texts I am sure you are aware of as well. There is simply no contradiction in the mind of a Molinist. Given a belief that there is no LFW....of course, this would not demonstrate otherwise.

According to LFW, the "ability to do otherwise" must, in some way, transcend all "influences," including intrinsic factors such as nature and character, and extrinsic factors such as environment and acts of penetration. If a free creature "would do" something "given a set of conditions," then LFW cannot be true because the real choice amounts to one outcome.

This is really little different than a Simple Foreknowledge View, and I think any argument leveled against Molinism works against SFV as well. According to SFV, there are indeed a specific "set of conditions"....presumably deliberated upon by God prior to the creative decree to which his creatures must respond. I think Molinism accepts a general truth to SFV...and merely adds to it the second "middle" layer, which helps to explain Sovereignty. Mechanically <---- for a lack of better words...LFW is simply no different in a Molinist view as it is in a SF view.

If God's knowledge in this regard according to "middle knowledge" is definitive based on the world that God actuated among all possible worlds, then LFW is still only an illusion of choice, but limited to a predetermined outcome according to how the environment is stacked.

Given an assumption against LFW....yes. But that is indeed the crux of the argument itself. I do not believe that LFW is illusory as understood by either the SFV or the Molinist view...as they are understood in exactly the same way. The Molinist is attempting to preserve Sovereignty not LFW. The free choice of the creature is logically prior to the content of God's knowledge. (I do not think that a creaturely free choice is in any way an ex nihilo creative act, and I wonder why no one has challenged your having described it this way yet). That is a category mistake I think. Nothing is Created...by a choice.

The wonder of Molinism fades away when this truth is revealed, because the explanation boils down to the exact same that any other Arminism tries to use to explain God's "foreknowledge" of what LFW produces. Molinism simply abstracts the explanation with a cloudy middle layer of "middle knowledge."

I found humor in this. Like you...I view Molinism as ostensibly Arminian, and yet on the Arm sites...Molinism is often called "closeted Calvinism". :laugh: I maintain Molinism because I think it more satisfactorily explains individual election...pre-ordination...and Sovereignty. I tend to think that Arminians too often engage in "explaining away" those things...rather than explaining them....As I also tend to think that Calvinism engages too much in "explaining away" choices as in explaining them. Molinism, at least, I feel takes upon it the duty to try to explain both as they do indeed both appear to me to be Scriptural.