Arminian View Consequentially Different?

[humblethinker]

I am not intending to adamantly make a truth claim, but this represents my understanding of the traditional Arminian view. Please offer your amendments or corrections to the framework below. I have presented my case in two different views, the first in narrative form and the other in a crude attempt at formalized sentential logic.

Narrative:
If God, to some extent has given man a contra-causal ability to act and God has granted man the ability to choose between God given options then man is culpable for the options he contra-causally chooses. If God foreknows with a certainty all future events and nothing can happen contrary to God's foreknowledge then nothing can happen other than that which does happen. Therefore, man is culpable for his evil actions, which, although not caused by God, he can not do other than what he did. This being the case then God knew man would fail, be held culpable and experience an eternal existence suffering. And, if this is so, then why would God start to create a conscious being at all?

Sentential Logic:
Arminian Premises:
A: God, to some extent, has given man a contra-causal ability to act.
B: God granted man the ability to choose between God given options.
C: God foreknows with a certainty all future events.
D: Nothing can happen contrary to God's foreknowledge.

If A & B ---> E: man, to this extent, is culpable.
If C & D ---> F: nothing can happen other than that which does happen
If E & F ---> G: Man is culpable for his evil actions, which, although not caused by God, he can not do other than what he did.
If G ---> H: God knew man would fail, be held culpable and experience an eternal existence of suffering
If H ---> ?

Are any of the premises incorrect, incomplete?
Is there a relevant premise necessarily missing that would make a difference?
Outside the idea of man's contra causal ability, how does this Arminian view differ in effect from the Calvinist view?

 

[Winman]

I am not intending to adamantly make a truth claim, but this represents my understanding of the traditional Arminian view. Please offer your amendments or corrections to the framework below. I have presented my case in two different views, the first in narrative form and the other in a crude attempt at formalized sentential logic.

Narrative:
If God, to some extent has given man a contra-causal ability to act and God has granted man the ability to choose between God given options then man is culpable for the options he contra-causally chooses. If God foreknows with a certainty all future events and nothing can happen contrary to God's foreknowledge then nothing can happen other than that which does happen. Therefore, man is culpable for his evil actions, which, although not caused by God, he can not do other than what he did. This being the case then God knew man would fail, be held culpable and experience an eternal existence suffering. And, if this is so, then why would God start to create a conscious being at all?

Sentential Logic:
Arminian Premises:
A: God, to some extent, has given man a contra-causal ability to act.
B: God granted man the ability to choose between God given options.
C: God foreknows with a certainty all future events.
D: Nothing can happen contrary to God's foreknowledge.

If A & B ---> E: man, to this extent, is culpable.
If C & D ---> F: nothing can happen other than that which does happen
If E & F ---> G: Man is culpable for his evil actions, which, although not caused by God, he can not do other than what he did.
If G ---> H: God knew man would fail, be held culpable and experience an eternal existence of suffering
If H ---> ?

Are any of the premises incorrect, incomplete?
Is there a relevant premise necessarily missing that would make a difference?
Outside the idea of man's contra causal ability, how does this Arminian view differ in effect from the Calvinist view?

I disagree with that part of your statement I have bolded and underlined in red.

If man truly has choice, then it is NEVER determined what he shall do. God can still know what he will do in my opinion.

If a man decides to tell a lie on Monday, then God knew that before tiime. If the man decides to tell the truth on Monday, then God knew that before time.

That this is so is shown in scripture.

1 Cor 2:7 But we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the hidden wisdom, which God ordained before the world unto our glory:
8 Which none of the princes of this world knew: for had they known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory.

God outsmarted Satan. Throughout the OT God foretold of Jesus going to the cross. Through Jesus he destroyed the works of the devil.

The devil is pretty smart, but he does not understand prophecy any better than us. If he would have known God would conquer him through Jesus, he would not have crucified him.

Judas may have known the scriptures, but he did not understand the Messiah would be betrayed for thirty pieces of silver. If he would have known this, he may have decided not to betray Jesus. But he did not know and went ahead with his plan.

God knew Judas would betray Jesus for thirty pieces of silver, and this is why Jesus chose him to be one of the disciples. But Judas chose to betray Jesus of his own free will. If he would have known, he could have done otherwise.

1 Cor 2:8 shows that the rulers of this world who crucified Jesus had choice. They could have chosen not to crucify him. So God did not cause them to crucify Jesus, but God KNEW they would crucify Jesus.

 

[humblethinker]

I disagree with that part of your statement I have bolded and underlined in red.

If man truly has choice, then it is NEVER determined what he shall do.

I agree with your statement but i think you are missing the point. Your point does not address what I'm proposing. It's not the predetermination issue that you and I would differ on. Wouldn't you agree that in either case man could not do other than that which was predetermined or that which was foreknown?

God can still know what he will do in my opinion.

I agree and that would be congruent with the Open Theism view as well. Per OT, God knows what will happen in the future. He knows all possibilities and among those possibilities is the one thing that will be actualized. He anticipates each possibility and already has a response for each possibility. You acknowledge that there are real possibilities that aren't ever actualized, don't you? In your view does God not anticipate possibilities that will not be actualized? If that is the case then could it be said that they were 'real' possibilities? If there are no real possibilities then how could man ever truly exercise a libertarian free will?

I appreciate your response.

 

[Winman]

I agree with your statement but i think you are missing the point. Your point does not address what I'm proposing. It's not the predetermination issue that you and I would differ on. Wouldn't you agree that in either case man could not do other than that which was predetermined or that which was foreknown?

Your statement seems to be a contradiction, but perhaps I do not understand you properly.

It was determined Jesus would die on the cross.

Luke 22:22 And truly the Son of man goeth, as it was determined: but woe unto that man by whom he is betrayed!

God did not cause Judas to betray Jesus, as God never tempts any man to sin. He did not tempt the Jews to kill Jesus for the same reason. But it was determined that Jesus would die on the cross. He had to make this happen.

Mat 26:53 Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father, and he shall presently give me more than twelve legions of angels?

This question demands a "YES" answer. Jesus "could have" called on his Father and been delivered from these soldiers who came to take him.

Mat 26:54 But how then shall the scriptures be fulfilled, that thus it must be?

Here is what was determined. Jesus allowed himself to be taken to fulfill the scripture. He had to make it happen by willingly submitting to his Father's will.

I agree and that would be congruent with the Open Theism view as well. Per OT, God knows what will happen in the future. He knows all possibilities and among those possibilities is the one thing that will be actualized. He anticipates each possibility and already has a response for each possibility. You acknowledge that there are real possibilities that aren't ever actualized, don't you? In your view does God not anticipate possibilities that will not be actualized? If that is the case then could it be said that they were 'real' possibilities? If there are no real possibilities then how could man ever truly exercise a libertarian free will?

I appreciate your response.

Well, I don't like to agree with other folks views unless I fully understand them, it may not accurately represent mine. But I do agree God knows real possibilities. This is shown in scripture.

1 Sam 23:9 And David knew that Saul secretly practised mischief against him; and he said to Abiathar the priest, Bring hither the ephod.
10 Then said David, O LORD God of Israel, thy servant hath certainly heard that Saul seeketh to come to Keilah, to destroy the city for my sake.
11 Will the men of Keilah deliver me up into his hand? will Saul come down, as thy servant hath heard? O LORD God of Israel, I beseech thee, tell thy servant. And the LORD said, He will come down.
12 Then said David, Will the men of Keilah deliver me and my men into the hand of Saul? And the LORD said, They will deliver thee up.
13 Then David and his men, which were about six hundred, arose and departed out of Keilah, and went whithersoever they could go. And it was told Saul that David was escaped from Keilah; and he forbare to go forth.

OK, here David prayed to God and asked whether Saul would come down to Keilah to capture him. God said he would. David also asked if the men of Keilah would turn him over to Saul. God said they would.

But this did not happen did it? No, because David was forewarned, he fled the city and then Saul decided not to come down.

It is all about foreknowledge, God knows what men will do before they do it. If God had not forewarned David and he would have remained in the city, then Saul surely and actually would have come down to Keilah, and the men of Keilah would have surely and actually turned David over to Saul.

In this case, God used foreknowledge to counter the actions of men. In the case of Judas and the Jews, God used his foreknowledge to bring about the crucifixion of Jesus so that he could give his life for us.

Acts 2:22 Ye men of Israel, hear these words; Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God among you by miracles and wonders and signs, which God did by him in the midst of you, as ye yourselves also know:
23 Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain:

God didn't cause Saul to hate David, and he didn't cause Judas to betray Jesus, but he KNEW that they would and acted accordingly to bring about his will.

The actions of men are not determined, but the actions of God are.

I see it sort of like chess. You can see your opponent is trying to take your queen. You could move your queen and escape capture, but you foresee if you allow your opponent to take your queen on your next move you can place your opponent in checkmate. You do not cause your opponent to want to capture your queen in chess, that is natural, but you can use this desire to bring about your own purpose.

This is how I see it.

 

[HeirofSalvation]

I am not intending to adamantly make a truth claim, but this represents my understanding of the traditional Arminian view. Please offer your amendments or corrections to the framework below. I have presented my case in two different views, the first in narrative form and the other in a crude attempt at formalized sentential logic.

Narrative:
If God, to some extent has given man a contra-causal ability to act and God has granted man the ability to choose between God given options then man is culpable for the options he contra-causally chooses. If God foreknows with a certainty all future events and nothing can happen contrary to God's foreknowledge then nothing can happen other than that which does happen. Therefore, man is culpable for his evil actions, which, although not caused by God, he can not do other than what he did. This being the case then God knew man would fail, be held culpable and experience an eternal existence suffering. And, if this is so, then why would God start to create a conscious being at all?

Sentential Logic:
Arminian Premises:
A: God, to some extent, has given man a contra-causal ability to act.
B: God granted man the ability to choose between God given options.
C: God foreknows with a certainty all future events.
D: Nothing can happen contrary to God's foreknowledge.

If A & B ---> E: man, to this extent, is culpable.
If C & D ---> F: nothing can happen other than that which does happen
If E & F ---> G: Man is culpable for his evil actions, which, although not caused by God, he can not do other than what he did.
If G ---> H: God knew man would fail, be held culpable and experience an eternal existence of suffering
If H ---> ?

Are any of the premises incorrect, incomplete?
Is there a relevant premise necessarily missing that would make a difference?
Outside the idea of man's contra causal ability, how does this Arminian view differ in effect from the Calvinist view?

Here is how I look at this:
Your premise D would be better as follows:
"Nothing will happen contrary to God's foreknowlege"
thus your premise from C&D If C & D ---> F: nothing can happen other than that which does happen is not entirely accurate
God's foreknowlege means that a future event is certain but it does not make it necessary thus:

God necessarily knows all future events
thus if John were to choose option 3 Necessarily God would have foreknown it
but if John were to Choose option 2 God necessarily would have foreknown that choice.
God's foreknowlege of the event is contingent upon the free actions of Human beings. But the Certainty of the event does not render it necessary.

In other words: Man could have acted differently than he did, but necessarily God foreknew what choice he would make.

The foreknowlege is contingent upon the Choice: the Choice is not contingent upon the foreknowlege

 

[humblethinker]

Your statement seems to be a contradiction, but perhaps I do not understand you properly.

It was determined Jesus would die on the cross.

Luke 22:22 And truly the Son of man goeth, as it was determined: but woe unto that man by whom he is betrayed!

God did not cause Judas to betray Jesus, as God never tempts any man to sin. He did not tempt the Jews to kill Jesus for the same reason. But it was determined that Jesus would die on the cross. He had to make this happen.

Mat 26:53 Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father, and he shall presently give me more than twelve legions of angels?

This question demands a "YES" answer. Jesus "could have" called on his Father and been delivered from these soldiers who came to take him.

Mat 26:54 But how then shall the scriptures be fulfilled, that thus it must be?

Here is what was determined. Jesus allowed himself to be taken to fulfill the scripture. He had to make it happen by willingly submitting to his Father's will.


Well, I don't like to agree with other folks views unless I fully understand them, it may not accurately represent mine. But I do agree God knows real possibilities. This is shown in scripture.

I agree with you 100%. If we have a relationship I am willing to take more risks for the sake of communicating ideas effectively, even if that means being temporarily being misunderstood. I think we would agree that there is much latitude given (or should be) with the labels that we banter about here on the board. If someone wants to call me an Arminian or an OT then that would be fine with me… to the extent that it is an exhaustively accurate label is another thing.

Regarding 'real possibilities'… I also agree. There is a cognitive dissonance I feel with the idea of a foreknowledge being so exhaustively precise that it is just as descriptive as determinism is prescriptive. If a theology requires that God's foreknowledge is as such, then it cannot follow that there are any real possibilities. I'm not putting forward the idea that there is no foreknowledge other than the foreknowledge that is due to predetermination. I'm putting forward the idea that His foreknowledge includes all possibilities and determinations. I'm putting forward the idea that He intended His foreknowledge not to be as precisely descriptive as predetermination is prescriptive. I'm not sure how one that believes in free will would be able to claim that this is necessarily not the case.

1 Sam 23:9 And David knew that Saul secretly practised mischief against him; and he said to Abiathar the priest, Bring hither the ephod.
10 Then said David, O LORD God of Israel, thy servant hath certainly heard that Saul seeketh to come to Keilah, to destroy the city for my sake.
11 Will the men of Keilah deliver me up into his hand? will Saul come down, as thy servant hath heard? O LORD God of Israel, I beseech thee, tell thy servant. And the LORD said, He will come down.
12 Then said David, Will the men of Keilah deliver me and my men into the hand of Saul? And the LORD said, They will deliver thee up.
13 Then David and his men, which were about six hundred, arose and departed out of Keilah, and went whithersoever they could go. And it was told Saul that David was escaped from Keilah; and he forbare to go forth.

OK, here David prayed to God and asked whether Saul would come down to Keilah to capture him. God said he would. David also asked if the men of Keilah would turn him over to Saul. God said they would.

But this did not happen did it? No, because David was forewarned, he fled the city and then Saul decided not to come down.

It is all about foreknowledge, God knows what men will do before they do it. If God had not forewarned David and he would have remained in the city, then Saul surely and actually would have come down to Keilah, and the men of Keilah would have surely and actually turned David over to Saul.

Good choice of scripture! What a great use of counterfactual reasoning in this story! I suspect that you are thinking that I was saying that God would not have any foreknowledge. He would. David was proposing that, given this scenario and all things being equal, will this happen. (the 'all things being equal' is being assumed by both God and David- meaning that barring any other event that would make the proposed scenario impossible, ie. David dying from heart attack before he is captured, etc.) God knew that given David's proposed scenario, that it was not a possibility that it could not happen.

In this case, God used foreknowledge to counter the actions of men. In the case of Judas and the Jews, God used his foreknowledge to bring about the crucifixion of Jesus so that he could give his life for us.

Another issue that could be entertained here is why would God even need to use foreknowledge to be able to answer David? Regarding Jesus' sacrifice, I believe that this was a predetermined thing. But again, why would God even need to use foreknowledge exclusively to ensure that the sacrifice would occur at this time. We say He used foreknowledge, this is fine but I would say that God's intelligence alone would be able to ensure such even with all of the infinite possibilities. The fact that this event was subject to God's "determinate counsel" obviously requires that the event be foreknown… more so than just a possibility but a 100$ certainty. (This thought seems to me to be a sticking point for understanding Open Theism. The only way that something is foreknown with 100% certainty that the event would take place is if it were predetermined. If there is nothing that is not foreknown with 100% certainty then how could the contra-possibility exist?)

Acts 2:22 Ye men of Israel, hear these words; Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God among you by miracles and wonders and signs, which God did by him in the midst of you, as ye yourselves also know:
23 Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain:

God didn't cause Saul to hate David, and he didn't cause Judas to betray Jesus, but he KNEW that they would and acted accordingly to bring about his will.

I see nothing wrong with what you say here. It could be said that there was a time when God knew, as a possibility, this hatred and anticipated the possibility with options to that hatred, and none of these options would deny God of His predetermined event.

The actions of men are not determined, but the actions of God are.

Generally, I would agree with the first part but would leave room for some determination regarding man's actions. But regarding the second part, I do not think that you are saying that God does not have a free will, correct? I would say that the only actions of God that are inevitable are those that are predetermined and even these are contingent on God changing his mind. What do you think? (That seems coherent, although I'll have to mull on that a bit more…)

I see it sort of like chess. You can see your opponent is trying to take your queen. You could move your queen and escape capture, but you foresee if you allow your opponent to take your queen on your next move you can place your opponent in checkmate. You do not cause your opponent to want to capture your queen in chess, that is natural, but you can use this desire to bring about your own purpose.

Great example… it seems to me that you are an Open Theist. ;-) Seriously though, I think you would appreciate and benefit from listening to the video http://www.baptistboard.com/showthread.php?t=77592 I referred to in the other thread I posted (especially regarding chess!).

This is how I see it.

I don't think we see things much differently. :wavey:

 

[humblethinker]

But the Certainty of the event does not render it necessary.

It seems your are making a distinction without a difference in the statement above. Would you then say that the necessity of an event does not render it necessary? I would propose (and I think this is congruent with some of what you said) that God knows all possibilities. Those events that He foreknows with 100% assurance (certainty) of their occurance are specifically and only the things that he predetermines. If the certainty of an event is not 100% then yes, I agree with your statement above, it is not rendered necessary.

 

[AresMan]

It seems your are making a distinction without a difference in the statement above. Would you then say that the necessity of an event does not render it necessary? I would propose (and I think this is congruent with some of what you said) that God knows all possibilities. Those events that He foreknows with 100% assurance (certainty) of their occurance are specifically and only the things that he predetermines. If the certainty of an event is not 100% then yes, I agree with your statement above, it is not rendered necessary.

If your reasoning is that God "knows all contingent possibilities" of how human agents would act according to their free will, and then "actualizes" certain results according how He desires the results to go according to the "chess board," would you describe your view as somewhat molinistic?

The difference I see in your view between classic Molinism is that classic Molinism has God "actualizing" the existing "universe" from all contingent possibilities from (or in "eternity past" before) the Creation, and you have Him "actualizing" contingencies progressively through time.

Am I assessing your view correctly?

 

[humblethinker]

If your reasoning is that God "knows all contingent possibilities" of how human agents would act according to their free will, and then "actualizes" certain results according how He desires the results to go according to the "chess board," would you describe your view as somewhat molinistic?

The difference I see in your view between classic Molinism is that classic Molinism has God "actualizing" the existing "universe" from all contingent possibilities from (or in "eternity past" before) the Creation, and you have Him "actualizing" contingencies progressively through time.

Am I assessing your view correctly?

Not intending to get into semantics, but why the assumption that He would be the one actualizing? I would say that that is part of what makes man made in His image. That being the case then the answer for which you were inquiring would be progrogressively.

 

[Skandelon]

humblethinker,

I completely get where you are coming from and I agree with many of your logical proofs. HOWEVER, the issue I have with this line of reasoning is that it places God on a linear time line:

<-------------God foreseeing-----------------------Action foreseen------>

But God isn't on the time line. He does immanently step into time (incarnation) to accomplish his redemptive and revelatory purposes, but He exists as spirit, not matter, and thus is not constrained by the time line of this manner of thinking.

Now, can I explain how God does know all things perfectly, NO. His knowledge, like his omnipresence and infinite nature is just beyond us, BUT if I were forced to attempt an explanation using our limited understanding then I would describe God's knowledge of all things as being in the 'eternal now.' He is the great I AM. We speak in past, present and future tenses because we exist in time and contained by that time line. God exists in the eternal NOW and thus to him everything is 'present tense' so to speak (again, this is mysterious but cool to ponder). God outside of time looks more like this:

<-GodGodGodGodGodGodGodGodGodGodGodGod->

Timeline<--------------------known action---------------->

So, I don't think of God looking into the future and seeing what will happen, as a lady with a crystal ball might do. Nor do I believe God's knowledge of events and choices is like our knowledge of past events. For example, how do you know what you friend said to you yesterday? You experienced it and remember it, right? Can you change what happened yesterday? No. It is fixed and unchangeable. I don't think God's knowledge is like that. I believe God's knowledge is more like your knowledge of what your reading RIGHT NOW. How do you know I wrote the words 'right now' in all caps. You know it because you experienced it RIGHT NOW. I believe that better describes God's knowledge of all things. This explanation is not complete, obviously, but it gives an different perspective for infinite limited creatures to attempt to grapple with the knowledge and abilities of an eternal and infinite Being.

I know some will read this and start accusing me of being an Openist or railing on me as not affirming the omniscience of God, but they are acting in ignorance, because that is NOT what I'm doing. I'm proposing a different theory (one which has been taught by scholars much smarter than me) to help one understand a 'broader' view of omniscience in a timeless Being. I can point you to some articles on the subject but I'll warn you they get pretty cerebral and I personally prefer to appeal to mystery in regard to such matters, because let's just be honest, its like a bunch of ants getting together to discuss rocket science when they should be digging tunnels and storing food for the winter.

 

[AresMan]

Not intending to get into semantics, but why the assumption that He would be the one actualizing? I would say that that is part of what makes man made in His image. That being the case then the answer for which you were inquiring would be progrogressively.

I was asking because you were using terms that set off my molinism detector.

Molinism tries to "harmonize" the sovereign election of God with libertarian free will for man by arguing the following:

1. God knows what any free creature will do given any set of conditions.
2. God desires that every human be saved.
3. All the countless contingency paths can be organized in the computer-like mind of God as "possible universes."
4. God chose to "actualize" the "best" universe, which is the one in which the maximum number of people are saved by their free choice.
5. In some "universes" some individuals are saved wherein in others they are not.
6. There are some people who would never be saved in any "universe."

It seems that quite a few today are resurrecting de Molina's Jesuit philosophical conjecturing because it seems appealing. However, the ramifications are rather negative if one thinks about it.
For example, it would appear that salvation with God is a "numbers game," in which God is concerned with numbers, but people who could be saved in an alternate "universe" do not given the chance because the "universe" that God "actualized" does not provide the contingencies necessary for their free choice for salvation.
Another problem is that it violates libertarian free will, although the Molinist would try to argue otherwise. If God knows infallibly what any person would do given the set of circumstances, then the choice is not truly "free," but is dictated by the environment.

 

[AresMan]

humblethinker,

I completely get where you are coming from and I agree with many of your logical proofs. HOWEVER, the issue I have with this line of reasoning is that it places God on a linear time line:

<-------------God foreseeing-----------------------Action foreseen------>

But God isn't on the time line. He does immanently step into time (incarnation) to accomplish his redemptive and revelatory purposes, but He exists as spirit, not matter, and thus is not constrained by the time line of this manner of thinking.

Now, can I explain how God does know all things perfectly, NO. His knowledge, like his omnipresence and infinite nature is just beyond us, BUT if I were forced to attempt an explanation using our limited understanding then I would describe God's knowledge of all things as being in the 'eternal now.' He is the great I AM. We speak in past, present and future tenses because we exist in time and contained by that time line. God exists in the eternal NOW and thus to him everything is 'present tense' so to speak (again, this is mysterious but cool to ponder). God outside of time looks more like this:

<-GodGodGodGodGodGodGodGodGodGodGodGod->

Timeline<--------------------known action---------------->

So, I don't think of God looking into the future and seeing what will happen, as a lady with a crystal ball might do. Nor do I believe God's knowledge of events and choices is like our knowledge of past events. For example, how do you know what you friend said to you yesterday? You experienced it and remember it, right? Can you change what happened yesterday? No. It is fixed and unchangeable. I don't think God's knowledge is like that. I believe God's knowledge is more like your knowledge of what your reading RIGHT NOW. How do you know I wrote the words 'right now' in all caps. You know it because you experienced it RIGHT NOW. I believe that better describes God's knowledge of all things. This explanation is not complete, obviously, but it gives an different perspective for infinite limited creatures to attempt to grapple with the knowledge and abilities of an eternal and infinite Being.

I know some will read this and start accusing me of being an Openist or railing on me as not affirming the omniscience of God, but they are acting in ignorance, because that is NOT what I'm doing. I'm proposing a different theory (one which has been taught by scholars much smarter than me) to help one understand a 'broader' view of omniscience in a timeless Being. I can point you to some articles on the subject but I'll warn you they get pretty cerebral and I personally prefer to appeal to mystery in regard to such matters, because let's just be honest, its like a bunch of ants getting together to discuss rocket science when they should be digging tunnels and storing food for the winter.

:thumbs:

I agree that God is not bound by time, and is in the "eternal now," just as you explained. The open view idea that God cannot know what "free creatures" will do until they do it requires that God in His eternal state is bound by time. The HUGE problem I have with this (besides theological) is in my understanding of the nature of spacetime and Einstein's theories of relativity. I actually had an open theist family member try to argue that time is eternal. I argued that this idea of an eternal progression of time runs afoul of the Kalam argument and goes against the scientifically testable relativity physics, and the observation of the expanding universe argues for a "time zero." Spacetime is just as dependent upon a point of origin and "First Cause" as is energymatter. He then had to concede with the idea that God may have created time and immediately subjected Himself to it because of His (alleged) desire to "relate" to His creation (as the sine qua non of open theism requires).
Open theists try to distance themselves from the implications of process theology that God didn't really create the universe, as both God and the universe are eternal and constantly "change" through the "power of persuasion." However, their solutions to the problem of process theology as they try to hold to the orthodox idea that God created the universe required them to have to fabricate tremendous metaphysical constructs (such as God creating time and then binding His eternal state to it) that have no evidence from Scripture.

 

[Skandelon]

the ramifications are rather negative if one thinks about it.

I'm not a Molinist, so don't take this as a defense of that view, BUT I'm not sure how you think Calvinism wouldn't afford these same negatives...

salvation with God is a "numbers game," in which God is concerned with numbers, but people who could be saved in an alternate "universe" do not given the chance because the "universe" that God "actualized" does not provide the contingencies necessary for their free choice for salvation.

Same would be true of the universe actualized by the Calvinistic worldview, right? The non-elect in the Calvinistic universe are ' not given the chance because the "universe" that God "actualized" does not provide the contingencies necessary for their free choice for salvation.' So, how is that a negative for monist when its a view you accept?

Another problem is that it violates libertarian free will, although the Molinist would try to argue otherwise. If God knows infallibly what any person would do given the set of circumstances, then the choice is not truly "free," but is dictated by the environment.

Again, this seems to prove that the Calvinistic worldview doesn't allow for free choice though many compatibilistic Calvinists attempt to make that claim. I'm not sure if you are a compatibilist or a 'pure determinist', but if the former then this too is a negative of your own system, if the latter you have a whole other list of issues.

 

[AresMan]

I'm not a Molinist, so don't take this as a defense of that view, BUT I'm not sure how you think Calvinism wouldn't afford these same negatives...

The implications of Molinism are negative to the Molinist's own reasons for embracing Molinism itself. They are also negative to me, anyway, because they turn salvation into an impersonal game of numbers, with arguably "free agents" as fodder, rather than an individually personal relationship with a mysterious purpose of God in election.

Same would be true of the universe actualized by the Calvinistic worldview, right? The non-elect in the Calvinistic universe are ' not given the chance because the "universe" that God "actualized" does not provide the contingencies necessary for their free choice for salvation.' So, how is that a negative for monist when its a view you accept?

The Calvinist view has the non-elect willfully rejecting the gospel and deserving condemnation because they hate God (for Who He really is) by nature, rather than they were (allegedly) free in the libertarian sense, but got the short end of the stick in God's "numbers game."

Again, this seems to prove that the Calvinistic worldview doesn't allow for free choice though many compatibilistic Calvinists attempt to make that claim. I'm not sure if you are a compatibilist or a 'pure determinist', but if the former then this too is a negative of your own system, if the latter you have a whole other list of issues.

I consider myself a compatibilist. Again, the "Calvinist" compatibilist position argues for divine purpose in the evil that actually occurs and that those who do not get saved (like everyone) have no excuse and have already broken God's law and are condemned justly. The Molinist position backfires on its attempt to give man libertarian free will, yet shortchanges some on this basis because God doesn't give "morally neutral" people who actually have the capacity within themselves to repent in an alternate "universe" what they would need to do so.

 

[humblethinker]

humblethinker,

I completely get where you are coming from and I agree with many of your logical proofs. HOWEVER, the issue I have with this line of reasoning is that it places God on a linear time line:

<-------------God foreseeing-----------------------Action foreseen------>

But God isn't on the time line. He does immanently step into time (incarnation) to accomplish his redemptive and revelatory purposes, but He exists as spirit, not matter, and thus is not constrained by the time line of this manner of thinking.

Now, can I explain how God does know all things perfectly, NO. His knowledge, like his omnipresence and infinite nature is just beyond us, BUT if I were forced to attempt an explanation using our limited understanding then I would describe God's knowledge of all things as being in the 'eternal now.' He is the great I AM. We speak in past, present and future tenses because we exist in time and contained by that time line. God exists in the eternal NOW and thus to him everything is 'present tense' so to speak (again, this is mysterious but cool to ponder). God outside of time looks more like this:

<-GodGodGodGodGodGodGodGodGodGodGodGod->

Timeline<--------------------known action---------------->

So, I don't think of God looking into the future and seeing what will happen, as a lady with a crystal ball might do. Nor do I believe God's knowledge of events and choices is like our knowledge of past events. For example, how do you know what you friend said to you yesterday? You experienced it and remember it, right? Can you change what happened yesterday? No. It is fixed and unchangeable. I don't think God's knowledge is like that. I believe God's knowledge is more like your knowledge of what your reading RIGHT NOW. How do you know I wrote the words 'right now' in all caps. You know it because you experienced it RIGHT NOW. I believe that better describes God's knowledge of all things. This explanation is not complete, obviously, but it gives an different perspective for infinite limited creatures to attempt to grapple with the knowledge and abilities of an eternal and infinite Being.

I know some will read this and start accusing me of being an Openist or railing on me as not affirming the omniscience of God, but they are acting in ignorance, because that is NOT what I'm doing. I'm proposing a different theory (one which has been taught by scholars much smarter than me) to help one understand a 'broader' view of omniscience in a timeless Being. I can point you to some articles on the subject but I'll warn you they get pretty cerebral and I personally prefer to appeal to mystery in regard to such matters, because let's just be honest, its like a bunch of ants getting together to discuss rocket science when they should be digging tunnels and storing food for the winter.

While He may be a timeless Being, is He not a sequential Being? Would you say that God experiences sequence? The time we experience would only be a construct within the sequence of events that God has. So, God's sense of 'time' (I wouldn't consider it that but for lack of better words...) would have nothing to do with a measured standard outside of himself as we have but rather His standard of reference would be the experience of events in sequence. The idea of sequence is outside of the time and space such that if we did not have time nor space there would still be sequence.

So, in this sense, there would be a before and after. If God, outside of the our time construct, can experience sequence then what of the 'eternal now'? Are sequential experiences explained in the 'eternal now' theory? I think you believe that God change His mind. How would He do that in the 'eternal now'?

Being that He is a Trinity the idea of 'otherness' is is inherent, He is therefore a relational God, each Person in relation to the Other, not to mention His/Their relationship with us. How do you experience relationship in the idea of an 'eternal now'? Relationships at their core experience give and take events between 'others' and these events are sequential in their essence. He lovingly interacts with us and we experience in a give and receive relationship with Him. How does the eternal now idea account for that? I'm not saying it doesn't, I'm just not sure how it would.

 

[AresMan]

While He may be a timeless Being, is He not a sequential Being? Would you say that God experiences sequence? The time we experience would only be a construct within the sequence of events that God has. So, God's sense of 'time' (I wouldn't consider it that but for lack of better words...) would have nothing to do with a measured standard outside of himself as we have but rather His standard of reference would be the experience of events in sequence. The idea of sequence is outside of the time and space such that if we did not have time nor space there would still be sequence.

So, in this sense, there would be a before and after. If God, outside of the our time construct, can experience sequence then what of the 'eternal now'? Are sequential experiences explained in the 'eternal now' theory? I think you believe that God change His mind. How would He do that in the 'eternal now'?

Being that He is a Trinity the idea of 'otherness' is is inherent, He is therefore a relational God, each Person in relation to the Other, not to mention His/Their relationship with us. How do you experience relationship in the idea of an 'eternal now'? Relationships at their core experience give and take events between 'others' and these events are sequential in their essence. He lovingly interacts with us and we experience in a give and receive relationship with Him. How does the eternal now idea account for that? I'm not saying it doesn't, I'm just not sure how it would.

I would say there is a logical sequence rather than a chronological sequence. For instance, with the ordo saludis, God has decrees that logically follow other decrees. However, I would not propose that God "spent time" conjuring these decrees or that there was "time" where God "thought" one of the decrees after the other. God is a logical God, but He is not bound to a chronological sequence such as that which spacetime actuates. According to Genesis 1:1, God created everything "in the beginning." There cannot be "time" "before" the Creation. To believe that God is now subject to the very time He created would seem to me like God "ballooning" part of His essence into His creation. Why not just go "whole hog" and embrace process theology?
Also, since space and time are related, for God to be bound by time, I would argue that He would also have to be bound by space as well, since the relativity of the two are distributively congruent. Therefore, the size of God would be the size of the universe itself, and the space of the universe must be finite because it was created at "time zero" and expands (another manifestation of the Kalam argument).

 

[Skandelon]

Humblethinker,

The short answer is I have absolutely no idea. Like I said, this is a mystery to finite being and I'm not sure our minds can even begin to grasp timelessness. I'm not sure we were created with the ability to fully comprehend that dimension...at least I wasn't with my limited intellect.

Regarding sequences, I suppose there is a WAY in which God progresses through time, but how do we explain it in our terms? I don't know. There is a way to speak of God within time as He is an imminent God who does interact with us in time, but there is also a way to speak of him in transcendent terms as one completely OTHER. In one sense we can speak of him as 'changing his mind' and 'weeping with us' etc, and in another sense we can speak of his eternal qualities (omni-). Those two may seem to clash at points in our finite logic, just as the concept of 3 in 1 (trinity) clashes with our logic. But, isn't that where faith really takes root? I mean, if God were completely explainable would faith really be necessary?

BTW, I don't have a problem speaking of God in sequence or even within time. I only have problems with drawing hard and fast conclusions based on such limited finite logic. For example, 'if God knew it before creating it then He must have determined it to be.' Or, 'if God knew it before then it can not be otherwise.' That may seem logical to us on some level, but scripture no where indicates that God's prior knowledge of an act is equal to God's determining of that act.

 

[humblethinker]

I would say there is a logical sequence rather than a chronological sequence. For instance, with the ordo saludis, God has decrees that logically follow other decrees. However, I would not propose that God "spent time" conjuring these decrees or that there was "time" where God "thought" one of the decrees after the other. God is a logical God, but He is not bound to a chronological sequence such as that which spacetime actuates. According to Genesis 1:1, God created everything "in the beginning." There cannot be "time" "before" the Creation. To believe that God is now subject to the very time He created would seem to me like God "ballooning" part of His essence into His creation. Why not just go "whole hog" and embrace process theology?
Also, since space and time are related, for God to be bound by time, I would argue that He would also have to be bound by space as well, since the relativity of the two are distributively congruent. Therefore, the size of God would be the size of the universe itself, and the space of the universe must be finite because it was created at "time zero" and expands (another manifestation of the Kalam argument).

I would say that before 'the beginning' (before time) God experienced sequence. So time, at least in this particular discussion, would not be a consideration.

If there were not a Trinity I could accept the case that there would be no sequence but since otherness is inherent in the Trinity, then there is a relationship (which is different than logical sequence) and therefore a sequence having nothing to do with time or space.

 

[Forest]

I am not intending to adamantly make a truth claim, but this represents my understanding of the traditional Arminian view. Please offer your amendments or corrections to the framework below. I have presented my case in two different views, the first in narrative form and the other in a crude attempt at formalized sentential logic.

Narrative:
If God, to some extent has given man a contra-causal ability to act and God has granted man the ability to choose between God given options then man is culpable for the options he contra-causally chooses. If God foreknows with a certainty all future events and nothing can happen contrary to God's foreknowledge then nothing can happen other than that which does happen. Therefore, man is culpable for his evil actions, which, although not caused by God, he can not do other than what he did. This being the case then God knew man would fail, be held culpable and experience an eternal existence suffering. And, if this is so, then why would God start to create a conscious being at all?

Sentential Logic:
Arminian Premises:
A: God, to some extent, has given man a contra-causal ability to act.
B: God granted man the ability to choose between God given options.
C: God foreknows with a certainty all future events.
D: Nothing can happen contrary to God's foreknowledge.

If A & B ---> E: man, to this extent, is culpable.
If C & D ---> F: nothing can happen other than that which does happen
If E & F ---> G: Man is culpable for his evil actions, which, although not caused by God, he can not do other than what he did.
If G ---> H: God knew man would fail, be held culpable and experience an eternal existence of suffering
If H ---> ?

Are any of the premises incorrect, incomplete?
Is there a relevant premise necessarily missing that would make a difference?
Outside the idea of man's contra causal ability, how does this Arminian view differ in effect from the Calvinist view?

You are advocating absolutly all things predestined and that is a false doctrine. God does have foreknowledge of every dission we make but you can't hold to the fact that man could not have made a different dission, it's just that God knows beforehand which dission he will make.

 

[Earth Wind and Fire]

You are advocating absolutely all things predestined and that is a false doctrine. God does have foreknowledge of every decisions we make but you can't hold to the fact that man could not have made a different decision, it's just that God knows beforehand which decision he will make.

Yes thats correct.....thats "Absolute ism" & extremely false. Are they suggesting that ALL Calvinists & orthodox theology believers participate in that? Thats False Perceptions rather than TRUTH.