dwmoeller1
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Let me ask again. Was there anything preventing God from not saving you?
If we presume that what God chose is the best, then yes.
Could he have chosen otherwise
No.
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Let me ask again. Was there anything preventing God from not saving you?
Could he have chosen otherwise
dwmoeller1 said:If we presume that what God chose is the best, then yes.
I understand that. It just seemed DW was arguing the same point that Feiberg was making and I wanted to post it for clarity of the issue.Brandon C. Jones said:I wouldn't mistake Feinberg to represent all Calvinists on free will past or present. He presents an argument that coheres with calvinistic soteriology and to critique it is fine, but I would recommend limiting your conclusions to Feinberg and those who advocate his position instead of all "calvinists."
Historically, those in the Reformed tradition discussed these matters under God's providence, and it's difficult to view their thoughts on freedom without using our anachronistic lens of analytic philosophical accounts of freedom (i.e., libertarian vs. compatibilism), which those in the past did not use.
Furthermore, today, there are many Calvinists who hold to libertarian free will regarding the vast majority of decisions (if not all) and would not want Feinberg to speak for them. Perhaps you can say they are inconsistent, but when you critique Feinberg you are not critiquing their view.
Thanks for the info...This subject has come up recently at a site that is frequented by quite a few analytic philosophers, and for some good discussion on calvinism and philosophy (with a little emphasis on the freedom issue) click here and scroll down a little. You'll see some contributions by Keith DeRose, James K. A. Smith and in the comments George Hunsinger and Dean Zimmerman. BTW "saints Al and Nick" are Alvin Plantinga and Nick Wolterstorff respectively if you do visit there and see some of the inside baseball lingo.
BJ
I know you are not trying to get into an argument, but forgive me if I feel the need for rebuttal...I don't like hit and runs...:wavey:PS-The blurring of environment and agent is a double-edged sword that can be wielded against the libertarian too. For instance, did Paul freely accept Christ after the stunning display on the road to Damascus? If one relies on contra-causal agency, it's plausibility is hindered by miraculous events like the one in Acts 9. (I'm not picking an argument but just giving one example since I've been over this before. I would recommend getting to know "heavenly pilgrim" in the "other denominations forum" since he/she is an avid defender of libertarian freedom).
Brandon C. Jones said:Please allow the "hit and run."
However, you should watch yourself because you're making quite the case for divine providence, which in the past was the mother of the determinism that you seek to avoid. If you allow God to break libertarian freedom on these special occasions in order to meet his "ultimate purposes" in miraculous events that are (like Paul's conversion) and are not empirically detectable (like the inspiration of Scripture), then regarding the latter you've got no epistemological foundation to think that other events where people act on their desires in accord with "decrees" may also not be determined for "ultimate purposes."
The only difference between the compatabilistic blurring of the environment and agent in Feinberg's arguments above and your own arguments over the inspiration of Scripture and other miraculous events is your limiting of it to special occasions. Unfortunately, this begs the question: how do you know God doesn't need to determine ALL events for His "ultimate purposes" when you've conceded that He needs to determine some? My guess is you don't, but you intuitively feel it to be the case. Scripture is unclear on this debate, so we'll just have to limp along with our buckets at the dam.
Let me hit and run and have fun checking out the other site. One thing I like about Christian philosophers is their sense of humour.
Skandelon said:Was it "best" because he chose it or did He choose it because it was best? See the problem with that answer?
So, God was not free (in the contra casual since of the word) to not save you, right?
What do you suppose prevented God from passing you over? Can it be anything outside of God's control? Surely it cannot. Thus you must be saying that God had no control over whatever it was that prevented his choice to not save you. You can't use the analogy of "God cannot lie" because lying would be contradictory to His nature...I don't see how choosing to pass you over would be contradictory to His nature unless you believe that it would be "wrong" or "sinful" to pass you by...which begs the question as to what makes saving you right and passing you by wrong? Doesn't God Himself define what is right and what is wrong...i.e. what is best and what is less than the best? What determined God's choice to make a world in which you are saved to be "best?"
Brandon C. Jones said:I checked the link and it works for me. However, you can type it the old-fashioned way.
www.generousorthodoxy.net/thinktank
This is a critical point, because it undercuts the plausibility of the compatibilist's argument that desire can be considered the basis for human freedom. When the compatibilist defines freedom in terms of desire (i.e., doing what one wants to do), this formulation initially appears plausible only because it tends to (subtly) evoke a sense of independence or ownership on the part of the human agent for his choices. That is, even though the compatibilist insists that God decisively conditions an agent's environment so as to guarantee the outcome of the agent's choices, we can nonetheless envision God's action in doing so as being compatible with human freedom so long as the human agent in question has the opportunity to interact with his conditioned environment as an independent agent, possessing his own desires and thus owning his choices in relation to that environment. But once we recognize (as we must within the larger deterministic framework encompassing compatibilism) that those very desires of the agent are equally part of the environment that God causally determines, then the line between environment and agent becomes blurred if not completely lost. The human agent no longer can be seen as owning his own choices, for the desires determining those choices are in no significant sense independent of God's decree. For this reason, human desire within the compatibilist framework forms an insufficient basis on which to establish the integrity of human freedom (and from this the legitimacy of human culpability for sin).
Brandon C. Jones said:Please allow the "hit and run."
However, you should watch yourself because you're making quite the case for divine providence, which in the past was the mother of the determinism that you seek to avoid. If you allow God to break libertarian freedom on these special occasions in order to meet his "ultimate purposes" in miraculous events that are (like Paul's conversion) and are not empirically detectable (like the inspiration of Scripture), then regarding the latter you've got no epistemological foundation to think that other events where people act on their desires in accord with "decrees" may also not be determined for "ultimate purposes."
Let me hit and run and have fun checking out the other site. One thing I like about Christian philosophers is their sense of humour.
dwmoeller1 said:If 'best' is defined as 'that which brings Him the most glory', then He chose it because it was best.
No i dont see the problem with the answer...although i am sure you will let me know![]()
So, if we presume that this reality is the 'best' (ie. it is best fit to bring Him the most glory), then there is no real possibility that God could have not saved me. This is not because something constrains Him but because He constrains Himself - He has a purpose and my being saved best fits His purpose - my not being saved would be contrary to His purpose. So, it is not something outside of God which constrains Him, but it is His determined purpose which 'constrains' Him.
In a system where all acts are determined there is no reason to even mention "special" divine intervention. EVERYTHING is divine intervention in a system where everything is determined, thus why would scripture even highlight its uniquness? Where is the basis of scriptures authority?
...and thus leaves no room for the miraculous times in which God chooses to step out of the transcendant and into the temporal world to bring about his purpose.
...my contention is that if you can accept that mystery in regard to the free agency of God could we also accept it for those He created in his image, who also have free agency?
Brandon C. Jones said:ugggh, alright my last point. Your post presumes a mechanistic view of the world where God's "tinkering" is disruptive and usually empirically detectable. I mentioned the lack of an epistemological foundation because since you believe in the divine inspiration of Scripture that I presume is organic as opposed to dictated, you don't know whether God works likewise in other matters. How could you know? You also don't know for sure if God really does need to decree every choice in order to fulfill His ultimate plans. How could you know? That's the lack of an epistemological foundation that I am talking about. I don't have one either; we're both dealing with cloudy Scripture and going on hunches here.
I think the Scriptures reveal a God whose interaction with His creation is far more sophisticated than resorting to the "miraculous" every now and then to reach His goals. You may think that there's nothing miraculous without your framework and I disagree. God can include unique and miraculous things as part of his providential dealings with His creation. The determinist would simply speak of ordained means and ends including ordained, miraculous, unique means as wells as ordinary ones without relegating God's activity to only one or the other.
This mindset reminds me of Gordon Fee's big book on the Holy Spirit. He seems to think that the Church put the Spirit "in the creedal box" because it downplayed the empirically detectable charismata through the years. However, the tradition (especially the Christian platonists) appealed to the Spirit's working in the miraculous and the ordinary, especially in the Reformed tradition. People like Fee (not lumping you with him, but he's an example to use) with their empiricist bent perhaps are guilty of putting God in the "methodological naturalism box." Unless I think it's miraculous, then it's not fully divine. If God works through ordinary means, then nothing or everything is miraculous and/or divine.
I will say that you have a friend in Friedrich Schleiermacher because he denied the existence of miracles since they were already part of God's plan, so at least someone agrees with your mindset on this matter. I think he just had a bad definition of what constitutes a miracle.
Okay, surely I've written enough to avoid the hit and run charge, but this topic bores me so my hearts not in this stuff.
BJ
donnA said:could it be that you want to be in control, where only God is in control? could it be that when scripture speaks you don't believe it? the bible says you do not seek God, but you think thats wrong, that you do seek God. have you ever seen a dead man make choices? i haven't. your theory serves you, not God, you make your own choices, based on what you want and what you want to achieve in life. thats a 'you' religion.
Skandelon said:The rebuttal is the same...what determines that which brings God the most Glory? Does God determine that? If so, and I assume you would agree that He is the determiner of such things, then he had to choose that saving you would bring him more glory...
Do you see what I'm saying? Just like the question as to what is "best" we must also ask what determines what brings God the most glory...the only one who could have determined that is God and that requires a determination...a CHOICE. So you are still left with the question. What determined that CHOICE? Regardless of where you go with this you end up with a infinite regress of choices and thus a mystery to finite men. We just can't comprehend it.
I believe since scipture teaches that God is not a tempter of men and that he will never allow us to be tempted beyond what we can resist, that we MUST believe that there is nothing preventing us as believers from choosing other than what we end up choosing. If I lie then I must believe that I could have not lied given those same circumstances and accept the mystery that accompanies that choice...that is where I have landed anyway...
You are only deferring the problem another step back DW. Now you have to ask what determines his purpose?