Galatian, since you missed the first time...
"12 of the 20 schools training soldiers in skills such as field artillery, infantry, and aviation have received the lowest readiness rating. They also disclose that over half of the Army's combat and support training centers are rated at the lowest readiness grade." ( Rowan Scarborough, "Army Training Centers Get Failing Grades," The Washington Times, August 29, 2000, p. A1.)
According to some of the military's highest-ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy (Peter Grier, "Ryan's Concerns About USAF Posture," Air Force Magazine, December 1999, p. 14, and "Representative Floyd Spence (R-SC) Holds Hearing on Readiness and Unfunded Requirements," House Armed Services Committee, FDCH Transcripts, Federal Document Clearing House, Inc., October 21, 1999.)
as of November 1999, two of the Army's 10 active divisions were rated at the lowest readiness level, and none were rated at the highest (Bradley Graham "Two Army Divisions Unfit for Major War: Both Flunk Ratings of Preparedness," The Washington Post, November 10, 1999, p. A1.)
Every division required additional manpower, equipment, or training before it would be prepared for combat, due largely to the units' commitments to operations in the Balkans. (Bradley Graham "Two Army Divisions Unfit for Major War: Both Flunk Ratings of Preparedness," The Washington Post, November 10, 1999, p. A1.)
23 percent of the Army's Chinook cargo helicopters, 19 percent of its Blackhawk helicopters, and 16 percent of its Apaches are not "mission-capable." (U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Readiness: Readiness Reports Do Not Provide a Clear Assessment of Army Equipment, GAO/NSIAD-99-119, June 1999, p. 12.)
Since the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. military has been deployed on over 50 peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. Yet the resources available to fund these missions have steadily decreased: The number of total active personnel has decreased nearly 30 percent, and funding for the armed services has decreased 16 percent. The strain on the armed forces shows clearly now as the reduced forces deploy for too long with insufficient and antiquated equipment. The result is indisputable: Readiness is in decline (U.S. General Accounting Office, Contingency Operations: Providing Critical Capabilities Poses Challenges, GAO/NSIAD-00-164, July 2000, p. 3.)
Consider the following table (I'm not sure if this will show up but here goes):
Here we see clearly that the military was decimated under the Clinton/Gore/Clinton regime.
Jack Spencer breaks it down, thusly:
In 1992, the U.S. Air Force consisted of 57 tactical squadrons and 270 bombers. Today the Air Force has 52 squadrons and 178 bombers. The total number of active personnel has decreased by nearly 30 percent. In the Navy, the total number of ships has decreased significantly as well. In 1992, there were around 393 ships in the fleet, while today there are only 316, a decrease of 20 percent. The number of Navy personnel has fallen by over 30 percent.
In 1992, the Marine Corps consisted of three divisions. The Corps still has three divisions, but since 1992, it has lost 22,000 active duty personnel, or 11 percent of its total. The Clinton Administration also cut the Marine Corps to 39,000 reserve personnel from 42,300 in 1992.
(Spencer, J The Facts About Military Readiness Heritage Foundation, 2000) (sorry, my APA is a little rusty).
Spencer, in the above paper, goes on to explain:
For each serviceman who participates in a military operation, two others are involved in the mission: one who is preparing to take the participant's place, and another who is recovering from having participated and retraining. Therefore, if 10,000 troops are on peace operations in the Balkans, 30,000 troops are actually being taken away from preparing for combat. Ten thousand are actively participating, while 10,000 are recovering, and 10,000 are preparing to go. Coupled with declining personnel, increased tempo has a devastating effect on readiness. Morale problems stemming from prolonged deployments, equipment that wears out too quickly, and decreased combat training levels heighten when troops are committed to non-combat operations.
the military's budget has continuously decreased over the past eight years; and, thus, the services are being forced to choose between funding quality of life improvements, procurement, training, and other essential spending. Consequently, none is adequately funded. For example, the Army is short by thousands of night vision goggles, binoculars, global positioning systems and hundreds of generator sets, battery chargers, and chemical agent monitors. According to the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, these shortages are due to "recent increases in requirements," "slowed procurement funding," and "use of operations and maintenance funds for higher priorities." (U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Readiness: Readiness Reports Do Not Provide a Clear Assessment of Army Equipment, p. 60.)
The pace of deployments has increased 16-fold since the end of the Cold War. 17 According to Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA), the Clinton Administration has deployed U.S. forces 34 times in less than eight years. During the entire 40-year period of the Cold War, the military was committed to comparable deployments just 10 times.(House Republican News Conference on Defense Appropriations Bill, Washington, D.C., October 25, 1999.)
Between 1991 and 1999, according to a GAO study, the percentage of mission-capable Air Force fighter aircraft has decreased from 85 percent to 75 percent ( U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Operations: Impact of Operations Other Than War on the Services Varies, p. 13.)
Consider the words of Jacques Gansler, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology: "We now have an average age of our fighters in the Air Force of about 20 years. These were designed for a 15-year life." ("U.S. Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA) Holds Hearing on Defense-Wide R & D Programs," Military Research and Development Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., March 1, 2000.)
The Navy's equipment has begun to age rapidly as well. Amphibious ships, for example, are on average over 27 years old, while the service life of these ships is only 30-35 years. 37 Currently, the shipbuilding accounts are inadequate to maintain current force structure. The Navy is being forced to cut its ship building accounts from 8.7 per year--the number needed to maintain a 300-ship Navy--to 6.5 per year. 38 (Prepared Statement of The Honorable H. Lee Buchanan III, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development and Acquisition and Vice Admiral James F. Amerault, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Logistics, before the House Armed Services Committee, Military Procurement Subcommittee, February 24, 1999.) and (Robert Holzer, "U.S. Navy Budget Takes a Hard Hit," Defense News, July 30, 2000, p. 1.)
In April, 2000, 40 percent of the Army's helicopters were assessed as being either unable or at high risk of being unable to perform their mission. (Ron Laurenzo, "Army Wants Leaner, Faster Helicopter Force," Defense Week, April 10, 2000.)
On August 4, 2000, Kenneth Bacon, the DOD Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, told reporters that spare parts are so scarce that the Air Force is made to "cannibalize" perfectly good aircraft for spare parts. (Kenneth Bacon, Defense Department Regular Briefing, August 4, 2000, The Pentagon.)
The impact this has on America's readiness to fight wars is immense. For example, by day 60 of a two-war scenario, 44 percent of the Army's Apache helicopters and 52 percent of its Kiowa helicopters will not be available due to shortages in spare parts. (U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Readiness: Readiness Reports Do Not Provide a Clear Assessment of Army Equipment, p. 20.)
Due to inadequate training, only three of the Army's 15 reserve brigades can report that their platoons meet the requirements for tasks such as attacking enemy positions or defending against attacks. And only 42 percent of the Army's 24 reserve mechanized battalions met training standards for firing at stationary and moving targets (U.S. General Accounting Office, Enhanced Brigade Readiness Improved but Personnel and Workloads are Problems, GAO/NSIAD-00-114, June 2000, p. 5.)
There is plenty more, including quality of life, staffing and retention issues, but you get the idea. Clearly, if we have a strong military, it's in spite of Clinton, not because of him.
Note that, with the exception of Jack Spencer, these stats all come from Clinton admin era agencies and those appointed by Clinton or serving under him.
This is hardly "Republican propaganda".