Willing to Believe: Introduction

Decisions, decisions. Should I be a soft determnist, a compatibalist (which is actually a form of soft determinism), a hard determinist (which according to the quote Is 40:28 gave from monergism.com is not to be distinguished from soft determinism), or a fatalist. I think I may be somewhat in the middle. I'm not sure if you'd call it a hard determinist with slight mellowing, an indeterminate fatalist, or a soft determinist with whipped cream. As Bugs Bunny said to Elmer Fudd: "I can't talk to you anymore. You're WAY too smart for me!" :laugh:

 

Not quite.

The quote just says that compatibalism is no less deterministic than hard determinism. In compatibalism, everything still happens according to God's decree, which means that everything that would comes to pass was determined before God created. That's what makes it no less deterministic.

But it doesn't say the two things—compatibalism and hard determinism—are not to be distinquished. There is a big difference between them.

Hard determinists (Christian hard determinists, anyway) believe that God stands behind evil things in exactly the same way he stands behind good things. They would never say, for instance, that an evil act came about by way of God's permission. They see God as the agent of evil acts as well as good acts. God moves people to do evil things in the same way he moves people to do good things.

Compatibalists, on the other hand, say that all evil acts come about by way of God's permission. The Holy Spirit doesn't move people to do evil. However, God's plan for creation includes evil acts and he brings about the evil acts in his plan by permitting them, and his permission ensures that those evil acts will occur.

In both cases, the outcome is equally determined. The means by which God accomplishes the outcome is differents. In one, God brings everything to pass by his direct agency. In the other, it is a combination of direct agency for good things and permission for bad things.

 

Russell55, here is a statement I made earlier on this thread:

I would modify this statement and say that I accept compatibalism but I reject hard determinism and I would add that I reject fatalism.

 

I'd affirm your modified statement, too, and I'm betting R. C. Sproul would as well.

 

All of which leads me back to my original question in post #4 which I will now restate. If a person CANNOT believe apart from regeneration and CANNOT help but believe after regeneration, how is that not determinism?

I suspect you will argue that this is soft determinism, but I will await your response.

 

It is determinism. Compatibalism is just as determinist as hard determinism. Every outcome is still determined by God and by God alone.

In compatibalism, however, every outcome, although determined by God, is not directly worked by God's agency.

In the case you give in your original question, the compatibablist answer would be that although the unbeliever CANNOT believe, the "cannot" comes from the natural state of their own hearts. God is not directly working to keep them from believing, or directly working to produce unbelief within them. Unbelief is the natural response of a corrupt heart and requires nothing more from God than his permission to come about. Unbelief, in compatibalism, is one of those evil things that is accomplished by way of God's permission, not his direct action. It's one of those evil things, to quote Carson that "is directly attributable to secondary causes", for the cause of the person's continued unbelief is the condition of their own hearts, not God's direct action.

In the case of the ones who believe, however, their belief is directly worked by God's agency. Their belief one of those good things, to quote Carson again, that is "always directly attributable to him."

 

Thanks for your reply Russell55. I will mark your post and the next time I interact with a calvinist who denies that he is a determinist I will advise him to read your explanation. I frequently have calvinists deny vociferously that they are determinists.

 

Not to be argumentitive here russell, but I have to agree with swaimj on this. Many of the Calvinist on the BB claim to BE determinist and specifically NOT compatablists, yet when you look more closely at their view it is distinctly more compatablist than determinist.

HOWEVER, I think the distinction comes from how THEY percieve or understand the meaning, or even modify the meaning for their different variant not commonly held.

 

There have been Calvinists (or perhaps hypercalvinists) on this board who were hard determinists and not compatabalists. I'm not sure there are any here anymore. But you've probably been around long enough to remember the person who argued that God was the immediate cause of people doing evil acts, and who said that God then condemned them just because he was God. That view, which puts God equally working in evil actions and in good ones and denies human moral responsibility, is a denial of compatibalism and an affirmation of hard determinism.

Someone can't be more compatibalist than determinist, since compatibalism is a form of determinism. Every compatibalist (at least if they are using the term as it is defined in philosophy) is a determinist. Specifically, combatibalism is the form of determinism that says that the free agency and responsibility of men is compatible with determinism.

There have, however, been some primative baptists on this board who did not believe in the absolute predetination of all things. They are not compatibalists or determinists. But then they aren't really calvinists, either.

I'm not sure I've ever seen a Calvinist here on the Baptist board claim not to be a determinist. That doesn't mean there haven't been. I just haven't seen it. The label I specifically remember being denied over and over by Calvinists here is fatalism, and that's the label that's usually thrown at us.

 

I think you missed my meaning.
There are TWO groups with regard to determinists; 1. Hard determinist, and 2. Compatablists (soft).

When people are typically speaking of 'Compatablistic view' there is a type of generic 'grid' used to associate toward which end of the compatablist view your inclination leans.
Thus, when the comparison is used it typically is only used with regard to the Compatablist view, and in hearing out their 'personal' views can one see to which end of their Compatablistic view tends to lean towards in this generic grid. I agree you though, either you are or are not a Compatablist, yet within that view itself there are various generic levels constructed by people's personal views/understanding.

But why do this?
Well sometimes it is due to trying to make ones personal view MORE RIGHT than anothers (go figure)

However, another reason is in fact due to the very nature of Compatablistic view view itself:
Hard determinism shows there is no allowance for the responsibility of men and therefore no variations can be implied. But, since Compatablism is not the opposite of hard determinism but in fact a variation of it, the very nature of the view necessitates there are varying degrees with the view because it is a variation itself.

This is what I was refering to when I was speaking of be 'more' or leaning more toward one view of determinism (absolute sovereign dication) and the other (absolute Libertarian free will).

Example of the above is seen in the mechanics debated in the C/A debates.
Does man have the ability accept the truth God reveals as equally as he does to reject it. If they hold to Compatablism the generic compatablism grid is then applied to see where one persons view stands in relation to the others. Thus, one being 'more' deterministic (leaning more toward the hard) than the other person who is leaning more toward Resposibility of Man.

 

My previous post should have started out with:
Those Calvinists who do not claim compatablism most times speak of it as if it is distinctly different from determinism. Ex. When speaking of Gods soveriegnty and Mans Responsiblity (or free-will) they will state they are determinists. Yet when you ask many about their view of if Gods soveriegnty works in conjunction with mans responsiblity, they will state yes. This is what I meant by "yet when you look more closely at their view it is distinctly more compatablist than determinist"

Many percieve or do not quite understand that compatablism is deterministic just not hard determinism. The reason many will state they are deterministic rather than compatablistic is either they see it as to 'free-willy' or, the other reason can be seen better in my previous post.

What is funny about this, is that I have been told I 'lean' more toward hard determinism in my compatablism by non-cal. And yet by the Cals I am told I 'lean' more toward free-will (Responsiblity). Yet I hold both equally since I see scripture stating they work in conjuction one with another.

 

Okay. Gotcha (I think.)

I think people get confused because they think soft determinism/compatibalism is less deterministic than hard determinism. As if it's simply hard determinism ratcheted back a little. It isn't. It's more like hard determinism with something added: human free agency, the liberty of second causes, etc.

The standard Baptistic statement of compatibalism is the London confession.

Here you have the determinism: God decrees everything that happens; what happens happens because God decreed it; what happens is certain to happen because God decreed it and his decree will not change.

If you left things here, this could be a statement of either soft or hard determinism. But things aren't left here. The confession goes on:

And here's the human responsibility and the part that makes it soft determinism/compatibalism. While what human beings do they do because God decreed it, they also do it voluntarily, and decreed effects flow from decreed causes in such a way that if decreed causes were not to occur (but of course, they are certain to occur because they've been decreed by unchangeable decree), the decreed effect would not occur either.